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Abstract
Estimating The Continuous Risk Of Accidents Occurring
In The South African Mining Industry
A. van den Honert
Department of Industrial Engineering,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MEng (Industrial)
December 2014
Statistics from mining accidents expose that the potential for injury or
death to employees from occupational accidents is relatively high. This study
attempts to contribute to the on-going efforts to improve occupational safety
in the mining industry by creating a model capable of predicting the contin-
uous risk of occupational accidents occurring. Model inputs include the time
of day, time into shift, temperatures, humidity, rainfall and production rate.
The approach includes using an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to identify
patterns between the input attributes and to predict the continuous risk of
accidents occurring. As a predecessor to the development of the model, a
comprehensive literature study was conducted. The objectives of the study
were to understand occupational safety, explore various forecasting techniques
and identify contributing factors that influence the occurrence of accidents and
in so doing recognise any gaps in the current knowledge. Another objective
was to quantify the contributing factors identified, as well as detect the sen-
sitivity amongst these factors and in so doing deliver a groundwork for the
present model.
After the literature was studied, the model design and construction was
performed as well as the model training and validation. The training and
validation took the form of a case study with data from a platinum mine
near Rustenburg in South Africa. The data was split into three sections,
namely, underground, engineering and other. Then the model was trained and
validated separately for the three sections on a yearly basis. This resulted
in meaningful correlation between the predicted continuous risk and actual
accidents as well as the majority of the actual accidents only occurring while
the continuous risk was estimated to be above 80%. However, the underground
ii
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section has so many accidents, that the risk is permanently very high. Yet, the
engineering and other sections produced results useful for managerial decisions.
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Uittreksel
Beraming van die Deurlopende Risiko van Ongelukke In
Die Suid-Afrikaanse Mynbedryf
(“Estimating The Continuous Risk Of Accidents Occurring In The South African
Mining Industry”)
A. van den Honert
Departement Bedryfs Ingenieurswese,
Universiteit van Stellenbosch,
Privaatsak X1, Matieland 7602, Suid Afrika.
Tesis: MIng (Bedryfs)
Desember 2014
Mynbou ongeluk statistieke dui aan dat die potensiaal vir besering of dood
as gevolg van beroepsongelukke relatief hoog is. Die studie poog om by te dra
tot die voortdurende verbetering van beroepsveiligheid in die mynbedryf deur
middel van ’n model wat die risiko van beroepsongelukke voorspel. Die model
vereis die tyd, tyd verstreke in die skof, temperatuur, humiditeit, reënval en
produksie tydens die ongeluk as inset. Die benadering tot hierdie model maak
gebruik van ’n Kunsmatige Neurale Netwerk (KNN) om patrone tussen die
insette te erken en om die risiko van ’n voorval te beraam. As ’n voorloper
tot die model ontwikkeling, is ’n omvattende literatuurstudie onderneem. Die
doelwitte van die literatuur studie was om beroepsveiligheid beter te verstaan,
verskeie voorspellings tegnieke te ondersoek en kennis van bydraende faktore
wat lei tot voorvalle te ondersoek. Nog ’n doelwit sluit die kwantifisering in van
geidentifiseerde bydraende faktore, asook die opsporing van die sensitiwiteit
tussen hierdie faktore en hierdeur ’n fondasie vir die voorgestelde model te
skep.
Na afloop van die literatuurstudie is die model ontwikkel, opgelei en ge-
valideer. Die opleiding en validasie is deur middel van ’n gevallestudie in ’n
platinummyn naby Rustenburg in Suid Afrika gedoen. Die data is verdeel in
drie afdelings, d.i. ondergronds, ingenieurswese en ander. Die model is vir
elke afdeling apart opgelei en gevalideer op ’n jaarlikse basis. Hierdie het ge-
lei tot ’n betekenisvolle korrelasie tussen die voorspelde risiko en die werklike
ongelukke met die meerderheid van die werklike ongevalle wat voorgekom het
terwyl die risiko 80% oorskry het. In die ondergrondse afdeling is so baie voor-
iv
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valle waarneem dat die risiko permanent hoog is. Die ander afdelings het wel
resultate verskaf wat sinvol gebruik kan word in bestuursbesluite.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This chapter serves the purpose of an introduction to the research undertaken,
covering the fundamentals of this entire study. In addition, this chapter de-
liberates the background of the study along with where this research fits into
the existing body of knowledge, as well as the significance of the research
performed. This is followed with the problem statement which is explored
throughout the thesis. Next, the delimitations of the research are discussed
along with the objectives of the research in order to give boundaries in which
the study will be conducted. After which the research design and methodol-
ogy is discussed to designate the method used going about evaluating the null
hypothesis. Lastly, this chapter is concluded with the outline to be followed
during the course of the rest of the thesis.
1.2 Background of Study
“Safety is a cheap and effective insurance policy” – Author
unknown
According to the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) of South
Africa as stated by the South African Department of Labour (2004), “every
employer shall provide and maintain, as far as is reasonably practicable, a
working environment that is safe and without risk to the health of his employ-
ees.” Since the OHSA is a legal requirement for all and sundry in South Africa,
this brands the theme of safety more dominant in all forms of industry. Thus,
in any organisation no matter what their core method of income generation
is, a primary concern of theirs is the safety of their employees. Groves et al.
(2007) discover that this is even more evident in the industries with higher
risks towards employee safety such as mining, as there are many more risks
at play and an injury can be very costly towards the organisation. However,
Lapere (2013) discusses with regards to mining, that the OHSA is not appli-
cable to any matter in respect of which any provision of the Mine Health and
1
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Safety Act (MHSA) is applicable. Nonetheless, the MHSA still insists that
employers do everything possible to provide conditions for safe operation and
a healthy working environment as well as ensure that employees can perform
their work without endangering the health and safety of themselves or of any
other person as stated by the South African Department of Mineral Resources
(1996). A mine can be defined as an excavation in the earth from which ore,
minerals and industrial commodities can be extracted, and this includes large
and small scale operations.
The South African mining industry realised 123 fatalities in 2011 and 112
fatalities in 2012 across all the mines in the country. Furthermore, South
Africa realised 3299 injuries in 2011 and 3377 injuries in 2012 across all the
mines in the country as published by South African Department of Mineral
Resources (2013g) in their Annual Report 2012/2013. These statistics can be
divided up and sorted according to individual commodities as can be seen in
Table 1.1. A fatality rate and injury rate is included in the table, it indicates
the rate of accidents per million man hours and its calculation can be seen
later in Equation 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
Table 1.1: South African mining fatalities and injuries and their rates per
commodity 2011/2012 (adapted from South African Department of Mineral
Resources (2013g) Annual Report 2012/2013)
Commodity
Fatalities Fatality Rate Injuries Injury Rate
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Gold 51 51 0.17 0.18 1498 1478 5.07 5.13
Platinum 37 28 0.09 0.07 1283 1360 3.2 3.43
Coal 12 11 0.07 0.06 241 267 1.44 1.51
Diamonds 3 2 0.11 0.07 42 48 1.58 1.78
Copper 1 1 0.14 0.15 19 13 2.66 1.9
Chrome 5 4 0.14 0.1 71 77 1.99 1.96
Iron Ore 0 2 0 0.04 20 20 0.39 0.39
Manganese 2 0 0.13 0 13 15 0.82 0.8
Other 12 13 0.12 0.12 112 99 1.12 0.9
All Mines 123 112 0.11 0.1 3299 3377 3 3.03
The South African Department of Mineral Resources (2013c) has estab-
lished targets to reduce occupational fatalities as well as occupational injuries
in the mining sector by 20% per year over the period of 2013 to 2016 as recorded
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in their Annual Performance Plan 2013/2014. From Table 1.1, it can be eas-
ily identified that the gold and platinum mines are the largest contributors to
mining fatalities and injuries in South Africa, however, this is with respect to
the number of accidents occurring. When looking at the fatality and injury
rates, which express these accidents per million man hours, which makes use
of the number of employees, this then identifies the most dangerous mining
operations by commodity are again the gold and platinum mines. However,
the copper, chrome and diamond mines hit the radar as also being dangerous.
Thus, in order to make the largest impact, focus should be placed on reducing
the fatalities and injuries in the gold and platinum mines. Furthermore, there
are far more injuries as opposed to fatalities and thus again the largest area for
improvement would be in reducing the injuries within the gold and platinum
mining areas.
Hofmann and Tetrick (2003) state that an organisation’s well-being de-
pends largely on its employee’s well-being. Furthermore, Clarke and Cooper
(2004) state that 60% to 80% of all workplace accidents are due to work place
stress and as such human behaviour is the biggest variable in industry, con-
sequently it is where the majority of risks originate from. Organisations are
continuously attempting to find ways to minimise the risks their employees
are exposed to, however, if these risks cannot be minimised, then exposure
to the risks is minimised as identified by HSE (1997). Yet, this is not such
a simple undertaking and occasionally employees will be exposed to known
risks. A classification of some such known risks can be seen in Table 1.2,
which represents the fatalities during 2011 and 2012 sorted by classification of
risk. Controls are typically set in place to protect the employee while being
exposed to these known risks, such as Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
and regulations of how work is to be executed in the safest possible manner.
Although organisations do what they can to mitigate known risks, it is
impossible to eradicate them all, at which point the organisation is required
to decide if it is an acceptable risk or if different processes need to be put in
place in order to bypass the risk, as it is known that being exposed to risks
has the inherent potential for injuries to occur. For example, automation in
underground mines to elude the danger of Fall Of Ground (FOG) injuries.
HSE (1997) state that all accidents and incidents are preventable, yet they
somehow still occur in industry. For the purpose of this study, an accident
refers to any undesired circumstances which give rise to ill health or injury,
whereas an incident refers to all near misses and undesired circumstances which
have the potential to cause harm.
Above, fatalities and injuries are discussed. In the mining sector, these two
classifications are used along with three more classifications. Thus, there are
five common classifications, which are Fatal Injury (FI), Serious Injury (SI),
Lost Time Injury (LTI), Medical Treatment Case (MTC) and High Potential
Incident (HPI). A FI corresponds to an accident that occurs where an employee
loses their life, a SI refers to an accident that causes a person to be admitted
to a hospital for treatment for the injury, a LTI refers to an accident that
occurs where an employee is injured and has to spend more than one complete
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Table 1.2: South African mining fatalities per risk classification 2011/2012
(adapted from South African Department of Mineral Resources (2013g) An-
nual Report 2012/2013)
Classification 2011 2012
Fall Of Ground (FOG) 40 26
Machinery 5 8
Transportation and mining 38 29
General 25 35
Conveyance accidents 3 1
Electricity 3 5
Fires 0 0
Explosives 4 4
Subsidence/caving 0 1
Heat sickness 2 2
Miscellaneous 3 1
Total 123 112
day or shift away from work as a result of the accident and a MTC refers to
any injury that is not a LTI, but does require treatment. Furthermore, a near
miss is recorded as a High Potential Incident (HPI), this is when an event has
the potential to cause a significant adverse effect on the safety and health of a
person.
In the mining industry, dealing with multiple known risks that employees
are exposed to daily, it is an everyday problem knowing when an accident will
occur. Furthermore, Wu et al. (2008) state there is a lack of knowledge in
safety modelling, which is very useful and vital in industries which deal with
risks daily that cannot be further mitigated. Knowing this, it would be very
useful to be able to estimate the continuous risk of accidents occurring such
that proactive measures can be put in place in order to reduce the probability
of an injury occurring. Thus, the success of this research in estimating the
continuous risk of accidents occurring before any accident occurs, will prove to
be tremendously valuable to the mining industry, as well as to the currently
tiny body of knowledge around predictive safety modelling. Moreover, the
created model will have the potential to be adapted to other industries dealing
with known risks.
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) found that the cost of work related accidents
for 1985 was estimated by the National Safety Council (NSC) to be US $
37.3 billion. This was a conservative value and did not include loss of future
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earnings or productivity due to workers being killed or permanently impaired.
Furthermore this did not include the full economic impact on the families of
seriously injured workers. Moreover, National Safety Council (2014) identified
that in 2012 the average economic cost of a death was US $ 1, 400, 000 per
case and of a disabling injury was US $ 53, 000 per case. These figures were
an average cost of wage and productivity losses, medical expenses and admin-
istrative expenses, and did not include any estimate of property damage or
non-disabling injury costs. With injuries being so costly, it is imperative to
put forward new ideas in attempt to make the workplace a safer place.
1.3 Problem Statement
In all forms of industry, employee safety is an essential aspect to the organisa-
tion’s operations regardless of the risks that the employees are exposed to. It
follows that any accidents which endanger human safety are intolerable. Fur-
thermore, people are becoming numb to safety warnings, which exposes the
problem of how does a person know when the risk of an accident occurring will
be of a high level for concern in order to be able to intervene and attempt to
prevent it. Additionally, what set of circumstances warrant renewed or addi-
tional effort to prevent or reduce the risk. This is a problem due to the fact
that the occurrence of an accident could be a violation of South African laws
as well as being costly towards an organisation in respect of medical claims, as
well as lost productivity time and lowered employee efficiency as identified by
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989). Following on from this, there is a large knowl-
edge gap in this field of predictive safety modelling identified and as such this
is where the scope of this research is aimed at fitting in.
The purpose of this research is to develop a model in the field of predictive
modelling in a safety environment, dealing with the exposure of employees
to known risks. Furthermore, this will add to the currently lacking body of
knowledge around predictive safety modelling.
From the above discussed problem, the following null hypothesis is derived,
H0:
‘A multivariate mathematical model cannot be used to link
circumstantial variables to estimate the continuous risk of
accidents occurring pertinent to the South African mining
industry.’
1.4 Delimitations
In research, it is imperative to set boundaries in order to not get distracted
as well as to keep focus throughout the study. The focus for this study is
on creating a model for estimating the continuous risk of accidents occurring,
which needs to stay within the following boundaries:
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G This study will include Fatal Injuries (FI’s), Severe Injuries (SI’s), Lost
Time Injuries (LTI’s), and Medical Treatment Cases (MTC’s) for the
predictive model.
G This study will not include any High Potential Incidents (HPI’s) in the
predictive model, because they are not actual accidents, as well as there
being so many, thus they will over complicate the model.
G This study is bound to the South African mining industry.
G The case study will only use data from one platinum mine in South
Africa, assuming the data is similar across all platinum mines.
This concludes the delimitations for this research.
1.5 Research Objectives
The aim of this research is to mathematically estimate the continuous risk of
accidents occurring within confidence bands. In order to achieve this aim, the
following research objectives are set to guide the research.
1. To understand occupational safety.
2. To explore the functions of various existing forecasting techniques.
3. To identify contributing factors that influence accidents.
4. To quantify these contributing factors that influence accidents.
5. To detect the sensitivity of these contributing factors that influence ac-
cidents.
6. To establish a model, combining circumstantial variables, for estimating
the continuous risk of accidents occurring.
This concludes the research objectives for this research.
1.6 Research Design and Methodology
Research can be divided into two main kinds of research, namely, quantitative
and qualitative. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2013), quantitative research
involves looking at quantities or amounts of one or more variables such that
the variables can be measured in a numerical way. In contrast to this, Leedy
and Ormrod (2013) state that qualitative research looks at characteristics or
qualities that cannot be reduced to numerical values. Human behaviour and
workers moral is an example of qualitative data, whereas production rate and
number of accidents is an example of quantitative data. Despite the relative
strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches, often a more complete
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picture can be created by combining elements of both approaches, Leedy and
Ormrod (2013) refer to this as mixed-methods.
With regards to the research design and methodology for this thesis, ini-
tially key areas for investigation will be identified with respect to the research
problem. Thereafter, a literature study of these key areas will be performed
to understand what has been done in the past and learn what techniques will
work best in this research.
Next, the type and availability of data will be investigated. This will steer
the direction of the research as it is essential for the model. This data will
be contextualised and a proposed solution will be designed. A mixed-methods
approach will be taken, as the data and inputs to the model is probable to
be of a quantitative and qualitative nature. Furthermore the model will be
verified through the use of additional independent data, and lastly the model
will be validated through the method of a case study.
1.7 Thesis Outline
This section provides a summary and breakdown of the layout and content in
the rest of the document. The document has a logical layout portraying the
research in the order it was completed. Furthermore, the research objectives
are progressively answered through the rest of the study in this logical layout.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1 is the introductory section, which explains the background and re-
search problem as well as the delimitations and research objectives which will
direct the research towards evaluating the null hypothesis.
Chapter 2: Literature Study
Chapter 2 introduces the fundamentals of safety and risk, along with factors
that influence accidents. This is followed by an overview of some modelling
techniques along with a comparison of them in order to identify the best tech-
nique.
Chapter 3: Design And Construction Of The Model
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the model for the proposed solution, followed
by a detailed look into the mathematics Artificial Neural Networks (ANN).
This is followed with an analysis of the data used in the model, as well as
calculating normalised continuous approximation of the influential factors and
explaining the setup of the data for the model.
Chapter 4: Training And Validation Of The Model
Chapter 4 presents the method of training and validating the model, followed
by the results from the training and validation, after which a sensitivity anal-
ysis of the inputs to the model is performed and lastly the intended use of the
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model is discussed.
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Chapter 5 brings closure to the study, through a brief summary of the study, a
discussion of some limitations and recommendations for future research, which
is followed by a final conclusion of the research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Study
2.1 Introduction
“A man who reviews the old so as to find out the new is qualified
to teach others” – Confucius
Badenhorst (2008) states that all research is grounded on prior research
and thus a literature review is essential to identify and deliberate where this
research emerges from previous research. In addition, Hofstee (2006) identifies
that a good literature review must be comprehensive, critical and contextu-
alised such that the reader is provided with a theory base, a review of suitable
published works and an analysis of that work. With this in mind, this liter-
ature study can be broken down into the following sections, (1) Safety1, (2)
Risks, (3) Influencing Factors and lastly (4) Forecasting Techniques.
In the first section on safety, aspects of organisational safety cultures will
be explored, comprising of safety leadership, safety climates, safety perfor-
mance, their inter-relationship as well as current safety models. Next, the
section on risks will explore what risk is, how it is approached, how it should
be managed, as well as the known risks a person is exposed to while working
on a South African mine. Then the section on influencing factors focuses on
the various factors which are known to influence the occurrence of an accident.
This includes human factors, machine factors, environmental factors and man-
agement factors. Lastly, multiple modelling techniques will be researched to
identify the most appropriate techniques required for the predictive model.
1Safety Management written by Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) was first written in 1956
and it redefined the work of safety specialists. It was widely adopted globally from students
to experienced practitioners. Furthermore, it introduced the phrase safety management,
which later became the universal description for the work of safety practitioners generally.
Moreover, every revision was influenced by anonymous reviewers and the public’s criticisms
and advice, refining the book and increasing its usefulness and the 5th (latest) revision was
published in 1989. With this in mind, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) work is used as a
foundation for this review on safety.
9
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2.2 Safety
O’Toole (2002) recognises that with limited resources to help diminish occupa-
tional injuries, companies struggle with how to optimally focus their resources
to attain the maximum reduction in injuries for the lowest cost. Furthermore,
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identify that typically, top management prefer
to know that safety measures put in practice will function to increase the all-
around efficiency of their departments rather than constitute an increase in
cost and a hindrance on production.
It is generally known that occupational safety is of importance in any or-
ganisation and thus accident prevention should be important on the list of
organisational activities performed. Hovden et al. (2010) describe an accident,
as a hazard becoming visible in a sudden probabilistic event (or chains of
events) with adverse consequences. In terms of occupational accidents, these
adverse consequences can be viewed as employee injuries. This definition is
confirmed by Hoyos et al. (1988), who define an accident in more simple terms
as, a set of undesirable conditions that can lead to a collision between a per-
son and an object. Thus, in accident prevention, the aim is to remove the
undesirable conditions or break the chain of events leading up to the accident.
In addition, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) define an accident as “an event or
condition occurring by chance or arising from an unknown or remote cause.”
However, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identify that nine out of ten occu-
pational injuries can be predicted. In this study, an accident refers to any
undesirable circumstances which give rise to ill health or injury. As well as, an
incident referring to all undesired circumstances and near misses which have
the potential to cause harm.
Hoyos et al. (1988) declare that hazardous situations can only arise if a
person is exposed to a hazard. According to Grimaldi and Simonds (1989),
in practice, safety appears to have a low priority among the government for
human well-being until the public is sufficiently aroused by being exposed to
accident reports and information. Despite the OHSA legally enforcing that all
employers must ensure the safety of their employees, Grimaldi and Simonds
(1989) identify that knowing these legal requirements will not optimise safety,
though it will create a climate which can be used for the development of safety
strategies to optimise safety.
As stated by Grimaldi and Simonds (1989), a simple matter of applying
particular procedures is often how safety is regarded, yet, an effective safety
management system entails more than just this. In practice, often safety re-
quirements are seen to conflict with other requirements such as productivity,
convenience or other factors. However, when there is sufficient motivation for
safe action, then safety requirements may have preference over other needs, for
example, when a task needing to be performed is known to be very dangerous.
Additionally, Hoyos et al. (1988) articulate the fact that safety experts under-
stand that accident prevention depends more on human factors than on an
engineering source. These human factors can be complex and are more than
just employee negligence, which is defined by Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) as
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the creation of unreasonable risk without intending to cause harm.
Despite the legal and moral implications of accidents, Hoyos et al. (1988)
establish that accidents have economic dimensions as well. Some examples of
costs involved in an occupational injury include
G Hospital costs, compensation costs, pensions, reparation costs, etc.
G Court costs for claims proceedings
G Costs for rescue measures and gear
G “Use” of first aid gear
G Loss of a person’s ability to function and resulting loss of income
G Stoppage or reduction of operations as long as an inquiry into the cir-
cumstances surrounding the accident is being conducted and the conse-
quences of the accident have not been fully accounted for
G Costs for the training of replacements
G Time lost for persons not directly involved with the accident
G Loss of reputation
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identify that significant savings both in human
suffering and in profits are possible through effective safety efforts. Thus a
well implemented safety system should reduce the risk of an incident as well
as save money.
Safety should be viewed holistically, as it is a developing property of systems
that comes from the interaction of system components as identified by Leveson
(2004). He suggests that a plant’s safety cannot be determined by inspecting
a single valve in the plant. Facts about the situation in which that valve is
used is also crucial. Thus, it is impossible to take a single system component
in isolation and evaluate its safety. A component that is completely safe in
one system may not be when used in another.
As stated by Hermanus (2007), the mining sectors accident and ill-health
records compare below par to that of other economic sectors such as manu-
facturing, construction and rail. This leads to the reputation that the mining
sector is the most hazardous industrial sector. Therefore, knowing the impor-
tance of mining to employment and the economy, there is substantial worth
in addressing health and safety methodically. Moreover, in the broader frame-
work of sustainable development, among the first expectations are healthy and
safe working conditions, which ensure workers are not denied of their liveli-
hoods or of their quality of life.
In a comparison completed by Hermanus (2007), it was established that
South African miners are 4 to 5 times more likely to lose their lives in mine
accidents than in Australia. However, it was not established if this was due
to different mining technology used or different management styles etc. Paul
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and Maiti (2005) agree with Hermanus (2007), stating that mining is consid-
ered one of toughest and most hazardous occupations. Paul and Maiti (2005)
continue that underground mine-workers have to work in severe working condi-
tions in narrow openings with substantial heat and humidity, heavy noise and
vibration, poor illumination, airborne dust and noxious gases. These physi-
cal hazards bring about a serious problem in handling the safety and health
risks of mine workers. As a result, accidents/injuries are prevalent across all
commodities in underground mining.
2.2.1 Safety leadership
According to Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) safety is not of the uppermost im-
portance in an individual’s mind and thus external governance is required to
provide some regularity in the behaviour necessary for safety to be achieved.
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) go on to define safety management as, “applying
steps to assist executive decisions about safety and to make use of the manage-
rial hierarchy to establish and maintain a visible active safety posture within
the organisation.” Very similarly, Wu et al. (2008) identify safety leadership
as “the process of interaction between leaders and followers, through which
leaders could exert their influence on followers to achieve organisational safety
goals under the circumstances of organisational and individual factors.”
As stated by Hoyos et al. (1988), management’s commitment to safety,
such as assigning further capital, giving accident prevention a greater prece-
dence, etc. is influential with respect to the success of safety efforts. Hofmann
and Tetrick (2003) add that leadership variables have a direct effect on safety
records, however, when leadership has done all it can do, accidents still occur.
Moreover, it is impossible to realise absolute safety, thus equilibrium must be
found amongst risk and utility. Furthermore, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989)
identify hazard elimination, not accident elimination, as a primary apprehen-
sion of safety management. This is due to hazard elimination removing the
danger and as such, an accident cannot occur. Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) go
on to say that as injuries are brought under control, it becomes more difficult
to continue major reductions, thereafter a program to maintain the accident
reductions is required.
Wong (2010) reveals the fact that unfortunately management is often solely
engrossed on the management of risks associated with financial gain and they
tend to overlook the need to manage the risk of losing their material and
human assets as well as the devastating impact that could have on their busi-
ness. However, O’Toole (2002) identifies that a positive impact on safety out-
comes was realised from employee perceptions of management’s commitment
to safety, colleagues participation in safety and the effectiveness of education
and training efforts on the part of management.
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) define the safety hierarchy within an organ-
isation as firstly, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is accountable for
the safety demeanour of the organisation. Next, the safety person within an
organisation is merely management’s representative, who develops the infor-
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mation needed which enables the line to exercise its authority effectively in
behalf of safety. Furthermore, the higher the safety specialist can reach in the
organisation (eg. CEO) the greater effectiveness they will have with the lower
echelons. Additionally, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identify the character
traits of a successful safety director as knowledgeable, respected and persua-
sive. Moreover, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identified that generally safety
specialists are more successful at encouraging safety consciousness rather than
persuading safe behaviour. A contributing factor to this would be production
performance versus safe behaviour trade-off.
In Table 2.1 the safety records within the automobile manufacturing in-
dustry are presented with relation to the size of the organisation, as well as
the number of safety people in the organisation. From this table, one can infer
Table 2.1: Safety records in automobile industry (adapted from Grimaldi and
Simonds (1989))
Employees Safety People Safety Record
140 - 580 0 15.7
400 1 2.3
11000 1 0.7
15000 6 1
18000 9 3.7
that organisations with permanent dedicated safety personnel, regardless of
how many, have vastly better safety performance as opposed to organisations
without dedicated safety personnel. Furthermore, the presence of at least one
person continually promoting safety is far more significant than ratio of safety
workers to number of employees. Despite the data in this table being old, the
theory is still valid with respect to the conclusions portrayed, linking improved
safety to permanent safety personnel.
In numerous larger organisations, there are entire departments devoted
to safety. Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) state that these safety departments
and safety personnel do not have the authority to shut down jobs and oper-
ations considered hazardous, however, they have to use their education and
persuasion to get managers to discontinue unsafe acts. An operational con-
flict frequently exists concerning the necessity for safety and the preference
to accept the decision based on cost-benefit considerations. Normally, safety
directors merely have advisory power. Despite forthcoming dangerous situa-
tions being identified, the safety officer’s decisions often inflict demands that
threaten an operation’s performance, which a manager is likely to resist. This
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE STUDY 14
is then resolved by higher authority and decided upon merits rather than on
what is morally best.
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) speculate that if safety specialists have the
authority to shut operations down, this would give them great power over pro-
duction managers, which commonly is not in line with organisational hierar-
chies. Thus the power of persuasion to influence necessary actions is valuable
with the use of well marshalled relevant facts. Despite safety being every-
one’s responsibility, Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) find that most functions in
modern society are fulfilled through an organisational hierarchy and thus the
accountability for the safety of others increases in significance as the echelons
are climbed.
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) find that superior safety records are found
in industries whose operations involve hazards that may possibly cause severe
consequences (such as mining) rather than other industries whose work does
not consist of such naturally inherent hazardous work. The motivation for
implementing safety is intense when inherent hazards are evident and serious
and as such, management often makes a very strong demand for safety achieve-
ments. Figure 2.1 depicts the result of bad risk management and how quickly
matters escalate unless events come under control.
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Figure 2.1: Result of bad risk management (adapted from Wong (2010))
From Figure 2.1, it can be seen that if an initiating event is not brought
under control, quickly events can become out of control which could result in
a possible major disaster. Whereas if well implemented risk management sys-
tems were in place, the consequences of the initiating event can be contained
to a minor incident. Reasons people do not record all injuries and near misses
are identified by Wong (2010) as the fear of blame culture, too much paper-
work, a waste of time, lack of motivation and too busy to bother. However,
Wong (2010) goes on to say that it is crucial to record all injuries and near
misses, since persistent near misses could lead to an injury and thus a review
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of these persistent near misses can be done in order to prevent an injury from
occurring in the future.
From personal correspondence with Turketti (2013), six mistakes are high-
lighted that managers tend to make with occupational health and safety. These
mistakes are
G Not walking the talk
G Turning a blind eye
G Not giving enough positive feedback
G Not buying into the health and safety system
G Forgetting the importance of habits
G The wrong intentions for health and safety observations
Walking the talk – According to Turketti (2013), actions speak louder
than words when it comes to occupational health and safety management.
Furthermore, people tend to look to their manager for direction and their
manager’s conduct is an aspect they will notice. Thus a manager ought to
reveal to everyone that ensuring people’s health and safety is at the top of
their priority list. As well as to remember that nothing makes a difference
if employees see managers acting in a different way to what they are saying.
Moreover, Wong (2010) agrees that management has to show strong leadership,
“walk the walk” and “talk the talk” on the workshop floor to create a safety
culture in an organisation.
Turning a blind eye – Health and safety rules and systems apply to
everyone, permanently. If a manager were to overlook minor breaches or small
unsafe acts and conditions, then they are effectively condoning and encouraging
those actions. Thus, by the manager’s personal absence of action they are
indirectly informing their team that it is acceptable to not comply with certain
rules or procedures.
Not giving enough positive feedback – It is important to give people
positive feedback when found working healthy, safely or doing things that
improve the workplace, rather than just letting people know when they are
not working healthy, safely or following the correct procedures, although this
is imperative too. Unfortunately managers tend to emphasise the negative
more than the positive which can lead to disastrous consequences. If managers
want the morale of the workforce to improve, they need to pay compliments
where they are due and the culture will automatically improve towards a more
positive health and safety climate.
Not buying into the health and safety system – Despite whether a
manger likes or agrees with the health and safety system or not, managers in
operation need to buy into the health and safety systems. If a manager has
feedback about why they believe the system will not work, that feedback must
be passed on to their boss and not to the employees under them. Furthermore,
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a team consists of the manager and his/her workforce (not the one or the other)
and both need to be committed to the health and safety system to make it
work and achieve its objectives. One person not buying into the management
system can cause the entire team to fail.
Forgetting the importance of habits – Habits are what save people
when their mind is not consciously on the job. Many health and safety systems
used are aimed at generating habits in people’s minds so that they are always
cognisant of hazards in the work environment, as well as able to react when
they see something that is about to hurt them. Repeating safety training or
safety talks is most certainly not a waste of time or money because when a
crisis hits it will probably be those repetitive safety sessions that will prevent
great harm or loss.
The wrong intentions for health and safety observations – When
partaking in health and safety observations, the aim should be to find ways
to give employees constructive feedback which would keep them on their toes
and challenge them in their work, not to try to catch people doing something
wrong. It is imperative to challenge and test people to make sure they know
what they are doing and how to do it correctly and safely.
2.2.2 Safety climate
All types of climates are based on an individual’s perceptions of the practices,
procedures and rewards in the organisation. A few of the organisational cli-
mates found are, a safety climate, climate for customer service and climate
for innovation, etc. Wu et al. (2008) identify a safety climate as “employees
perceptions of safety culture in the organisation; and the perceptions, which
are influenced by the organisational factors and individual factors, eventually
affect employees safety behaviours.” Furthermore, Griffin and Neal (2000) con-
firm this with identifying that a safety climate should reflect perceptions of
safety-related policies, procedures and rewards. Furthermore, the safety cli-
mate should reflect the degree to which employees believe that safety is valued
within the organisation. Griffin and Neal (2000) go on to state that man-
agement’s commitment to safety related matters (for example, managements
concern for employee well-being, managements attitudes toward safety, per-
ceptions that safety is important to management and production and safety
trade-offs) is often included in a safety climate. Lastly, O’Toole (2002) states
that the safety culture has been identified as a critical factor that sets the tone
for importance of safety within an organisation.
Examples of fundamental safety undertakings that need to be carried out
by individuals to sustain workplace safety are adhering to lockout procedures
and wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). These are the activities
that make up organisational safety compliance as identified by Griffin and Neal
(2000). Furthermore, Griffin and Neal (2000) state that safety participation
describes behaviours such as partaking in voluntary safety activities or attend-
ing safety meetings. Although these behaviours may not directly contribute
to workplace safety, they do cultivate an environment that supports safety.
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Groves et al. (2007) found that manufacturing and mining employee’s percep-
tions of safety climate were profoundly associated to employee’s safety knowl-
edge and the degree to which employees participate in safe work behaviours.
Borodzicz (2007) identifies that some of the most pertinent and challenging
risks to manage are often handled at a junior level within an organisation.
When done constructively, there are noticeable links here that bring about a
good ‘safety culture’ or ‘risk culture’ within the organisation by including more
junior staff in the risk and security problems.
When analysing an accident, it should be similar to a systems analysis,
where an accident is the undesired output of the system. Furthermore, Hoyos
et al. (1988) identify that the system definition is essential, it must not be too
extensive or constricted. For example, with a mine hauling accident, it would
be insufficient to regard the driver and the means of transportation as the
system and take no notice of those parts of the mine where transported goods
are loaded and unloaded. From this, it is established that safety programs
are required. Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identify an overview of four basic
steps all conventional safety programs should contain. These are as follows:
G Case analysis: Classify events triggering injuries, detect their origins,
determine trends and evaluate these events.
G Communication: Communicate the knowledge derived from the case
analysis.
G Inspection: Perform inspections to ensure people comply with injury
counter measures and to detect unsafe conditions and practices before
an injury occurs.
G Supervisor safety training: Orientate the supervisor about safety
achievement responsibilities.
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) go into more detail and identify seven steps
that should be taken in the creation of a basic safety programme. These steps
are as follows:
G Secure principal managements involvement: Obtain highly visible
commitment to safety from management.
G Organise for achievement: Safety specialist is expected to marshal
facts and resources, forming a coordinated effort.
G Detail the operating plan: The company’s safety objective, policies,
rules and regulations and the method chosen for their implementation
should be communicated upon the programs initiation. All participants
should be made aware of revisions as well.
G Inspect operations: Knowledge about the conditions to be corrected
and an on-going evaluation of the progress being made is provided by
plant inspections.
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G Consider engineering revisions: Corrections are expected to begin
with consideration of means of removing physical hazards.
G Use guards and protective devices as a last resort: If engineering
revisions are not possible, or will not complete the safety objective, use
supplementary means to safeguard the exposure.
G Provide education and training: Awareness and motivational devel-
opment are necessary ingredients in the remedy for controllable injuries
and illnesses.
2.2.3 Safety performance
Safety is defined by Van Steen (1996) as the absence of danger from which
harm or loss could result. Thus the only manner to measure performance is in
terms of harm or loss that occurs and consequently decreasing harm or losses
indicates performance is improving. Shannon et al. (1997), Wu et al. (2008),
and Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) identify that the most common measure-
ment of safety performance is the injury/accident rate, although as Grimaldi
and Simonds (1989) state, top management occasionally likes to measure safety
performance as the costs saved from the safety efforts employed. Shannon et al.
(1997) continue, that measuring safety performance in injury rates is conve-
nient since all accidents of a certain severity level are obligated to be reported
by law and the statistics has to be published to the public, which means there
is readily available data. However, Van Steen (1996) believes that safety per-
formance cannot be expressed in terms of a single parameter or index. Rather,
they believe it is a range of mostly qualitative, but sometimes quantitative,
indicators from each monitoring activity. The separate measurements can be
expressed in a variety of ways. These ways include:
G Inferences based on, for example, the number and nature of defects or
non-conformances found and the nature and type of recommendations
made.
G Qualitative assessments of performance on broad scales from, say, ‘poor’
(immediate improvement action needed) through ‘satisfactory’ (capable
of improvement) to ‘good’ (best practice, no action necessary).
G Quantitative ratings - for example, percentage compliance with the var-
ious specific elements of the management system.
G Quantitative and/or qualitative ratings about the quality of the safety
management activities and about system implementation commensurate
with the risks of the operations.
It was stated by Hoyos et al. (1988) that during the premature stages of
industrialisation, sources of hazards were predominantly of a mechanical na-
ture (eg. unprotected rotating wheels, exposed transmissions, etc.). Thus in
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general, the potential for danger was fairly apparent. In this day and age with
modern technology, a lot of equipment is becoming electronic and the con-
trol of machines is being taken over by computers. As a consequence of this
automation and mechanisation, more incidents transpire during the course of
repair work as opposed to during the operation of the machines. Furthermore,
Jansen and Brent (2005) stated in 2005 that the South African platinum min-
ing industry had experienced a significant increase in fatal accidents. They
go on to state that mine accidents are in principle preventable and there is
enormous pressure on employers to reverse this trend.
Van Steen (1996) quotes that “you cannot manage what you do not mea-
sure”. Van Steen (1996) goes on to identify that safety performance measure-
ment covers four areas, three positive areas and one negative area. As can
been seen in Figure 2.2, the three positive measurement areas are, plant and
equipment, people and systems and procedures; the negative area measured is
failures. Examples of each area are also presented in the figure.
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Figure 2.2: Safety performance measurement areas to be covered (adapted
from Van Steen (1996))
Van Steen (1996) continues by stating that continual improvement in safety
management tries to proactively develop the positive inputs and diminish the
negative outputs, which will decrease the total incidents that create harm and
loss to people, the environment and assets which can be seen in Figure 2.3.
Safety management consists of three main areas, namely, the plant and equip-
ment, people, and systems and procedures. The plant and equipment perfor-
mance should reduce the risks from identified hazards as far as is reasonably
practicable. The people must be competent through knowledge, skills and
attitudes, to operate the plant and equipment and to implement the systems
and procedures. The systems and procedures should operate and maintain
the plant and equipment in a satisfactory manner and manage all associated
activities. This control reduces risk of operations.
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Figure 2.3: Safety performance continual improvement (adapted from Van
Steen (1996))
Loubser (2010) brings about a different aspect to safety by introducing the
fact that the notion of caring is in most cases, confused with material needs
and not psychological needs. He goes on to say that by providing employees
a job, most managers think that employees should be grateful and return the
goodwill by being loyal, productive and working safely. In extreme cases,
managers hold the view that employees should be fortunate to have a job. In
order to show and demonstrate that management are caring for the safety of
the workforce, management requires being involved, dedicated and committed.
Lastly, Loubser (2010) identifies that the main drive of any organisation should
be to attain the trust and respect of the workforce, because the secret of
optimal safety performance lays within trust and respect.
Society generally accepts a risk probability of one in a million (10−6) for a
fatality to occur as completely acceptable as stated by Grimaldi and Simonds
(1989). They go on to present several common exposures that relate to a
fatality risk probability of 10−6, these can be seen below:
G Smoking 1.4 cigarettes
G Traveling 16.1 km by bicycle
G Traveling 483 km by car
G Traveling 1610 km by jet
G Having one chest x-ray
G Living five years at a site boundary of a typical nuclear power plant in
the open
G Drinking thirty 340 g cans of diet soda
The size of an organisation does play a role in the safety performance, as
highlighted by Grimaldi and Simonds (1989). They identify that organisations
with a small number of employees (50 - 500) have higher injury frequency rates
compared to those with masses of employees (over 2000). The injury frequency
rates can be seen in Table 2.2.
There are two types of injury frequency rates, the first being Lost Time
Injury Frequency Rate (LTIFR) and the second being Fatal Injury Frequency
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Table 2.2: Work injury rates rated by establishment size (adapted from
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989))
Employees Injury frequency rate
Less than 20 9.9
20 to 49 13.4
50 to 99 17.0
100 to 249 20.4
250 to 499 17.9
500 to 999 14.2
1000 to 2499 11.2
2500 or more 7.3
Rate (FIFR). They are both calculated in the same manner, however, the
LTIFR uses the number of accidents that resulted in a LTI (i.e. An injury that
results in workers being unable to report to their next work shift (Talisman,
2014)). Then the FIFR makes use of the number of accidents that resulted in
a fatality (i.e. an employee died from the accident). Generally, the LTIFR and
FIFR are presented per million man hours at work. The LTIFR and FIFR
calculations are taken from Wannenburg (2011) and presented in Equations
2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
LTIFR =
LTI× 1000000
E ×H (2.2.1)
where:
LTIFR is Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate (per million man-hours)
LTI is Number of Lost Time Injuries
E is Number of Employees
H is Hours per Employee per Anum
FIFR =
FI× 1000000
E ×H (2.2.2)
where:
FIFR is Fatal Injury Frequency Rate (per million man-hours)
FI is Number of Fatal Injuries
E is Number of Employees
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H is Hours per Employee per Anum
Industry in general uses the LTIFR and FIFR as safety performance mea-
sures, although other measures do exist. Table 2.3 displays injuries in the
South African mining industry over the period from 2008 until 2012, which
are grouped according to commodity2. One can easily identify that gold, plat-
inum and coal are the three highest contributors to South African mining
accidents.
Table 2.3: Number of mining injuries by commodity in South Africa (adapted
from South African Department of Mineral Resources (2013d), South African
Department of Mineral Resources (2013e), South African Department of Min-
eral Resources (2013f ) and South African Department of Mineral Resources
(2013g))
Injuries
Commodity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
All Mines 3750 3650 3438 3299 3377
Gold 1938 1756 1379 1498 1478
Platinum 1221 1299 1515 1283 1360
Coal 332 295 273 241 267
Diamonds 35 46 50 42 48
Copper 22 19 19 19 13
Chrome 58 60 84 71 77
Iron Ore 12 15 18 20 20
Manganese 16 11 17 13 15
Other 116 149 82 112 99
From Table 2.3, the top three contributors to accidents are plotted to easily
identify the current accident trends, as can be seen in Figure 2.4. The first
critical observation is that from 2011 to 2012 the number of accidents increased.
Figure 2.5 zooms into 2012, graphically presenting the percentage split of
accidents across all the commodities. Again, it is clear that gold and platinum
mines are the largest contributors to South African mining accidents.
2In 2010 there is one more accident in total than in the sum of the nine commodities, it
is unsure were the error is, however, this is as it is reported in the South African Department
of Mineral Resources (2013f ) Annual Report: 2011 - 2012.
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Figure 2.4: South African mining injuries from 2008 to 2012 (adapted from
(South African Department of Mineral Resources (2013d), South African De-
partment of Mineral Resources (2013e), South African Department of Min-
eral Resources (2013f ), and South African Department of Mineral Resources
(2013g)))
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Figure 2.5: South African mining injuries in 2012 by commodity (adapted
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(2013g)))
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2.2.4 Safety leadership, climate, and performance
relationship
Loubser (2010) identifies that safety inspections and audits repeatedly reveal
that managers and supervisors are unsuccessful at conforming with their safety
risk control responsibilities without suffering any negative consequences. Addi-
tionally, non-compliances with safety risk control responsibilities are evidence
of non-caring behaviours and non-caring behaviours have a substantial influ-
ence on the safety performance of employees. Furthermore, Loubser (2010)
states that non-caring is the core cause for forming a ‘mind my own business’
safety culture and thus a non-caring safety culture encourages risk taking be-
haviour which is gambling with one’s own safety and the safety of others.
Hofmann and Tetrick (2003) define four types of leadership along with how
they fit in with an organisations safety climate and its leadership, as can be seen
in Figure 2.6. The four leadership types are, transformational, constructive,
corrective and laissez-faire. Transformational leadership is value-based and
personalised communication, resulting in better discussion quality and a larger
concern for welfare. Constructive leadership entails an intermediate level of
concern for an employee’s welfare. Corrective leadership primarily embraces
error detection and correction based on active or passive monitoring. Laissez-
faire leadership offers the lowest level of concern for welfare.
High Transformational Leadership
Constructive Leadership
Corrective Leadership
Laissez-faire Leadership
Low
Low High
S
a
fe
ty
 C
li
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Leadership
Figure 2.6: Relationship between leadership and safety climate (adapted from
Hofmann and Tetrick (2003))
Wu et al. (2008) state that the better an organisation’s safety climate, the
better its safety performance. Furthermore, employees who perceive their job
as safe tend to be involved in less accidents than employees who perceive their
job as dangerous. Additionally, Wu et al. (2008) identify a significant positive
correlation between safety climate and safety performance through research
performed. In their research, four hypotheses were tested of which all four
were supported. The four hypotheses are as follows:
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G Safety climate mediates the relationship between safety leadership and
safety performance. This hypothesis means that safety climate has a
direct effect on safety performance and safety leadership has an indirect
effect on safety performance.
G Safety leadership is positively related to safety climate. This hypothesis
means that the more positive the perceived safety leadership, the more
positive the perceived safety climate.
G Safety climate is positively related to safety performance. This hypoth-
esis means that the more positive the perceived safety climate, the more
positive the perceived safety performance.
G Safety leadership is positively related to safety performance. This hy-
pothesis means that the more positive the perceived safety leadership,
the more positive the perceived safety performance.
Figure 2.7 is used by Wu et al. (2008) in their research to aid in creating
an operational definition of safety leadership, climate, and performance. The
operational definition is a score from all the dimensions under each section
seen in the figure.
Safety Climate 
CEO's safety commitment 
Managers safety commitment 
Employee's safety commitment 
Emergency response 
Percieved risk 
Safety Performance 
Safety organisation and management 
Safety equipment and measures 
Accident statistics 
Safety training evaluation 
Accident investigations 
Safety training practice 
Safety Leadership 
Safety caring 
Safety coaching 
Safety controlling 
Figure 2.7: Model relating safety leadership, safety climate, and safety perfor-
mance (adapted from Wu et al. (2008))
The practical application of the study performed by Wu et al. (2008) ex-
presses that safety leadership and safety culture are two vital forecasters of a
good safety performance and that safety climate takes a mediating role in the
relationship between safety leadership and safety performance.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE STUDY 26
2.2.5 Safety models
Hoyos et al. (1988) deliberate that all knowledge with respect to how acci-
dents take place, as well as all facts about safe and unsafe conduct at work,
eventually must be converted into processes which protect the obligatory jobs
and improve the safety of socio-technical systems. Leveson (2004) goes on to
provide a solution for Hoyos et al. (1988) by introducing that accident mod-
els form the foundation for investigating and analysing accidents, preventing
future accidents and determining whether systems are suitable for use, such
as for a risk assessment. Maiti and Bhattacherjee (2001) add that accident
researchers should extend the study of individual characteristics to include the
work-environmental factors which may affect the risk of injury too. Further-
more, Hoyos et al. (1988) add that risk estimation techniques serve to evaluate
the level of risk involved in the operation and detailed analysis of the actual
single incidents and accidents by means of models is typically employed to
identify possible weak spots in the plant and its operation.
Hoyos et al. (1988) define direct and indirect as the two core approaches
used when dealing with hazard and safety analysis methods. Direct encom-
passes detecting accident potentials in planned or present systems. Indirect
includes comprehensive studies and statistical analyses of accidents. Despite
these two core tactics, there are a host of different types of models, some
such models are causal, probabilistic, statistical, epidemiological, hazard iden-
tification and analytical trees, as identified by Hoyos et al. (1988). Hoyos
et al. (1988) continue that causal or probabilistic models can predict the level
of risk involved in a process in structured work areas with single incidents
occurring (some examples include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Management
Oversight & Risk Tree (MORT) and National Institute for Research & Safety
model (INRS)). However, for circumstances characterised by less structured
work and a relatively high number of incidents reported (such as workshops
and construction sites), alternate methods are employed, such as statistical
and epidemiological methods. Furthermore, Hoyos et al. (1988) list a few
models, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard Anal-
ysis (PHA), Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and
Systems Hazard Analysis (SHA) that all fall under the heading of hazard
identification models and FTA and MORT fall under the heading of analytical
trees which are used in safety analysis.
As can be seen in Table 2.4, Lehto and Salvendy (1991) present a large
comparison of 64 different accident causation models.
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Table 2.4: Accident causation models comparison (adapted from Lehto and
Salvendy (1991)
Area Purpose Focus Structure Input Output
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General
Models of the
Accident
Process
Sequential
Models
Domino Theory 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Updated Domino Theory 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Stair Step Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Stage Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Event Trees 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Fault Trees 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cause Trees 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
MORT 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Multi-linear Sequencing 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PERT/CPM 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Epidemiological
Models
Host-Agent-Environment 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cohort Analysis 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Home Accident Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Industrial Accient Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Haddon Matrix 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Energy
Transfer Model
Energy Exchange Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Energy Countermeasures 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Systems
Models
P-Theory 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Change Analysis 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Manual Control Theory 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Car-Driver Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Models of
Human Error
and Unsafe
Behaviour
Behavioural
Accident
Models
Accident Proneness 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Personality Traits 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Life Change Units 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Adjustement Stress Theory 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Human
Decision
Making Models
Purposive Risk Taking Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Risk Perception Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Risk Acceptability Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Heuristic and Biases 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Expected Utility 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Signal Detection 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Bayesian Inference 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Brunswick Lens 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Human
Information
Processing
Models
Single Channel Hypothesis 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Human Error Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Decision Stage Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Communication Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Warning Tree 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Arousal/Effect/Attention 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Resource Allocation 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Task Scheduling 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Levels of Performance 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
GOMS 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Human Error
Taxonomies
Data Store 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Error Mechanisms 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Integrative Taxonomy 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
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Table 2.4: Accident causation models comparison (adapted from Lehto and
Salvendy (1991)
Area Purpose Focus Structure Input Output
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Models of the
Mechanics of
Human Injury
Tool Use Trauma 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
CTD-123 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
NIOSH Lifting Guide 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Biomechanical Model 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
MMH Mode 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Slip Resistance 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Ladder Climbing 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Application
Techniques
Fault Tree Analysis 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
FMEA 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
HAZOP 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
STARS 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
WSA 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
AEA 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Decision Sequence Analysis 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
D/R/C matrix 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
THERP 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
SLIM-MAUD 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
SHERPA 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
As can be seen in Table 2.4, all 64 models are distributed into four focal
groupings. These are, general models of the accident process, models of hu-
man error and unsafe behaviour, models of the mechanics of human injury and
application techniques. Additionally, these models are compared in six areas,
these areas are, area, purpose, focus, structure, input and output. If one filters
these 64 models to search for models that are generic for the area and pur-
pose, focus on accidents, are mathematical in structure, have definitions and
specifications as the inputs as well as outputs a probability, then this results in
five usable models, which are, Event Trees (ET), Fault Trees (FT), Program
Evaluation & Review Technique - Critical Path Method (PERT/CPM), Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA), and Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA). The
first three fall under sequential models, in the category of general models of
the accident process and the last two fall under the application techniques
section.
Leveson (2004) identifies that event-based accident models describe acci-
dents in terms of multiple events sequenced as a chain over time, this can be
in a forward sequence (such as FMEA or ET) or backward sequence (such as
FT). Additionally Leveson (2004) finds that event-based models are bad at
representing systemic accident factors, such as structural deficiencies in the
organisation, management deficiencies and flaws in the safety culture of the
company or industry. Leveson (2004) goes on to state that in event-based mod-
els, the causal factors identified depend on the events that are considered and
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the selection of the conditions related to those events. However, other than the
physical events directly preceding or directly involving the accident, the choice
of events to incorporate is subjective and the selection of conditions to explain
the events are even more so. Although the first event in the chain is often
labelled the “initiating event”, the choosing of an initiating event is arbitrary
and prior events and conditions could always be added. From this, the above
list of five possible models is reduced to one model, which is the PERT/CPM.
However, PERT/CPM is used primarily in project management, to identify
the minimum time needed to complete a project, and it is more of an event-
orientated technique. Thus, all five models mentioned are not suitable for this
study.
According to Hovden et al. (2010) the majority of accident models and
philosophies applied in the arena of occupational accidents are grounded on
epidemiological models of energy-barriers and use a closed system safety men-
tality. From this, four contending modelling approaches developed. These
are:
G Causal sequences similar to the domino model (e.g. International Loss
Control Institute causation model (ILCI))
G Descriptive models of accident processes in terms of chronologically timed
events and/or phases (e.g. Sequentially Timed Events Plotting (STEP)
and Occupational Accident Research Unit deviation model (OARU))
G System models based on a combination of causal sequences and epidemi-
ological models (e.g. TRIPOD and ‘Swiss cheese’ model)
G Logical risk analysis stimulated models (e.g. MORT and Safety Man-
agement and Organisation Review Technique (SMORT))
Hovden et al. (2010) continue that accident models can be used in both reactive
and proactive safety management. However, he highlights that two systemic
models were recently introduced which may stimulate a more creative quest
for alternate and proactive safety performance indicators. These two models
are Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) and Systems-Theoretic
Accident Model & Processes (STAMP).
Leveson (2004) explains that in STAMP, systems are regarded as inter-
related components, held in a state of equilibrium by feedback loops of in-
formation and control. The process building up to an accident is defined in
terms of an adaptive feedback function that does not succeed in maintaining
safety, as performance fluctuates over time, to achieve a complex set of goals
and values. Rather than describing safety management in terms of preventing
component failure events, it is defined as a continuous control task to impose
the constraints necessary to limit system behaviour to safe changes and adap-
tations. Thus, accidents can be understood, in terms of why the controls that
were in place did not prevent or detect changes, by recognising the safety con-
straints that were violated and determining why the controls were inadequate
in enforcing them.
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Hollnagel (2014) states that the understanding of the role that humans
play in accidents has gone through three phases. Firstly, humans are per-
ceived to be susceptible to errors. The accident investigation purpose was
therefore to identify the human error that either was the primary cause or
the initiating event. Next, the human error view was not plausible and there-
fore, descriptions transformed to search for how performance shaping factors
or performance conditions could force individuals to fail. This did not elimi-
nate the notion of a human error but altered it from being an inherent human
error mechanism to a result of working conditions and work pressures. Lastly,
the human role in accidents was understood such that failures and successes
have the same foundation. Hollnagel (2014) continues that FRAM offers an
approach to describe outcomes using the idea of resonance arising from the
unpredictability of daily performance. Furthermore, a FRAM can be used to
obtain a description of functional variability and resonance, which can lead to
recommendations for damping unwanted variability. A FRAM analysis con-
sists of four main stages, which are:
G Identify and describe critical system functions and characterise each func-
tion using the six basic characteristics (Output, Input, Precondition,
Resource, Control and Time).
G Characterise the potential variability of the functions in the FRAM
model, as well as the possible actual variability of the functions in one
or more instances of the model.
G Define the functional resonance based on dependencies/couplings among
functions and the potential for functional variability.
G Identify ways to monitor the development of resonance either to reduce
variability that may lead to undesirable consequences or to intensify
variability that might lead to desired outcomes.
Lastly, the FRAM is a qualitative method which in its current version does not
support quantification, although quantification is not impossible. However,
a different nature for the quantification would be needed, since the FRAM
concentrates on the prospect of function variability rather than the probability
of malfunctioning or failure.
Tomas’ Structural Equation Model (SEM), shown in Figure 2.8, is de-
scribed by Attwood et al. (2006) as a model which suggests that accidents
ought to be handled as if they had stemmed from an intricate sequence of
events. Attwood et al. (2006) go on to identify the five conclusions identified
from Tomas’ SEM, which are:
G There is a significant explanatory chain that flows from safety climate
through supervisors, co-workers and worker attitudes and behaviours to
an accident occurrence.
G Safety climate does not have a significant direct effect on either safety
behaviour or co-worker response.
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G Supervisor response significantly affects co-workers’ response, attitude
and safety behaviour.
G Attitudes affect behaviour, while behaviour influences the probability of
accidents occurring.
G Hazards do not have a direct impact on accidents (i.e. most hazards can
be dealt with effectively if the workforce is both capable and motivated).
Safety 
Climate
Supervisors 
Response
Co-workers 
Response
Worker 
Attitude
Hazards
Safety 
Behaviour
Actual Risks Accidents
Figure 2.8: Tomas’ Structural Equation Model (SEM) (adapted from Attwood
et al. (2006))
2.3 Risks
Joughin (2011) identifies that in all areas of life, individuals need to compre-
hend that every action gives rise to risk and in the absence of risk nothing
can be done. As such, it is not possible to achieve a state of zero risk, for the
reason that a state of zero risk does not exist. Thus, decisions are required to
be made on the tolerable levels of risk in industry. Furthermore, Hoyos et al.
(1988) add to this by stating that a hazardous situation is developed due to the
presence of potentially harmful energy. For example, a heavy moving truck is
an obvious one, however a banana peel on the floor is not as obvious, yet it has
the potential for one to step on and slip and injur themself. In addition to this,
Wong (2010) states that nothing can be 100% reliable and safe. He identifies
that reliability cannot be predicted without statistical data and that making
things safe and reliable costs money. Furthermore, when everything operates
without incident, operators and management may perhaps be comforted into
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a false sense of security and may do something dangerous. Ultimately, humans
will make mistakes. Equally important, Hovden et al. (2010) identify that in
the majority of industrial sectors the potential for attaining low injury rates
through continuous work to improve performance through deviation control is
high.
Borodzicz (2007), HSE (1997), and Hoyos et al. (1988) all agree that risk
analysis is seen primarily in quantitative terms, by placing an assessment value
on the combination of the frequency or probability of a potential physical fail-
ure and its severity. This approach leads to management apprehensions about
how best to avoid, eradicate or diminish potential threats as well as aid in
decision making about the costs and benefits of risk management. Risk tol-
erability is explained by Grimaldi and Simonds (1989), were it is identified
that hazards are preferably eliminated or neutralised by fail safe methods so
that no danger is present, however, this does not work in practice. The toler-
ability of the risk imposed after the application of the most effective controls
practicable, governs the hazard’s acceptability. Risk tolerability generally is
determined as a combination of the seriousness of the effects and the likelihood
of the undesirable event. Furthermore, occasionally, sensitivity of exposure is
included in the combination too (for example, ethical and legal responsibility).
At the same time, Joughin (2011) adds to this argument by presenting the
fatality guidelines developed in the United Kingdom (UK) for major indus-
trial hazards in the form of an F-N diagram as can be seen in Figure 2.9. In
this figure, N denotes the number of fatalities in a single event, and F de-
notes the frequency of occurrence of N or more fatalities in a year. This figure
encloses three regions, the negligible region, the As Low As Reasonably Practi-
cable (ALARP) region, and the intolerable region, furthermore, three lines are
superimposed on the figure which identify what the Netherlands legislation,
UK Health & Safety Executive and Hong Kong upper risk guidelines perceive
and declare as their tolerable limit.
Webber-Youngman and Van Wyk (2013) ascertain that it is confirmed that
fatalities are cyclical in nature, that there are periods of high fatality rates fol-
lowed by periods of lower fatality rates, which is often due to concentrated
devotion to improve adherence to safety standards, especially during the peri-
ods of higher fatality rates. However, in endeavouring to make a meaningful
strive towards zero harm, the aim should be to minimise these cyclical ten-
dencies. Regularly automation is identified as a method to avoid the human-
hazard interactions, however, Hovden et al. (2010) consider that automation
is not necessarily the approach to take. To illustrate this point, take the case
study of occupational accidents and costs in the Norwegian furniture industry
reported by Hovden et al. (2010). This case study revealed that automation
of the production line reduced the number of injuries, especially the cutting
of fingers, but it also revealed that maintenance and handling of disruptions
resulted in more severe injuries, such as the amputation of arms.
Hoyos et al. (1988) present that the likelihood of a man-machine system
being a success or failure is a combination of human reliability and equipment
reliability. Human behaviour is difficult to define. Figure 2.8 presented by
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Figure 1 presents the fatality guidelines developed in the UK for major industrial hazards in the form of an F-N diagram. F
represents the frequency of occurrence of N or more fatalities in a year and N represents the number of fatalities in a single event,
for example, the failure of a dam or the crash of an airliner. These criteria were the result of the major hazards transport study
conducted by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK. The vertical axis on this graph is the annual rate of occurrence, F, of
N or more fatalities. Of particular note is the zone defined as negligible. The frequency of 1x10-4 for a single fatality comes from a
comparison with the Age Specific Death Rates (ASDR) of males from all causes in the USA, Figure 2, where the lowest ASDR is a
little more than 0.1 per 1000 per annum at the age of 10 years. This therefore implies that, should the fatality risk to a worker be
limited to within 1 in 10,000 per annum, he will not be exposed to a significantly higher risk than death due to other causes. This is
a very conservative number and does not represent the fatality risk due to natural causes of the age group at work.  A more realistic
figure and generally accepted within industries is 1 per 1,000 per annum.
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Figure 1   F-N diagram.  F, along the vertical axis, represents the frequency of occurrence of N or more fatalities in a year and N represents the number of
fatalities in a single event. 
Figure 2   Age Specific Death Rates for males in the USA and South Africa. Deaths per1000 in a year at a particular age.
Figu 2.9: F-N diagram (adapted from Joughin (2011))
Attwood et al. (2006) of Tomas’ SEM identifies some associations to a humans
behaviour. Hovden et al. (2010) give some insight by stating that humans
have the inclination to underestimate known risks and overvalue new risks.
Moreover, Hofmann and Tetrick (2003) add to this insight by stating that
job diversity may potentially alleviate boredom and improve attentiveness,
thereby reducing risks, whereas excess job demands may cause workers to take
shortcuts, thereby increasing the possibility of injuries. Luckily, equipment re-
liability is more defined. Equipment reliability can be divided into six types of
failure probabilities, which is presented by PRAGMA (2013). These six types
are presented in Figure 2.10 and they are, worst old, bathtub, slow aging, best
new, constant and worst new. The first three contribute to 11% of equipment
failures, while the last three take up the remaining 89% of equipment failures.
Furthermore, the first three are generally more common in mechanical systems,
while the last three are generally more common in electrical systems.
The ‘Worst Old’ case is the least common failure mechanism and an ex-
ample of this type of system would include impellers, crusher jaws, tracks and
liners. The ‘Bathtub’ case is a combination of ‘Worst New’ and ‘Worst Old’
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Worst Old 
Bathtub 
Slow Aging 
Best New 
Constant 
Worst New 
Mechanical 
Electrical 
89% of failures 
11% of failures 
Figure 2.10: Six classes of equipment failure probability (adapted from
PRAGMA (2013))
cases. It has a high probability of failure at the beginning and end of its
life and an example of this case is a simple electromechanical system. The
‘Slow Aging’ case is a steady increase of probability of failure with age. It is
generally associated with corrosion or creep and an example includes pipes,
tyres and clutches. The ‘Best New’ case is not age related, except for the
beginning of the equipment’s life, an example would be hydraulics or pneu-
matics. The ‘Constant’ case is not age related, it is just random failure that
is generally associated with complex equipment systems, a light bulb is an
example of this equipment failure type. Lastly, the ‘Worst New’ case is the
most common failure mechanism for complex equipment, an example would
be electronics and avionics. Knowing these different failure modes for differ-
ent types of equipment helps with knowing when to perform maintenance or
perform condition monitoring to prevent unplanned equipment failure, which
can place an operator in danger.
Jansen and Brent (2005) identify that hazards and risks inflicted on work-
ers safety and well-being should be identified and evaluated on a continuous
basis. From a combination of Jansen and Brent (2005) and Hoyos et al. (1988),
a priority order of preventative and proactive measures that should be imple-
mented are identified and ranked in order of efficiency of accident prevention,
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as listed below:
G Elimination of the hazard/risk
G Control of the hazard/risk at source and separation of the hazard and
man
G Minimise the risk/hazard by the design of safe work systems
G Personal and technical protection
G Safety psychology
Statistically, South Africa has far higher road accidents than the UK and
United States of America (USA). Joughin (2011) concludes that this is due
to the South African culture not being risk averse. This willingness to take
risks is also problematic in the South African mining industry. Furthermore,
Webber-Youngman and Van Wyk (2013) identify that in the setting of the
South African mining industry with its diverse workforce, it becomes a very
serious challenge to ensure that every person that is exposed to risks compre-
hends the consequences of unsafe actions. This is due to the fact that South
Africa has a multi-cultural and multi-lingual environment where the language
can perhaps be a risk as well, as such the meaning of different risks and the
prevention and or dealing with them can be understood differently by unalike
linguistic groups. This in itself is a major risk, as one can never be sure that
the equivalent message was heard by all as it was intended. Lastly, Jansen and
Brent (2005) add that despite the mining industry growing and consequently
facing the risks associated with greater than before mining depths, as well as
extended tramming distances, of which this expansion is critical for employ-
ment and economic growth in South Africa, it cannot be completed at the
expense of health and safety.
The South African Department of Mineral Resources (2013g) divide fatal-
ities by classification, these classifications can be perceived as the risks asso-
ciated with mining, they can be seen in Table 2.5. Understandably, the risk
percentages for injuries and fatalities may differ, but they all bring a certain
amount of risk into the mining industry. Wannenburg (2011) adds that these
risks also vary between underground deep (underground operation with shafts
more than 1000 m in depth) and underground shallow (underground operation
with shafts less than 1000 m in depth) mines, however underground shallow
and surface mines (which includes open-cast operations, surface complement
at underground mines, as well as processing plants) contain similar risks.
According to the research of Groves et al. (2007), the six main causes of
injuries in the mining industry are, handling material, slip or fall of person,
machinery, hand tools, fall of roof and powered haulage. The six main causes
of fatalities in mining is power haulage, machinery, fall of roof, slip or fall of
person, electrical and fall of face. Rupprecht (2011) adds to this by associating
transportation to 26% of all mine accidents in South Africa, which includes
vertical (e.g. shaft), horizontal (e.g. haulages) and in-stope transportation
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Table 2.5: South African mining fatalities per risk classification (adapted from
South African Department of Mineral Resources (2013d), South African De-
partment of Mineral Resources (2013e), South African Department of Min-
eral Resources (2013f ) and South African Department of Mineral Resources
(2013g))
Classification 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fall of ground 56 65 48 40 26
Machinery 4 8 3 5 8
Transportation and mining 41 47 37 38 29
General 45 32 20 25 35
Conveyance accidents 13 2 1 3 1
Electricity 5 5 3 3 5
Fires 2 0 5 0 0
Explosives 2 4 5 4 4
Subsidence/caving 0 0 0 0 1
Heat Sickness 1 4 2 2 2
Miscellaneous 2 1 3 3 1
Total 171 168 127 123 112
systems. Furthermore, Groves et al. (2007) identify that the newer a person is
to their job, the greater the probability is of them being involved in an accident.
Especially those with less than five years experience in their present job. Thus
experience in a job is a factor to keep in mind. Lastly, Hermanus (2007)
states that dust and noise are inherently associated with rock breaking and in
underground mines, air and light must be supplied artificially, which all have
their own associated risks attached. On top of this, blasting, as well as mining
itself, releases harmful gases into the underground environment. Also, often
miners generally operate in cramped conditions, do heavy work and handle
heavy equipment which presents ergonomic hazards. This all contributes to
increased safety risks.
2.4 Influencing Factors
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) state that the majority of incidents that fill
safety records could be predicted and so cannot be considered exclusively as
accidental. Furthermore, their causes and resolutions were established already
by numerous similar previous occurrences. Kunar et al. (2010) add to this by
stating that it is acknowledged that job-related hazards and individual factors
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influence occupational injuries. Equally important, Grimaldi and Simonds
(1989) identify that performance measurement systems should identify the
factors that are most substantial to achieving the desired result and should
weigh them up consistently. In addition, Hofmann and Tetrick (2003) state
that although most studies propose that work characteristics do affect injuries,
there is little consistency concerning which work characteristics are significant
(e.g. workload, job boredom, physical hazards, etc.).
According to Hoyos et al. (1988), all accidents derive from the three follow-
ing sources, specific job oversights and omissions, general management systems
and assumed risk. Specific job oversights and omissions deals with technical
information systems, facilities of functional operability, maintenance and in-
spection as well as supervision of management. General management systems
deals with plant policies, implementation of methods, staff, information flow,
management services, budgets and risk assessment systems. Assumed risk
deals with risks that are known but for some reason not controlled, reasons
can vary from unavailability of preventive measures to unacceptable cost ben-
efit relationships.
Hoyos et al. (1988) ascertain that human error is responsible for the major-
ity of the causes of incidents and that human error is not similar for dissimilar
skill levels. Wang and Guo (May 2013) confirm this by referring to Heinrich’s
Accident Causation Chain Theory which was developed through the explo-
ration of 75000 accidents. From all these accidents, it was identified that 88%
of them were triggered by unsafe human behaviour, 10% by the unsafe state
of things and 2% were due to uncontrollable factors. In addition, Hoyos et al.
(1988) identify some human behavioural factors that influence the occurrence
of an incident. Namely, insufficient acceptance of technical safety precautions,
lack of information for ability to work safely, lack of knowledge or training
(limit to human capacities for perception and information processing) and
production rate (pressure resulting from too little time or from compulsion to
perform).
Hoyos et al. (1988) state that human senses are crucial to hazard identifi-
cation. He lists the five human senses along with their threshold values:
G Light - A candle flame 48.3 kilometers away on a dark clear night.
G Sound - The tick of a watch under quiet conditions 6.1 meters away.
G Taste - One teaspoon of sugar in 9.1 litres of water.
G Smell - One drop of perfume diffused into the entire volume of a three
room apartment.
G Touch - The wing of a bee falling on the cheek from a distance of one
centimeter.
Also, Hoyos et al. (1988) identify that radioactivity, bacteria, viruses, electric-
ity, too little oxygen in the air breathed and vapours emitted by solvents are
a few hazards which cannot be perceived by humans.
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Kunar et al. (2010) finds that on a daily basis, mine-workers are exposed to
numerous job-related hazards such as heat, humidity, noise, dust, inadequate
ventilation and slippery floors, all of which undoubtedly inflict additional pres-
sures. Hoyos et al. (1988) enhance this list with identifying monotony, restric-
tions with respect to movement, night time and changing shifts as job-related
hazards too. Furthermore, Hoyos et al. (1988) identify that even simple acci-
dents tend to be complex in terms of numerous causal factors and preventive
measures. Additionally, Wang and Guo (May 2013) identify four main cat-
egories that all influencing factors fall into. These are human factors (e.g.
physiological, psychological, technical quality, etc.), machine factors (e.g. old
or new machine, advanced level, reliability, etc.), environmental factors (e.g.
temperature, humidity, illumination, noise, air quality, etc.) and management
factors (e.g. scientific management, safety supervision, safety training, etc.).
All four of these categories are interrelated and are explored further in the
next sections.
2.4.1 Human factors
Amongst Leveson (2004), Wang and Guo (May 2013), and Wong (2010) it
is agreed that between 70% to 80% of accidents are caused by human error.
Wang and Guo (May 2013) add that these human factors include physiological,
psychological, quality of work and safety values. Leveson (2004) defines human
error as “any deviation from the performance of a specified or prescribed se-
quence of actions”. However, as operators endeavour to become more efficient
and productive and have to deal with time pressures, their instructions and
written procedures are almost never followed precisely. Leveson (2004) con-
tinues that a common method for workers to apply pressure to management
without actually going on strike is to work to rule, which can lead to a collapse
in productivity.
Leveson (2004) identifies that humans are progressively sharing more con-
trol of systems with automation and are moving into situations of higher-level
decision making with automation implementing the decisions. These changes
are leading to new types of human error and a new distribution of human
errors; for example, an increasingly significant factor in accidents is the inade-
quacies in communication between humans and machines. This lead to several
recent accidents that were blamed on operator error, although they could more
correctly be categorised as a consequence from flawed system and interface de-
sign. Figure 2.11 depicts the human-machine interface, the figure shows that
the human has to be able to make sense of the data fed out by the machine,
then make a decision about what to do and lastly manually input the action to
be taken. Multiple errors can be made here, such as not fully understanding
the data, not receiving enough data, forming the wrong conclusions and tak-
ing the wrong action. This leads Leveson (2004) to state that going forward
from here, formulating new and more effective accident models will necessitate
transferring the emphasis in explaining the role of humans in accidents from
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error or deviations from normative procedures to pay more attention on the
mechanisms and factors that shape human behaviour.
Human
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Figure 2.11: Human control loop (adapted from Wong (2010))
Wong (2010) confirms the argument of Leveson (2004) by stating that
accidents are not necessarily the operators fault, often the factors that caused
the operators error may be the prime cause of the accident. Furthermore, Wong
(2010) defines four central factors that influence human behaviour and as such
can influence an accident. These four factors are ergonomics, anthropometrics,
physiology, and psychology.
Firstly, ergonomics refers to the design of machines and equipment such
that it matches the capacities of the people who will be operating it. Er-
gonomics can be made up of the working environment (e.g. temperature,
lighting, noise and space), mental capacity of humans (e.g. match the de-
sign to the mental ability and skills of the operators and maintenance staff),
the human control loop (e.g. Figure 2.11), information (e.g. unambiguous
and sufficient data in order to lead to a clearly defined course of action, as
too much data can cause confusion and bewilderment and too little data may
cause a wrong conclusion), and operator controls (e.g. the arrangement of
controls must be in some logical order and in some sort of symmetry to help
prevent the operator selecting the wrong item in a moment of panic or loss of
concentration).
Secondly, anthropometrics deals with humans being different (e.g. different
sizes and shapes due to sex or ethnicity etc.) which needs to be taken into
consideration in design (e.g. short people cannot see out of a car window or
an overweight person cannot work in a confined space).
Next, physiology deals with the human physical factors and limits. Wong
(2010) states that despite a human having five senses, they in general only use
two in the working environment, these being sight and sound. Furthermore,
there are two main causes of accidents associated to physiology; these are task
overload and fatigue.
Lastly, psychology is significant in how people perform as well as the atti-
tudes they have, what is more, humans are not robots, they reason and have
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emotions that affect the way they behave. There are five factors that psychol-
ogy can be divided into, firstly, mental state of humans, which are emotional
factors that are challenging to account for and to detect such as lack of concen-
tration, lack of motivation, a conscious disregard to instructions, etc. Secondly,
fixed mind set, such as operators cutting corners because they know their per-
formance is measured by productive output. Next, complacency, which refers
to a relaxed state of mind without fear or stress, in this case an operator is
no longer alert for possible hazardous situations. Fourthly, mental capacity,
it is known that everyone has different capacities and overloading a person
inflicts a risk of mental breakdown and possibly chronic depression. Lastly,
communication should be clear, for example, management needs to ensure a
suitable shift overlap to allow clear communication between shifts to prevent
anything being misunderstood.
Hoyos et al. (1988) identify factors that influence human errors, these fac-
tors are very similar to those identified by Wong (2010) stated above. Hoyos
et al. (1988) influential factors are presented below:
G Causes of human malfunctioning
External events
Excessive task demands
Operator capacity
Human variability
G Situational factors
Task characteristics
Physical environment
Work time characteristics
G Performance shaping factors
Subjective goals
Mental load
Affective components
Physiological stressors
Paul and Maiti (2005) identify that employees who are more involved in
their jobs exhibit better safety performance, which consequently diminishes
occupational injuries. Furthermore, occupational stress and the safety en-
vironment predict the employee’s job involvement and occupational hazards
induce more occupational stress in the workers while social support mitigates
the same. This leads Paul and Maiti (2005) to conclude that job stress and the
safety environment are the two key factors that influence work related injuries
in mines. Furthermore, Kunar et al. (2010) and O’Toole (2002) identify age
to influence the occurrence of accidents; they believe that younger people are
more likely to suffer occupational injury due to a lack of knowledge.
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In addition to this, Hoyos et al. (1988) identify more human behavioural
factors that influence the occurrence of incidents. Namely, insufficient accep-
tance of technical safety precautions, lack of information in order to work
safely, lack of knowledge or training (limit to human capacities for perception
and information processing), and production rate (pressure resulting from too
little time or from compulsion to perform).
Hoyos et al. (1988) identify repetitive work as a factor that influences ac-
cidents, additionally, repetitive work can lead to fatigue and as Wong (2010)
says, fatigue is a major cause of accidents. Furthermore, Theron and van
Heerden (2011) identify that fatigue is one of the major causal and/or con-
tributing factors when it comes to causes of fatalities in the mining industry.
Additionally, Schutte (2010) confirms this by stating that there have been
numerous accidents in the South African mining industry where fatigue was
acknowledged as either causal or contributory.
Schutte (2010) and Theron and van Heerden (2011) identify that fatigue is
not merely tiredness, but also a feeling of weariness or a deficiency of energy
that does not go away with rest, and it has a direct effect on alertness and
work performance. Theron and van Heerden (2011) identify two varieties of
fatigue, namely, physical fatigue in which a person’s muscles are unable to
perform activities as effortlessly as they normally do, and psychological fatigue
in which it is a challenge to concentrate for extended periods of time.
Theron and van Heerden (2011) identifies the harshness of fatigue by stat-
ing that by remaining awake for 17 hours is equivalent to having a 0.05 blood
alcohol level, and by staying awake for 20 hours is equivalent to having a 0.1
blood alcohol level. Currently in South Africa, the legal blood alcohol limit
to drive is 0.05 and to enter some mines this limit is 0.00. However, fatigue
cannot be picked up through a simple breathalyser and as such, organisations
need to be very cautious of fatigue.
Schutte (2010) identifies that high levels of fatigue cause reduced perfor-
mance and productivity in the workplace and increase the threat of accidents
and injuries taking place, as well as affecting the capacity to think clearly,
which is imperative when making safety related decisions and judgements.
Theron and van Heerden (2011) add to this by stating that a person’s ca-
pacity to function can be significantly affected by fatigue. This leads to the
understanding that the effects of fatigue include decreased performance and
productivity and increased potential for incidents/injuries to transpire. Fa-
tigue can lead to incidents/injuries due to it affecting a number of key mental
and physical abilities. For example, fatigue can result in impaired concen-
tration, poor judgement, reduced hand-eye coordination and slower reaction
times.
Lastly, Schutte (2010) identifies that the threat of fatigue is inherent in
shift work and work that is physically or mentally demanding, repetitive or
requiring high vigilance. Theron and van Heerden (2011) add that fatigue can
be a normal and important human response to physical exertion, poor eating
habits, emotional stress, boredom or lack of sleep and thus needs to be handled
and controlled cautiously.
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2.4.2 Machine factors
According to Wang and Guo (May 2013), there are three important machine
factors that influence accidents which include equipment condition, ability to
adapt to the change of the external environment and machine running stabil-
ity. It should also be noted that, an item of equipment failing and triggering
an incident is not necessarily the root cause of the incident but improper or
insufficient maintenance, which linked to human behaviour, could be identi-
fied as the root cause of the incident and not the equipment. However, with
respect to this research and for the purpose of this study, these factors will
not be included due to the fact that the model to be created is focussed on
being mine specific and not equipment specific. Although, it should be stated
that the occupation section under the management factors will account for
factors such as if the employee works behind a desk or is involved in hauling
etc., because occupation is a more generalised and measurable factor linking
groups of equipment to employees that work with them.
2.4.3 Environmental factors
As identified by Wang and Guo (May 2013), the environmental factors that
influence accidents include, temperature, humidity, lighting, noise, dust, toxic
and harmful concentrations of gases in the underground working environment.
For the purpose of this section, three groupings have been used, namely, time of
day, temperature & humidity and noise. The lighting factor will be combined
into the time of day. The location factor, dust and toxic and harmful gases will
be incorporated into the occupation factors, under the management factors.
2.4.3.1 Time of day
Temperature, humidity, and lighting are a few of the environmental factors
influencing incidents as identified by Wang and Guo (May 2013) and Wong
(2010). These three factors can be loosely related to the time of the day, as
well as the time of year, thus the section on time of day relating to incidents
is explored.
Hoyos et al. (1988), Theron and van Heerden (2011), and Schutte (2010)
all agree that more accidents occur during night shifts because it is more
demanding to concentrate at night when a person would ordinarily be sleep-
ing/resting. Additionally, the physiological inclination to sleep at night and to
be awake during the day is influential, and problems can occur when disrupt-
ing this tendency. This can lead to fatigue, as discussed earlier, which causes
reduced workplace performance and productivity, as well as an increased risk
of accidents and injuries.
However, in research performed by Jansen and Brent (2005) amongst mul-
tiple mines in Rustenburg in 2003, the majority of fatal accidents occurred
during the morning shift when early inspection takes place and working areas
are being made safe. Additionally, 33% of the fatally injured were in supervi-
sory positions, indicating possible inadequate safety awareness.
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Furthermore, Attwood et al. (2006) identify from a statistical analysis of
a database of more than one thousand offshore accidents, in an attempt to
extract possible relationships between the accidents and the operations being
undertaken at the time, that about 32% of injuries between 10am and 11am
were categorised as fatal or major, compared to 19% for the remaining 23
hours. Figures 2.12 and 2.13 represent the actual accidents and fatalities by
time of day in 2010 as presented by the South African Department of Mineral
Resources (DMR). From these figures it can be seen that fatal and non-fatal
injuries are more prominent during the working day (7am to 4pm), which is
counterintuitive with regards to the earlier discussion.
However, one can deduce that despite it being seen as more dangerous to
work late at night, there are more employees working during the day and thus
the sample space exposed to hazards and risks during the day time is larger
and hence more accidents occur during the day. Another possible explanation
for these graphs could be that maintenance of equipment generally only occurs
during the day shift and there is a high risk for injury during maintenance.
0
50
100
150
200
250
Time of day
00
:0
0 
− 
00
:5
9
01
:0
0 
− 
01
:5
9
02
:0
0 
− 
02
:5
9
03
:0
0 
− 
03
:5
9
04
:0
0 
− 
04
:5
9
05
:0
0 
− 
05
:5
9
06
:0
0 
− 
06
:5
9
07
:0
0 
− 
07
:5
9
08
:0
0 
− 
08
:5
9
09
:0
0 
− 
09
:5
9
10
:0
0 
− 
10
:5
9
11
:0
0 
− 
11
:5
9
12
:0
0 
− 
12
:5
9
13
:0
0 
− 
13
:5
9
14
:0
0 
− 
14
:5
9
15
:0
0 
− 
15
:5
9
16
:0
0 
− 
16
:5
9
17
:0
0 
− 
17
:5
9
18
:0
0 
− 
18
:5
9
19
:0
0 
− 
19
:5
9
20
:0
0 
− 
20
:5
9
21
:0
0 
− 
21
:5
9
22
:0
0 
− 
22
:5
9
23
:0
0 
− 
23
:5
9
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
in
ju
ri
e
s
Figure 2.12: Actual injuries by time of day 2010 (adapted from South African
Department of Mineral Resources (2013b))
2.4.3.2 Temperature & Humidity
As identified by Wang and Guo (May 2013), Wong (2010) and Kunar et al.
(2010), temperature and humidity are two work related hazards miners are
exposed to daily, which undoubtedly impose additional stresses and partake in
influencing the occurrence of an accident. Theron and van Heerden (2011) add
that workers exposed to thermal stress for prolonged periods become fatigued
which leads to heat exhaustion and contributes to multiple physiological dis-
turbances such as excessive cardiovascular strain and hyperthermia. Also, as
discussed earlier, fatigue is a prominent contributing factor to accidents.
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Figure 2.13: Actual fatalities by time of day 2010 (adapted from South African
Department of Mineral Resources (2013a))
Hoyos et al. (1988) identify that in a work environment of temperatures over
30◦C, there is an evident and relatively radical deterioration in performance
which increases unsafe worker behaviour and thus increases the potential for
an accident to occur.
HSE (2014) and National Weather Service (2014) define the Wet Bulb
Globe Temperature (WBGT) as the most widely used and accepted index for
the assessment of heat stress in industry. It is a measure of the heat stress
which takes into account temperature, humidity, wind speed, sun angle and
cloud cover (solar radiation). Additionally, Ramsey et al. (1983) state that
the WBGT is the recommended thermal index by the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health. Donoghue et al. (2000) recognise that in
South African underground Gold mines, a WBGT of 26.5◦C to 28.3◦C and
higher can cause heat stroke.
In Figure 2.14 the Unsafe Behaviour Index (UBI) is plotted as a function
of WBGT. This is a predicted second order regression for three different
workloads (light, medium, and heavy) as presented by Ramsey et al. (1983).
From the study of Ramsey et al. (1983), it was established that the region
of preferred WBGT temperature was 17◦C to 23◦C. This is an optimal range
of thermal conditions within which people demonstrate the best performance
in terms of error rates, learning time and production values. Outside of this
range an individual’s performance deteriorates.
Donoghue et al. (2000) deliberate the reasoning for the incidence of heat
exhaustion increasing during summer and at depth underground. This is due
to increased temperature and humidity in deep underground mines. Further-
more, Donoghue et al. (2000) identify six factors that affect this increase in
temperature, firstly, the surface air temperature and humidity may be high to
begin with. Secondly, rock temperature increases with depth, this is known as
geothermal gradient. Thirdly, air temperature also increases with depth due
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Figure 2.14: UBI versus temperature recreated from Ramsey et al. (1983)
to increasing air pressure, this is known as auto-compression. Next, ground-
water and mine water transfer heat to the air by evaporation and increase the
humidity. Also, most of the energy consumed by mining machinery and equip-
ment is liberated as heat, be it electrical, compressed air, or diesel. Lastly, less
important sources of heat underground include human metabolism, oxidation
processes, explosives blasting, rock movement and pipelines.
2.4.3.3 Noise
Wilkins and Acton (1982), Wong (2010), Wang and Guo (May 2013), and
Theron and van Heerden (2011) all agree that noise is a factor that leads
to accidents as well as increased fatigue. It reduces alertness, overpowers
acoustic signals such as warning cries, sirens and machine sounds and it hinders
communication when protective devices must be worn to protect ones hearing
(e.g. PPE). Furthermore, Hoyos et al. (1988) identify a relationship between
the average number of errors and increasing noise in tasks demanding optical
vigilance. In addition, Kunar et al. (2010) and Hermanus (2007) identify that
noise levels are known to be high in mines and as such miners are exposed
daily to noise which will impose additional stresses.
Hermanus (2007) continues that the well-known problem in mining, noise
exposure, is due to the use of heavy equipment, drilling and rock breaking,
transferring material, sorting and milling of rock, and confined working condi-
tions. Hermanus (2007) identifies that from available data for noise exposure
to South African miners, that nearly half the employees are exposed to deaf-
ening noise, and of these workers, more than 90% work in zones in which noise
exceeds the 85dBA time weighted average, with 11% working in zones in which
the noise levels are even higher.
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2.4.4 Management factors
As identified by Wang and Guo (May 2013), management factors include, co-
ordination of people, machine and environmental factors in production, no
loopholes in management, and no defects in a system. This section focuses
on three factors, namely, production rate which relates to the stress placed
on an employee, shift length which incorporates the time into the shift, and
occupation which acknowledges there are different risks associated with differ-
ent occupational functions in the mining sector. The effects of management
interventions are not explored.
2.4.4.1 Production rate
Wong (2010), Wang and Guo (May 2013), and Hoyos et al. (1988) identify
that overloaded production, production rate and task overload are some main
causes of accidents. Production rate influences the occurrence of accidents be-
cause it generates a pressure resulting from insufficient time to complete a task
or it creates a compulsion to perform, at which time safety is not a primary
concern. Additionally, Ramsey et al. (1983) identify that higher workloads,
result in higher values of UBI. Paul and Maiti (2005) add to this by identi-
fying that production pressure is a significant factor in accident development.
Furthermore, Paul and Maiti (2005) state that pressure on production seems
to lead to an escalation in disabling injuries, which as a consequence reduces
the production. Lastly, Leveson (2004) finds that written procedures and in-
structions are seldom followed precisely as workers endeavour to become more
efficient and productive and have to deal with time pressures. This also leads
to the increased potential for accidents to occur.
2.4.4.2 Shift length
Ramsey et al. (1983) identify that the time into the shift has noteworthy
effects on worker safety related behaviour. Furthermore, Attwood et al. (2006)
identify that in the off shore oil and gas industry, in the first hour subsequent
to a shift change a large percentage of accidents occurred. Moreover, Hoyos
et al. (1988) identify that the risk of an accident is higher during a shift change.
Lastly, Theron and van Heerden (2011) identify that irregular working hours
can cause fatigue which in turn influences the occurrence of incidents.
2.4.4.3 Occupation
Maiti and Bhattacherjee (2001), O’Toole (2002) and Wang and Guo (May
2013) identify that workplace location influences the occurrence of accidents.
Karra (2005) states that with respect to location in the mining sector, occu-
pational risk in underground mining is much higher than in surface mining.
Furthermore, the location can in general be linked to the occupation, for exam-
ple, mechanics work in certain locations primarily, and drillers work in different
locations primarily. Thus the occupation is explored as an influential factor.
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Karra (2005), Paul and Maiti (2005), O’Toole (2002), and Maiti and Bhat-
tacherjee (2001) identify that occupation groups or job categories are predictor
variables that influence the occurrence of accidents. Paul and Maiti (2005)
state that haulage workers are the most accident prone work group, followed
by loaders, due to slip and fall being a major contributory cause of the ac-
cident occurrences. Kunar et al. (2010) add that material handling related
hazards are more influential factors for injuries compared to other job hazards
in underground coal mines.
2.5 Modelling Techniques
According to ScienceDaily (2014) a mathematical model is an abstract model
that uses mathematical language to describe the behaviour of a system. In
addition to this, de Vries (2001) identifies mathematical modelling as the use
of mathematics to describe and explain real-world phenomena, investigate im-
portant questions about the observed world, test ideas and make predictions
about the real world, as can be seen in Figure 2.15. Klir and Yuan (1995) add
that the purpose of constructing models is to understand some phenomenon
of reality, be it natural or man-made, to make adequate predictions or retrod-
ictions, to learn how to control the phenomenon in any desirable way and how
to utilise all these capabilities for various ends. Furthermore, de Vries (2001)
states that there is no best model, only better models. He quotes Howard
Emmons about the challenge in mathematical modelling,
“The challenge in mathematical modelling is not to produce the
most comprehensive descriptive model but to produce the simplest
possible model that incorporates the major features of the phe-
nomenon of interest.”
Model 
Mathematical 
Conclusions 
Predictions / 
Explanations 
Real-World 
Data 
Formulation 
Interpretation 
Test Analysis 
Figure 2.15: The process of mathematical modelling (adapted from de Vries
(2001))
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Lastly, Klir and Yuan (1995) identify that the aim in model construction
is to attempt to always maximise its utility. This is connected closely with
the relationship amongst three key characteristics of every systems model:
uncertainty, complexity and credibility. Uncertainty can be very valuable when
considered in connection to the other characteristics of systems models. In
general, allowing more uncertainty tends to reduce complexity and increase
credibility of the resulting model. The challenge is to find an optimum level
of uncertainty for the problem at hand. This section on modelling techniques
covers five techniques, namely, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Fuzzy Logic,
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Hidden Markov Model (HMM), and Learning
Decision Trees.
2.5.1 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
Page et al. (1993) and Nelles (2001) state that Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN) materialised from studies of biological structures of how human and
animal brains perform operations, which are tremendously powerful for tasks
such as information processing, learning and adaption. Russel and Norvig
(2010) add that ANN have the aptitude to execute distributed computation,
withstand noisy inputs and learn, however, regardless of Bayesian networks
having the same properties, ANN persist as one of the most prevalent and
effective forms of learning systems. Page et al. (1993) suggest that ANN are
popular due to their capacity to characterise non-linear systems. Furthermore,
Page et al. (1993) and Nelles (2001) identify four central attributes of neural
networks as described below,
G Capability of learning by example.
G The trained network is capable of producing sensible outputs when pre-
sented with new unseen input data.
G Robust to noisy data that occurs in real world applications.
G In general, network performance does not significantly degenerate if some
of the network connections become faulty.
Larose (2005) confirms that with respect to noisy data ANN are robust be-
cause the network comprises of multiple nodes, with every connection assigned
different weights, thus an ANN can acquire the ability to function around un-
informative examples in a data set. Mitchell (1997) adds that ANN can be
used for decision tree learning tasks with comparable accuracy. Furthermore,
Mitchell (1997) identifies that ANN are one of the most effective learning
methods for learning to understand multifaceted everyday data, as well as
they offer a general, practical method for learning real-valued, discrete-valued
and vector-valued functions from examples.
Nelles (2001) and Page et al. (1993) find that the most broadly recognised
and used ANN architecture is the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) network. The
MLP network is comprised of one input layer, multiple hidden layers (usually
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one or two) and one output layer, as can be seen in Figure 2.16. Page et al.
(1993) add that the MLP network can accurately characterise any continuous
non-linear function connecting the inputs to outputs. Furthermore, Russel and
Norvig (2010) state that with one adequately sized hidden layer, representing
any continuous function of the inputs with good accuracy is possible, and with
two hidden layers even discontinuous functions can be represented. However,
Russel and Norvig (2010) find that very large networks generalise well if the
weights are kept small, otherwise the large networks may memorise all the
training examples and then not generalise well to new unseen inputs, which is
known as over-fitting.
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Figure 2.16: Schematic of a MLP Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) model
with one hidden layer (adapted from Nelles (2001))
Page et al. (1993) state that in a MLP network the outputs of each node in
a layer is linked to the inputs of all the nodes in the subsequent layer. For one
hidden layer as in Figure 2.16, the output neuron, yˆ, is a linear combination of
the hidden layer neurons, Φi, with an offset (or bias or threshold), w0, which
is expressed mathematically in Equation 2.5.1.
yˆ =
m∑
i=0
wiΦi(
n∑
j=0
wijuj) (2.5.1)
where:
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m is the number of hidden neurons.
n is the number of inputs.
wi are the output layer weights.
wij are the hidden layer weights.
uj are the inputs.
Φi is the output from the hidden layer neurons.
An activation function is a function which defines the output of a node.
It scales the output value to a discrete value of ‘0’ or ‘1’ (Hard Limiter), or
to a continuous value between ‘0’ and ‘1’ (Sigmoid, Threshold) or ‘−1’ and
‘1’ (Tanh), depending on the function selected. Four activation functions are
identified from the text, and they are presented in Figure 2.17. Of these acti-
vation functions, Page et al. (1993), Russel and Norvig (2010), Nelles (2001),
Mitchell (1997), and Larose (2005) all agree that the sigmoid (or logistic) func-
tion is the most common activation function used. Furthermore, Russel and
Norvig (2010) state that the sigmoid function is most popular, because it is
differentiable.
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Figure 2.17: Activation functions (adapted from Page et al. (1993) and Nelles
(2001))
Page et al. (1993) state that training the model using a set of input and
output data determines the suitable values for the network weights (including
the bias). Furthermore, Page et al. (1993) state that training speed is influ-
enced by the quantity of nodes in the network and therefore the quantity of
nodes necessary should be determined by the complexity of the relationships
between the input and output data. They suggest using a Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) as a technique to measure the relative contribution of
the inputs to output variations. Additionally, they propose using the PCA
values to initialise the weights for the model, although Mitchell (1997) recom-
mends initialising all the network weights with small random values between
−0.5 and 0.5. Notwithstanding which method is used to initialise the weights,
numerous texts suggest that the back-propagation algorithm is used for train-
ing the model, as it is the most popular technique. Mitchell (1997) adds that
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multilayer networks trained with back-propagation are capable of expressing
a large variety of non-linear decision surfaces.
Mitchell (1997) states that the back-propagation algorithm for a multi-
layer network learns the weights using a gradient descent optimisation to try
minimise the squared error between the network output values and the target
values for these outputs. Equation 2.5.2 presents the mathematical represen-
tation for the squared error between the network output values and the target
values for these outputs.
E(~w) ≡ 1
2
∑
d∈D
∑
k∈O
(tkd − okd)2 (2.5.2)
where:
d is the training example.
D is the set of training examples.
k is the kth output.
O is the set of output units in the network.
tkd is the target value of the kth output and dth training example.
okd is the output value of the kth output and dth training example.
Mitchell (1997) continues, that in multilayer networks multiple local minima
can be found on the error surface and the gradient descent search is only
guaranteed to converge towards some local minima and not necessarily the
global minimum error. However, despite this, back-propagation still produces
outstanding results. The back-propagation algorithm starts by creating a net-
work with the preferred number of hidden and output nodes and all weights
are initialised. Then for each training example, it applies the network to the
example, computes the gradient with respect to the error on this example,
then updates the weights in the network. This gradient descent step is then
iterated until the network performs acceptably well.
2.5.2 Fuzzy logic
Ross (2010) identifies that for a typical problem, just a minor portion of knowl-
edge or information might be considered as certain or deterministic, and Klir
and Yuan (1995) confirm this by stating that uncertainty is unavoidable. Ad-
ditionally, Nguyen and Walker (2005) state that conveying knowledge and
information using every day natural language has a copious amount of impre-
cision and vagueness, or fuzziness. For example, statements such as, “Jaco is
short” and “Marinel is young” are vague. A primary concern from such im-
precise statements is how to represent, manipulate and draw inferences from
them. Moreover, Klir and Yuan (1995) identify that linguistic concepts are
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vague as well as context dependent, for example, a large distance has different
meanings in the context of walking, driving or air travel.
Ross (2010) finds that the larger the uncertainty in a problem, the less
precise the understanding of that problem will be and over time, this uncer-
tainty has been named fuzziness. As stated by Nelles (2001), fuzzy logic was
invented in 1965 by Zadeh as an extension of Boolean logic. Ross (2010) con-
tinues that when considering the use of fuzzy logic for any given problem, the
need for exploiting the tolerance for imprecision should be considered. Klir and
Yuan (1995) add that fuzzy sets offer a meaningful and powerful representation
of measurement uncertainties, as well as meaningful representation of vague
concepts expressed in natural language. Furthermore, Ross (2010) identifies
that fuzzy sets provide a mathematical approach to characterise vagueness and
fuzziness in humanistic systems.
Ross (2010) identifies that algebraic functions map an input variable to
an output variable, and that fuzzy systems map an input group to an output
group, of which these groups can be linguistic propositions or other forms of
fuzzy information. A major advantage of fuzzy systems theory is to approx-
imate system behaviour where analytical functions or numerical relations do
not exist. Klir and Yuan (1995) add that fuzzy sets are sets with boundaries
that are not precise and that the membership in a fuzzy set is a matter of
a degree, rather than a matter of affirmation or denial. Lastly, Ross (2010)
identifies that fuzzy systems are primarily used in deductive reasoning, which
is the kind of thinking were specifics are inferred from the general.
Ross (2010), Klir and Yuan (1995), and Nelles (2001) distinguish the differ-
ence between crisp sets and fuzzy sets. They identify that crisp sets are precise
and assign a value of 1 for true and 0 for false, thus they have no grey areas
(for example, identifying the set of heights from 5 to 7 feet). However, fuzzy
sets are imprecise and assign a value on the interval [0, 1] dependant on the
degree of membership to the attribute tested (for example, the set of heights
in the region around 6 feet). Figure 2.18 represents these examples, and as
can be seen in the figure, a height of 6 feet would receive a value of 1/true or
100% membership for a crisp and fuzzy set respectively, however, a value of
4.999 feet is not far off from 6 feet yet as a crisp set it would have a value of
0/false, although as a fuzzy set it will have a small degree of membership to
the attribute of around 6 feet.
Klir and Yuan (1995) identify that crisp sets are unrealistic due to un-
avoidable measurement errors, despite them being mathematically correct.
Furthermore, fuzzy variables are more adjusted to reality since they capture
measurement uncertainties as a part of the experimental data. Additionally,
data based on fuzzy variables provides more accurate evidence about real phe-
nomena than data based upon crisp variables.
Ross (2010) states that in crisp sets, the transition is abrupt and well de-
fined for an element in the universe between membership and non-membership
in a given set. Whereas for an element in the universe that contains fuzzy sets,
this transition can be gradual due to the vague and ambiguous boundaries.
Klir and Yuan (1995) add that a fuzzy set can be defined mathematically by
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE STUDY 53
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Crisp Set
Attribute
M
e
m
b
e
rs
h
ip
 t
o
 A
tt
ri
b
u
te
, 
χ
(a) Crisp set for heights from 5 to 7 feet
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(b) Fuzzy set of heights around 6 feet
Figure 2.18: Comparison of crisp sets and fuzzy sets (adapted from Ross
(2010))
assigning individuals a value representing its grade of membership in the fuzzy
set. This grade corresponds to the degree to which that individual is similar
or compatible with the concept represented by the fuzzy set. For example, in
Figure 2.19, if the temperature is 2.5◦C, that corresponds to a low temperature
to the degree of 0.75, and a medium temperature to the degree of 0.25.
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Figure 2.19: Fuzzy membership functions for low, medium, and high temper-
ature (adapted from Nelles (2001))
Nelles (2001) states that the trapezoidal and triangular membership func-
tions, such as in Figure 2.18 and Figure 2.19, lead to information losses where
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the slope is equal to zero. Furthermore, these types of membership functions
are not differentiable and thus learning from data may have problems. Nelles
(2001) identifies normalised Gaussians to be used as membership functions in-
stead. However, Klir and Yuan (1995) offer more alternatives for membership
functions as can be seen in Figure 2.20, although, Klir and Yuan (1995) state
that many applications are not overly sensitive to variations in the shape and
thus it is convenient to use a simple shape such as a triangle or trapezoid.
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Figure 2.20: Possible shapes of membership functions for fuzzy sets (adapted
from Klir and Yuan (1995))
Lastly, defuzzification is the process of reducing a fuzzy set to a crisp
single-valued quantity, where fuzzification is merely the converse. There are
multiple methods for defuzzification (e.g. maximum membership principle,
centroid method, weighted average method, etc.), all of which are capable of
identifying a precise quantity from a fuzzy set.
2.5.3 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Murty and Devi (2011) identify that Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a
binary classifier which extracts a decision boundary in multi-dimensional space
using an appropriate sub-set of the training set of vectors; the elements of this
sub-set are known as the support vectors. Geometrically, support vectors are
those training patterns that are closest to the decision boundary. Steinwart and
Christmann (2008) adds that the number of support vectors has a direct impact
on the time required to evaluate the SVM decision function, as well as the time
required to train the SVM. Hamel (2009) states that linear classifiers based on
SVMs can easily extend to non-linear classifiers and that kernel functions are
at the core of this generalisation. Interestingly, non-linear SVMs preserve the
efficiency of finding linear decision surfaces but allow the application of these
classifiers to training sets that are not linearly separable.
Hamel (2009) identifies that SVM can be generalised by allowing the un-
derlying maximum-margin classifier to make mistakes on the training set. This
is accomplished through the introduction of slack variables. Although this is
counterintuitive, real-world training sets are not faultless and do contain noise.
Simple decision surfaces tend to generalise better and therefore have a higher
probability of classifying points correctly that are not part of the training set.
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Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor (2000) state that SVM is a learning system that
uses hypothesis space of linear functions in a high dimensional feature space,
trained with a learning algorithm from optimisation theory that implements
a learning bias derived from statistical learning theory. Furthermore, the four
problems of efficiency of training, efficiency of testing, over-fitting and algo-
rithm parameter tuning are all avoided in the SVM design.
Russel and Norvig (2010) state that the core of SVM is that some examples
are more significant than others, and that paying attention to them can lead
to better generalisation. Furthermore, some examples can appear close to
the problem decision boundary such that a minor disturbance would shift it
outside the decision boundary. SVM beats this by attempting to minimise
expected generalisation loss rather than minimising expected empirical loss.
Although it is unknown where new points may fall, under the probabilistic
assumption, it can be assumed that they will come from the same distribution
as the previously seen examples.
As can be seen in Figure 2.21, if examples are not linearly separable, then
the inputs can be mapped to new vectors Φ(x). If data is mapped into a space
of sufficiently high dimensions, then they will almost always be linearly sepa-
rable. The resulting linear separators when mapped back to the original input
space, can correspond to arbitrarily wiggly, non-linear decision boundaries be-
tween the positive and negative examples. Schölkopf and Smola (2002) adds
that by mapping the input data non-linearly (via Φ) into a higher-dimensional
feature space (e.g. R2 → R3) and constructing a separating hyper plane there,
an SVM corresponds to a non-linear decision surface in the input space.
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Figure 2.21: Schematic of SVM mapping (adapted from Russel and Norvig
(2010))
Schölkopf and Smola (2002) depict the SVM architecture as can be seen in
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Figure 2.22. Schölkopf and Smola (2002) continue, that if the kernel function
k is chosen first, it determines the type of classifier (e.g. polynomial classifier,
radial basis function classifier or neural network). All the other parameters
(number of hidden units, weights, threshold b) are found during training, by
solving a quadratic programming problem. The first layer weights xi are a
subset of the training set (the support vectors), the second layer weights λi =
yiαi are computed from the Lagrange multipliers. The classification equation
is presented in Equation 2.5.3.
f(x) = sgn(
∑
i
λik(x, xi) + b) (2.5.3)
where:
λi is the weight.
k(x, xi) is the kernel function.
b is the threshold.
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Figure 2.22: Schematic of SVM architecture (adapted from Schölkopf and
Smola (2002))
2.5.4 Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
As stated by Cappé et al. (2005), a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a dis-
crete time process {Xk, Yk}k≥0, where {Xk} is a Markov chain and, conditional
on {Xk}, {Yk} is a sequence of independent random variables such that the
conditional distribution of Yk only depends on Xk. However, Zucchini and
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MacDonald (2009) identify that the basic HMM is based on a homogeneous
Markov chain and has neither trend nor seasonal variation. Furthermore, the
observations can be either discrete valued or continuous valued. Cappé et al.
(2005) continue by stating that the Markov chain {Xk}k≥0 is hidden and thus
not visible, however what is visible is an alternative stochastic process {Yk}k≥0,
connected to the Markov chain in that Xk governs the distribution of its corre-
sponding Yk. Zucchini and MacDonald (2009) add that the distribution of Yk
depends exclusively on the current state of Xk and not on the previous states
or observations.
Murty and Devi (2011) add to this discussion, that state transitions are
probabilistic and observations are probabilistic functions of state which deals
with noise in the data, and consequentially, the classifier evades over-fitting
and generalises well. Furthermore, Zucchini and MacDonald (2009) identify
that HMMs allow the probability distribution of each observation to depend on
the unobserved state of a Markov chain, which accommodates over-dispersion
and serial dependence. Lastly, Cappé et al. (2005) find that the hidden states
make the model generic enough to deal with a multitude of multifaceted real-
world time series, while the reasonably simple prior dependence structure still
allows for the use of efficient computational procedures. Figure 2.23 presents
a schematic of how a simple Markov model and a simple HMM look.
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Figure 2.23: Markov Model and Hidden Markov Model factor graphs (adapted
from Koski and Noble (2009))
Fraser (2008) states two assumptions of a HMM, firstly, the observations
are conditionally independent of the states (e.g. given the current state, the
probability of the current observation is independent of states and observations
at all earlier times).
PY (k)|Xk1 ,Y k−11 = PY (k)|X(k) (2.5.4)
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Then secondly, the state process is Markov (e.g. given the current state,
the probability of the next state is independent of earlier states. Combined
with the first assumption, this implies that the next state is also conditionally
independent of past observations).
PX(k+1)|Xk1 ,Y k1 = PX(k+1)|X(k) (2.5.5)
For example, a day can be classified as sunny (S), rainy (R), or cloudy (C).
A typical week in summer would be ‘SSSSSSS’, and in winter ‘RRRRRRR’.
This is in the ideal world, however, in summer some days could be rainy or
cloudy. Furthermore, transition from one day to the next is probabilistic.
S → S is more likely during summer.
S → R is more likely during the rainy season.
Classes of patterns can be characterised using a HMM, where each pattern is
regarded as a sequence of states. Perchance the actual state can be hidden and
merely its probabilistic variations are visible. For example, if we are sealed in
an apartment and cannot see outside if it is sunny, cloudy, or rainy, we could
discern whether a guest has an umbrella or not, as well as pick up the sound
of rain.
2.5.5 Learning decision trees
Mitchell (1997) identifies decision tree learning as one of the most practical
and extensively used methods for inductive inference. He states that it is a
technique for approximating discrete-valued functions that is robust to noisy
data and capable of learning disjunctive expressions. Russel and Norvig (2010)
add to this by stating that decision tree induction is one of the simplest and
most successful forms of machine learning. They continue that a decision tree
represents a function that takes an input as a vector of attribute values and
returns a single output value (decision), and these input and output values can
be discrete or continuous.
Larose (2005) states that a decision tree is an assortment of decision nodes,
coupled by branches, which spread down from the root node until terminating
in leaf nodes. Mitchell (1997) adds to this by stating that decision trees provide
classification to an instance by sorting them down the tree from the root node
to some leaf node. Every node postulates a test of some attribute of the
instance, and each branch descending from that node corresponds to one of
the possible values for this attribute. Russel and Norvig (2010) identify that a
decision tree performs a sequence of tests to reach its decision. Every internal
node in the tree relates to a test of the value of one of the input attributes,
Ai, and the branches from the node are labelled with the possible values of
the attribute, Ai = vik. Lastly, each leaf node in the tree specifies a value to
be returned by the function.
Mitchell (1997) describes that a general learning decision tree algorithm
makes use of a top-down, greedy search through the space of possible decision
trees. It does this by starting with the root node which is statistically found
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as the attribute which best alone classifies the training examples. Next, a de-
scendent of the root node is created for each possible value of this attribute
and training examples are sorted to the appropriate descendent node, after
which this procedure is repeated. This greedy search finds a suitable decision
tree, however, the algorithm never backtracks to re-evaluate previous selec-
tions. Russel and Norvig (2010) add that there is no way to efficiently search
through the trees. Larose (2005) identifies that training data needs to be rich
and varied, providing the algorithm with a healthy cross section of types of
records for which classification may be needed in the future. Mitchell (1997)
continues that decision trees allow for the training data to contain errors or
missing attribute values, although Russel and Norvig (2010) state that deci-
sion trees are bound to make some mistakes for cases where the tree has not
seen examples.
Mitchell (1997) states that a vital part of the algorithm is to identify which
attribute to test at each node in the tree. He states that the most useful at-
tribute for classifying the examples should be selected. Larose (2005) adds
that the attributes for each node should be selected based on their purity, or
as Mitchell (1997) states, how well a given attribute separates the training
examples according to their target classification. Both Mitchell (1997) and
Larose (2005) identify Information Gain from the C4.5 algorithm as one of
the best methods to achieve this. In order to understand information gain, En-
tropy needs to be introduced. Entropy characterises the impurity/purity of an
random assortment of examples. Entropy can be mathematically represented
as in Equation 2.5.6.
Entropy(S) ≡
c∑
i=1
−pi log2 pi (2.5.6)
where:
pi ≡ Proportion of S belonging to class i.
S is a collection of examples.
Now, Information Gain identifies the effectiveness of an attribute in classi-
fying the training data and it is the expected reduction in entropy caused by
partitioning the examples according to this attribute, which is mathematically
represented as in Equation 2.5.7.
Gain(S,A) ≡ Entropy(S)−
∑
v∈Values(A)
|Sv|
|S| Entropy(Sv) (2.5.7)
where:
Entropy(S) is defined in Equation 2.5.6.
Values(A) is the set of all possible values for attribute A.
Sv is the subset of S for which attribute A has a value v.
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For example, the Outlook, Temperature, Humidity, and Wind are four at-
tributes measured to decide whether to go play sport outside or not. Their
individual gains are calculated, where the Outlook gain is the largest which
identifies it as the attribute which best predicts the target attribute ‘to go play
sport outside’. Of 14 training examples, Outlook has nine positive examples
and five negative examples (meaning nine examples result in going outside, and
five examples result in not going outside). Looking down the Sunny branch,
there are two positive examples and three negative examples. Down the Over-
cast branch, there are four positive examples and no negative examples, thus
it results in a leaf node saying ’yes’ go play sport outside. This can be seen in
Figure 2.24.
Outlook 
? ? Yes 
Sunny Overcast Rain 
[9+,5-] 
[3+,2-] 
[4+,0-] 
[2+,3-] 
Figure 2.24: Learning decision tree example
In order to identify which attribute should be tested next when following
the Sunny branch, the gains of the remaining attributes should be calculated
relative to the new subset of examples; these three gains can be seen below.
Gain(SSunny,Humidity) = 0.970
Gain(SSunny,Temperature) = 0.570
Gain(SSunny,Wind) = 0.019
The Humidity gain is the largest, and thus it is the next attribute that should
be tested down the Sunny branch.
After this process is completed, validation of the tree should be performed
to identify if over-fitting has occurred. Over-fitting is described by Murty and
Devi (2011) and Russel and Norvig (2010) as when there is a unique path
through the tree for every pattern in the training set, and this occurs when
the algorithm generates a large tree when there is actually no pattern found.
Russel and Norvig (2010) state that over-fitting is more likely to occur as the
hypothesis space and the number of input attributes grow and is less likely
to occur as the number of training examples are increased. Lastly, Murty
and Devi (2011) and Russel and Norvig (2010) both state that pruning is a
solution to the problem of over-fitting by eliminating nodes of attributes that
are clearly not relevant.
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2.5.6 Summary and comparison of the modelling
techniques
As discussed earlier, ANN are tremendously powerful for tasks such as infor-
mation processing, learning and adaption as well as being one of the most
prevalent and effective forms of learning systems.
Fuzzy sets offer a meaningful and powerful representation of measurement
uncertainties and fuzzy sets provide a mathematical approach to characterise
vagueness and fuzziness in humanistic systems. Fuzzy systems are primarily
used in deductive reasoning.
SVM is a binary classifier which abstracts a decision boundary in multi-
dimensional space using an appropriate sub-set of the training set of vectors.
A HMM can be used to characterise classes of patterns, where each pattern
is viewed as a sequence of states. The Markov chain is hidden and thus not
observable, however what is available to the observer is another stochastic
process, linked to the Markov chain.
Lastly, decision tree learning is one of the most widely used and practical
methods for inductive inference. It is a method for approximating discrete-
valued functions that is robust to noisy data and capable of learning disjunctive
expressions, whereby creating a tree of decisions, different paths followed will
result in different outcomes.
The model to be used in this study will see each accident or time step as
a pattern, thus a generalised pattern will be determined, which links all the
influencing factors to the outcome and then all the consecutive patterns will
be plotted versus time. As such, a pattern recognition sample data set was
obtained to test which technique will be best suited for the application. The
data set obtained contained 214 entries, each entry had nine input attributes
and two output classifications. The input attributes were, Refractive Index,
Sodium, Magnesium, Aluminium, Silicon, Potassium, Calcium, Barium, and
Iron and the output classifications were, Non-window glass or Window glass.
163 of the examples are classified as non-window glass, and the remaining 51
examples are classified as window glass.
Firstly, it must be noted that fuzzy logic is a method for extracting definite
results from vague or uncertain values, however, it does not connect multiple
factors to determine an output. Secondly, a HMM is time dependant and
searches for patterns dependant on time and not on patterns between multiple
factors, so although this process may work with accident data that is based on
time, it will not identify a pattern connecting the influencing factors together.
This leaves us with three remaining techniques, namely, ANN, SVM, and
learning decision trees. These three methods were all tested with the same
glass classification data and the results are presented below.
The ANN was created with the nine inputs, seven hidden nodes and the two
output nodes. The hidden layer nodes and output layer nodes all used sigmoid
activation functions. Then the data was split such that 65% of the data was
used for training the model, 25% of the data was used for validating the model,
and 10% of the data was used for testing the model. Table 2.6 presents the
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associated Mean Square Error (MSE) and percentage errors for the three sets
of data, as well as the totals. After the network was suitably trained to the
Table 2.6: ANN MSE and percentage error
MSE % E
Training 1.79747(10−2) 2.15827
Validation 2.09714(10−2) 0
Testing 2.36972(10−3) 0
Total 1.71996(10−2) 1.40186
errors seen in Table 2.6, the network was run with all 214 examples in the
data set. This yielded 211 of the examples being correctly classified and three
examples misclassified. The confusion matrix for this technique is plotted in
Figure 2.25, it shows that one non-window glass example was classified as
window glass, two window glass examples were classified as non-window glass,
162 non-window glass examples were correctly classified, and 49 window glass
examples were correctly classified. Figure 2.25 also shows that the overall error
for the ANN is 1.40%.
Non-window 
glass
Window glass Total
98.80%
1.20%
98.00%
2.00%
99.40% 96.10% 98.60%
0.60% 3.90% 1.40%
True 
P
r
e
d
ic
ti
o
n
Non-window 
glass
162 2
Window glass 1 49
Total
Figure 2.25: Glass classification confusion matrix for Artificial Neural Net-
works (ANN) method
Next, the SVM technique was tested using the same data set. The data
was split such that 70% was used for training and 30% was used for testing.
Firstly, the model parameters need to be set; from using the 10−fold cross
validation method to minimise error, the optimal values for the cost function
(C = 1.0) and gamma (γ = 0.1) were found. Next, the model was trained
with the training data, using a radial kernel function, and the two optimal
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parameters calculated above. Of the 150 training examples, 40 are identified
as support vectors (22 classifying non-window glass and 18 classifying win-
dow glass). After this, the testing data was run through the model, Table
2.7 presents the percentage errors associated to the training, testing and total
data. After the network was trained suitably, the model was run with all 214
Table 2.7: SVM percentage error
% E
Training 2.000
Testing 3.125
Total 2.340
examples in the data set. This yielded 209 of the examples being correctly
classified and five examples misclassified. The confusion matrix for this tech-
nique is plotted in Figure 2.26, it shows that two non-window glass example
were classified as window glass, three window glass examples were classified
as non-window glass, 161 non-window glass examples were correctly classified,
and 48 window glass examples were correctly classified. Figure 2.26 also shows
that the overall error for the SVM is 2.34%.
Non-window 
glass
Window glass Total
98.17%
1.83%
96.00%
4.00%
98.77% 94.12% 97.66%
1.23% 5.88% 2.34%
Total
P
r
e
d
ic
ti
o
n
Non-window 
glass
Window glass
True 
161 3
2 48
Figure 2.26: Glass classification confusion matrix for Support Vector Machine
(SVM) method
Lastly, a learning decision tree was created using all 214 examples and the
C4.5 algorithm which discerns between attribute importance dependant on
the maximum information gain. A binary decision tree was created, implying
that each attribute could only have two branches, thus each attribute was split
according to its mean value as can be seen in Figure 2.27 which presents the
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decision tree created, the ‘W’ classifies window glass and ‘NW’ classifies non-
window glass. Then the decision tree was pruned and the result after pruning
can be seen in Figure 2.28. After the decision tree was created, all 214
[ 3+ , 150- ]
Barrium
[ 28+ , 0- ] [ 20+ , 13- ] [ 1+ , 149- ] [ 2+ , 1- ]
Iron Sodium Aluminium
[ 18+ , 5- ] [ 2+ , 8- ] [ 0+, 102- ] [ 1+ , 47- ] [ 0+ , 1- ] [ 2+ , 0- ]
Potasium Silicon Calcium
[ 14+ , 5- ] [ 4+ , 0- ] [ 1+ ,7- ] [ 1+ , 1- ] [ 1+ , 29- ] [ 0+ , 18- ]
[ 48+ , 13- ]
Refractive Index
[ 51+ , 163- ]
Magnesium
W 
NW 
NW W NW 
NW W W NW W 
Figure 2.27: Decision tree created for glass classification example
examples in the data set were run through the decision tree. This yielded 206
of the examples being correctly classified and eight examples misclassified. The
confusion matrix for this technique is plotted in Figure 2.29, it shows that six
non-window glass example were classified as window glass, two window glass
examples were classified as non-window glass, 157 non-window glass examples
were correctly classified and 49 window glass examples were correctly classified.
Figure 2.29 also shows that the overall error for the decision tree is 3.74%.
In conclusion, from the three techniques analysed above, it can be seen that
the ANN has the lowest total error. Also, further calculations were performed
on all three techniques with the data from their confusion matrices to ensure
that an ANN is the best technique to use. The calculations used to gauge the
modelling techniques are, True Positive Rate (TPR) (also known as sensitiv-
ity), True Negative Rate (TNR) (also known as specificity), Positive Predictive
Value (PPV) (also known as precision), Negative Predictive Value (NPV), av-
erage accuracy, average reliability and overall accuracy. Appendix B presents
the equations used for all the calculations. Table 2.8 displays the results from
all the calculations. As can be seen from Table 2.8, ANN is the best overall
technique and the most accurate, thus it is the modelling technique chosen to
be used in the model to be created.
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[ 48+ , 13- ] [ 3+ , 150- ]
Refractive Index Barrium
[ 28+ , 0- ] [ 20+ , 13- ] [ 1+ , 149- ] [ 2+ , 1- ]
Iron Aluminium
[ 18+ , 5- ] [ 2+ , 8- ] [ 0+ , 1- ] [ 2+ , 0- ]
Silicon
[ 1+ ,7- ] [ 1+ , 1- ]
Magnesium
[ 51+ , 163- ]
W 
NW W 
NW 
W 
NW W 
Figure 2.28: Decision tree after pruning
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Figure 2.29: Glass classification confusion matrix for learning decision tree
method
2.6 Chapter 2 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, from the literature study, safety is identified as crucially impor-
tant in all forms of industry. Additionally, there are very few safety models
available which predict the continuous risk of accidents occurring in the future.
Furthermore, risk is found to be a part of everyday life and the risk is higher
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Table 2.8: Comparison of modelling techniques
ANN SVM Decision Tree
TPR 0.9878 0.9817 0.9874
TNR 0.9800 0.9600 0.8909
PPV 0.9939 0.9877 0.9632
NPV 0.9608 0.9412 0.9608
Avg. Accuracy 0.9775 0.9645 0.9620
Avg. Reliability 0.9840 0.9709 0.9392
Overall Accuracy 0.9860 0.9766 0.9626
in industries such as mining. Moreover, risk has a direct effect on occupational
safety and thus is essential to keep in control. Also, the measurable influential
factors that lead to accidents are identified as the time of the day, the temper-
ature and humidity, the noise levels, the production rate, the shift length and
the occupation. Lastly, five modelling techniques were explored and evaluated,
resulting in identifying the ANN as the best modelling technique which is used
for the model developed in this study.
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Chapter 3
Design And Construction Of The
Model
3.1 Introduction
From the previous chapter it was identified that an Artificial Neural Net-
works (ANN) model with a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) network configura-
tion will be used for the model. The ANN model will be trained with the back-
propagation algorithm and after the model is built, trained, and validated, the
continuous risk of accidents occurring will be calculated. This chapter is closely
linked with the next chapter, as this chapter covers the mathematics behind
ANNs, the data analysis, the model design, and lastly the setup of the model.
Then the next chapter goes about training and validating the model.
3.2 Model Overview
The model can be created in three separate parts, the first being the data
manipulation for the network, which is presented later in this chapter. The
second part involves the ANN model which links all the inputs to the output
(training the network), which is presented in the next chapter. The third part
involves use of the model to predict the continuous risk of an accident occurring
into the future (running the model) for the year the network was trained with,
as well as for the subsequent year in order to validate the networks accuracy,
which is presented in the next chapter as well.
The nine influential inputs to the model identified in the literature study
are, Location, Occupation, Noise level, Time of day, Time into shift, Lighting,
Temperature, Humidity and Production rate. The first part of the model ma-
nipulates these values to prepare them as inputs for training the network. The
next part takes these inputs, runs them through the ANN model to calculate
the current risk of accidents occurring. Next, the third part of the model takes
the ANN model with its associated parameters and uses the calculated current
risk of accidents occurring as well as estimates of future attribute values, in
order to predict the continuous risk of accidents occurring in the future, within
67
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certain confidence intervals. This model described above is schematically pre-
sented in Figure 3.1. Both the training and running models have 1-to-n inputs,
Input (1,1)
Input(2,1)
Input(n,1)
ANN
Current risk of 
an accident
(a) Training model
Input (1,t)
Input(2,t)
Input(n,t)
ANN
Continuous time 
based risk
(b) Running model
Figure 3.1: Overview of the model to be developed
however, the training model takes a vector of inputs at each accident which
results in a single risk value, whereas the running model takes a matrix of these
inputs separated by a certain time interval which results in a continuous time
based risk profile. The section to follow discusses the mathematics behind the
ANN used in the model.
3.3 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
Mathematics
The work covered in this section is based primarily on five separate texts
written by Larose (2005), Russel and Norvig (2010), Nelles (2001), Page et al.
(1993), and Mitchell (1997). Figure 3.2 presents a one hidden layer MLP ANN
which will be referred to during the explanations to follow, and a description
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of the variables used can be found in the nomenclature at the beginning of this
thesis.
3.3.1 Network architecture
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN) model with one hidden layer (adapted from Nelles (2001))
Firstly, from the figure, it can be seen that there are three layers (Input,
Output, and Hidden layer). The input and output layers always only consist
of one layer each, however, they can have multiple nodes within each layer.
Generally, the input layer has as many nodes as the number of attributes
measured in the training data and occasionally with an extra node for a bias
term. The output layer can also have multiple nodes, although they often
only have a single node, as depicted in Figure 3.2. Moving to the middle,
the hidden layer can have multiple layers as well as multiple nodes within
each layer, however, choosing how many hidden layers to use has no logical
steps. If the data is linearly separable, then an ANN is not required and
no hidden layers are needed. Furthermore, with a single sufficiently large
hidden layer representing any continuous function of inputs is possible, and
with two hidden layers even discontinuous functions are representable. Thus,
generally for most applications one hidden layer is sufficient. Furthermore,
the increase in performance of the ANN is minor when an additional hidden
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layer is coupled, all-the-while the complexity is drastically increased. With
regards to choosing how many nodes to use within every hidden layer, the rule
of thumb is that in the hidden layer the quantity of nodes is usually between
how many nodes there are in the input layer and the how many nodes there are
in the output layer. Some texts take the mean value of the quantity of nodes
in the input and output layers, while some texts take two thirds of the sum
of the input and output nodes. Irrespective of how many nodes are chosen for
the hidden layer, if there are too many modes in this layer, then after training
the model, the redundant nodes can be removed using a technique known as
pruning. However, if there are too few hidden layer nodes, then the network
may never converge. Thus, it is imperative to start off with sufficient or too
many nodes rather than too few hidden layer nodes. If over-fitting occurs, the
quantity of nodes in the hidden layer can be reduced; alternatively, if training
accuracy is lower than acceptable, then the quantity of hidden layer nodes
can be increased. Over-fitting is the opposite of generalisation, it is when the
network has too many parameters relative to the number of examples and then
the network will have poor predictive performance and will exaggerate minor
fluctuations in the data.
The structure of the hidden layer and output nodes is different to that of
the input layer, because the input layer nodes only take the input data and
pass it on to the hidden layer nodes, whereas the hidden layer and output layer
nodes both have a summation function and an activation function.
3.3.2 Inputs
Input data should be normalised such that the input value (uk) multiplied by
the value of the weight connecting it to the hidden layer (wik), for all inputs and
weights, are roughly in the similar range such that no input is more dominant.
All attribute values of the input data entering an ANN must take a value
between zero and one. For continuous variables the min-max normalisation
method can easily transform the data to a value between zero and one as can
be seen in Equation 3.3.1.
X∗ =
X −min(X)
range(X)
(3.3.1)
However, categorical variables such as gender is more problematic and cannot
be normalised by using Equation 3.3.1, although, indicator variables can be
used in these cases. For example, the values of male, female or unknown can
be assigned to the gender attribute. Therefore, indicator variables can be
created for male and female, and then every entry would contain a value for
each. Thus, entries for males would assume a value of one for male and zero
for female, whereas entries for females would contain a value of zero for male
and one for female, and lastly unknown entries would assume values of zero
for female and zero for male.
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3.3.3 Outputs
With respect to the output, a continuous value between zero and one is always
returned by the output nodes of the ANN. With clearly ordered classes, single
output nodes are generally used. For example when classifying if a loan can
be given,
G If 0 ≤ yˆ < 0.50, classify loan denied.
G If 0.50 ≤ yˆ < 0.90, classify loan approved.
G If yˆ > 0.90, classify offer larger loan.
When categories are unordered, multiple output nodes can be used. For exam-
ple, marital status has six classes, these are single, married, divorced, separated,
widowed and unknown. This type of output is known as 1-of-n output encod-
ing, which has one output node per output category of the target variable,
then classification for that particular record is based on the output node con-
taining the maximum value. A measure of confidence (the difference between
the highest and second highest) is an advantage the 1-of-n output encoding
offers, and classifications with low confidence can be highlighted for further
clarification. After classification, an output (between zero and one) can al-
ways be transformed back into a predicted value by inverting the min-max
normalisation, which is known as denormalisation.
3.3.4 Node mathematics
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are four predominant activation
functions, namely the sigmoid, the hyperbolic tan, the threshold and the hard-
limiter, which can be seen in Figure 3.3. Of these four activation functions,
the sigmoid is the most popular function since dependent on the input value
it conglomerates close to linear behaviour, curvilinear behaviour and close to
constant behaviour. The sigmoid activation function is also known as the
logistic function, which is described in Equation 3.3.2.
y =
1
1 + e−x
(3.3.2)
When an ANN operates in feed-forward mode, every node receives an input
from upstream nodes (eg. the hidden node receives an input from the input
node) and delivers the output to downstream nodes (eg. the hidden nodes
send its output to the output node). The input values (uk) get passed on to
the hidden nodes via the weighted connections (wik). The hidden node firstly
sums these inputs (neti) as in Equation 3.3.3.
neti =
n∑
j
wijuj (3.3.3)
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Figure 3.3: Graph of activation functions
After this, neti is passed on to the activation function, as in Equation 3.3.4.
Φi =
1
1 + e−neti
(3.3.4)
This activation function output, Φi, is then passed on to the next hidden layer
where the same procedure takes place, although the input to the next hidden
layer is Φi now and not uk as before, or if there are no more hidden layers Φi
is then passed on to the output layer.
3.3.5 Network training
In order to obtain all the weights within the network, the network needs to
be trained with multiple examples. Furthermore, the most common method
of training the network is back-propagation using the gradient descent optimi-
sation method to minimise the error function as seen in Equation 3.3.5. The
error function used in the optimisation is the sum of squared errors, where the
squared prediction errors (difference between actual output values and target
output values) are added across every output node and every record in the set
of training examples. Equation 3.3.5 describes mathematically how the sum
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of squared errors is calculated.
E(~w) =
1
2
∑
d∈D
∑
k∈O
(tkd − okd)2 (3.3.5)
where:
d is the training example.
D is the set of training examples.
k is the kth output.
O is the set of output nodes in the network.
tkd is the target value of the kth output and dth training example.
okd is the output value of the kth output and dth training example.
If there is only one output node, Equation 3.3.5 would reduce to,
E(~w) =
1
2
∑
d∈D
(td − od)2 (3.3.6)
3.3.6 Gradient descent method
A problem arises with setting the model weights such that the sum of squared
errors is minimised, and this is where the gradient descent method comes in.
In order to lessening the error function the gradient descent method identi-
fies the direction that each weight should be adjusted. The gradient descent
method can only be used if the output of the nodes is differentiable, thus the
sigmoid function is a very popular activation function, as it is differentiable.
Assuming there is a vector of r weights ~w = w1, w2, ..., wr in an ANN, the vec-
tor derivative is the gradient of the error function with respect to the weights
vector ~w is the, as presented in Equation 3.3.7, it is the partial derivative of
the error function with respect to each of the weights.
∇E(~w) =
[
∂E
∂w1
,
∂E
∂w2
, ...,
∂E
∂wr
]
(3.3.7)
In order to demonstrate how the gradient descent method operates, assume
an instance when only one weight, w1 is used. As can be seen in Figure 3.4,
the error function is plotted versus an assortment of weight w1 values. The
values of w1 that minimise the error function are sought after. w∗1 depicts the
optimal value for weight w1 and in order to move nearer to this optimal value
from the current position on the graph, Equation 3.3.8 can be used.
wnew = wcurrent + ∆wcurrent (3.3.8)
where:
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Figure 3.4: Finding the direction for the weight adjustment using the gradient
of the error function with respect to weight w1
∆wcurrent is the change in current location of w.
For example, if in Figure 3.4 the current weight wcurrent is near w1L, then
the weight needs to be increased to move wcurrent closer the optimal point w∗1.
Similarly, if the current weight wcurrent is near w1R, then the weight needs to
be decreased to move wcurrent closer the optimal point w∗1. In order to achieve
this, the partial derivatives of the error with respect to the current weight
are required, because the derivative ∂E/∂w1 is just the gradient of the error
function at w1. The gradient is negative for values of w1 close to w1L, and
the gradient is positive for values of w1 close to w1R. Thus the adjustment
direction for wcurrent is negative the sign of the derivative of the error function
at the current position (−sign(∂E/∂wcurrent)).
The next step is to set how far the adjustment should move, since the
direction is already identified. If the magnitude of the derivative is used, when
the gradient is steep then large adjustments are used, and when the gradient is
flatter the step size will be smaller, which intuitively makes sense to do. Finally,
a learning rate η is commonly multiplied to the derivative. This learning rate
is a positive constant varying between zero and one that scales the step size.
Thus the resulting change in location of w is ∆wcurrent = −η(∂E/∂wcurrent).
3.3.7 Back propagation
As stated earlier, the algorithm for back-propagation uses the prediction er-
ror for a particular example and filters the error back through the network,
which assigns partitioned responsibility for the error to the various connections.
Thereafter, these connections weights are adjusted to reduce the error using
the gradient descent method. When making use of a sigmoid activation func-
tion and the gradient descent optimisation technique, the back-propagation
rule for an ANN can be rewritten as,
wik,new = wik,current + ∆wik (3.3.9)
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where:
∆wik = ηδixik.
where:
η signifies the learning rate.
xik signifies the kth input to node i.
δi signifies the responsibility for a particular error belonging to node i.
Appendix A derives the error responsibility δi, and can take two forms condi-
tional on the layer the node resides in. These two forms are as follows,
δi =
{
oi(1− oi)(ti − oi) for output layer nodes.
oi(1− oi)
∑
downstreamwikδi for hidden layer nodes.
(3.3.10)
where:
oi is the output computed by node i.
ti is the target output for node i.∑
downstreamwikδi refers to the weighted sum of the error responsibilities
for the nodes downstream from the particular hidden layer node.
Earlier it was established that the input attribute values must be normalised
to values between zero and one, this is because large non-normalised values
would dominate the weight adjustments, and therefore the error propagation
throughout the network would be overwhelmed and learning would be affected.
The ANN algorithm would normally proceed to step through every record
in the training data set and after each record adjust the weights accordingly.
This weight updating after each record is known as online back-propagation.
This performs as a barrier stopping the function getting caught in a local min-
imum, however, a momentum term can always be added to assist in skipping
some local minima in an attempt to find the global minimum of the error
function E(~w).
3.3.8 Momentum
Adding momentum to the back-propagation algorithm can be used to stream-
line the training process. Momentum α (0 < α < 1) is a constant which
essentially adds momentum which helps from one iteration to the next to keep
the ball rolling in the same direction. This has the effect of keeping the ball
rolling through small local minima or along flat regions. It gradually increases
the step size in areas when there is no change in the gradient, and thus con-
vergence is reached quicker. Mathematically, this changes Equation 3.3.9 to,
wik,new = wik,current + ∆wik,current (3.3.11)
where:
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∆wik,current = ηδixik + α∆wik,previous
where:
η represents the learning rate.
δi represents the responsibility for a particular error belonging to node
i.
xik signifies the kth input to node i.
α represents the momentum (0 < α < 1).
∆wik,previous represents the weight update value from the previous itera-
tion.
The algorithm may undershoot the global minimum from a small momen-
tum, α and the algorithm may overshoot the global minimum from a large
momentum, α. For example, in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, the weight is initialised
at position I, position A and C are local minima, and position B is the global
minimum. If the momentum α is small, as in Figure 3.5, the algorithm will
easily find the first minimum at position A, however, it may stay stuck in this
valley and never make it over the first hill, thus never finding the global opti-
mum. Conversely, if the momentum α is large, as in Figure 3.6, the algorithm
will easily get passed the first hill, but it may have too much momentum and
overshoot the global minimum at position B, ending up at the local minimum
at position C.
 
𝑤 
𝐸 
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐼 
Figure 3.5: The algorithm may undershoot the global minimum from a small
momentum, α
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Figure 3.6: The algorithm may overshoot the global minimum from a large
momentum, α
3.3.9 Learning rate
Another way to speed up finding the region around the global minimum would
be to alter the learning rate η (0 < η < 1). It is also a constant that can be used
to assist adjusting the weights in the network with the goal of obtaining the
global minimum error E(~w). If a small learning rate is chosen, the adjustments
to the weight have a tendency to be rather small and the network takes a long
time to converge. However, if a large learning rate is chosen, the adjustments
to the weight will tend to be larger and the possibility of overshooting the
global minimum is higher. To solve this predicament, the learning rate can
start large which allows the network to rapidly approach the general area of the
global minimum, after which the learning rate can be gradually decreased to
avoid overshooting the minimum. Thus it is important to consider the values
used for the learning rate η and momentum α. Generally experimentation
is required with numerous values of η and α before the best results can be
achieved.
3.3.10 Termination criteria
The back-propagation algorithm would run continuously until a termination
criterion is met, of which there are three. The first termination criteria is to
stop the training after a certain time period has lapsed or a certain number of
iterations of the training data set is achieved, although what is gained with the
short training time is at the expense of poor model effectiveness. The second
termination criteria is when the error function E(~w) for the training data is
below a certain threshold value. Lastly, the third termination criteria, which
is the most effective and popular method, is when the model is trained and
then validated with separate unseen data, and the error function E(~w) for the
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validation data set is below some threshold value, and if it is not, the process
of training and validating is performed again.
3.3.11 Pruning
As discussed earlier, the hidden layer nodal quantity, cannot be predetermined
and thus there may be redundant units in the ANN. This makes the generalisa-
tion ability lower, the analysis more difficult and is computationally expensive.
Furthermore, over-fitting can occur. Pruning is a tool which assists removing
the redundant nodes and thus helping the network generalise better, as well
as become more efficient. There are two main types of pruning, the first being
incremental pruning which starts with just an input and output layer, then
the algorithm incrementally increases the size of the ANN and retrains at each
increment. Whichever configuration trained the best is assumed to be the opti-
mal network configuration. The second type is selective pruning which begins
with an already trained ANN that has some hidden layers and hidden nodes.
The selective pruning algorithm chooses hidden nodes to remove that will not
affect the error rate of the ANN. Through this method, redundant nodes can
be identified and eliminated.
One such selective pruning method removes the nodes from the ANN on
the basis of the influence of removing each node on the error, and the ANN
is retrained to recover the damage of the removal. This six step algorithm is
presented below,
Step 1 Train a large enough ANN until E ≤ Ethreshold.
Step 2 Remove the rth unit virtually and calculate E(r).
Step 3 If every unit is examined by removing it virtually and calculating
E(r), then go to Step 4, else go back to Step 2.
Step 4 Remove the ath unit where E(a) is the minimum among all the E(r)
values.
Step 5 Retrain the ANN, which has been removed of the ath unit.
Step 6 If E ≤ Ethreshold; then memorise the weights and the structure, and
go back to Step 2; else replace the network by the previous one,
and finish the steps.
3.3.12 Sensitivity analysis
Once the model is built, trained and pruned if necessary, a sensitivity analysis
can be performed in order to identify the relative influence each input attribute
has on the output. A sensitivity analysis will take three steps, firstly, new ob-
servations must be generated with each attribute equal to its mean value (u¯1,
u¯2, ..., u¯n). Secondly, the output for this mean record (¯ˆy) must be recorded.
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Lastly, attribute by attribute the mean values u¯ must be varied to the at-
tributes minimum and maximum values, in order to identify the difference in
network output for every variation and they can be compared to ¯ˆy. This will
find that there are larger effects that certain attributes impose on the network
output than other attributes.
3.3.13 Example
For an example of how the ANN model operates in a normal feed-forward
method, have a look at Figure 3.7 of a simple ANN with three inputs (1, 2,
and 3), one hidden layer with two nodes (A and B), and in the output layer a
single node (X) and Table 3.1 which contains the initial values for the weights
as well as the data inputs. Firstly, nodes 1, 2 and 3 only pass the inputs
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𝑤𝐵2 
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Input layer Output layer Hidden layer 
Node 1 
Node 3 
Node 2 
Node B 
Node X 
Node A 
Figure 3.7: Schematic of simple Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
Table 3.1: Data inputs and initial weight values for ANN in Figure 3.7
Input Node A Node B Node X
u0 = 1.0 wA0 = 0.8 wB0 = 0.1 wX0 = 0.9
u1 = 0.8 wA1 = 0.1 wB1 = 0.3 wXA = 0.2
u2 = 0.4 wA2 = 0.9 wB2 = 0.5 wXB = 0.4
u3 = 0.1 wA3 = 0.6 wB3 = 0.9
to nodes A and B. Nodes A and B start by individually producing a linear
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combination of the node inputs and the connection weights into a single value.
Thus for node A this will be,
netA =
∑
i
wAiuAi
= wA0uA0 + wA1uA1 + wA2uA2 + wA3uA3
= 0.8(1) + 0.1(0.8) + 0.9(0.4) + 0.6(0.1)
= 1.30
Then, this output is put through the sigmoid activation function before it can
be passed on to node X. This activation function step can be seen below,
ΦA =
1
1 + e−1.30
= 0.7858
Similarly for node B this will be,
netB =
∑
i
wBiuBi
= wB0uB0 + wB1uB1 + wB2uB2 + wB3uB3
= 0.1(1) + 0.3(0.8) + 0.5(0.4) + 0.9(0.1)
= 0.63
ΦB =
1
1 + e−0.63
= 0.6525
Next, node X follows a similar procedure, by linearly combining its inputs
(ΦA and ΦB) with the associated weights (wXA and wXB) of the connections
between these nodes. This can be seen below,
netX =
∑
j
wXjΦi
= wX0uX0 + wXAΦA + wXBΦB
= 0.9(1) + 0.2(0.7858) + 0.4(0.6525)
= 1.3182
yˆ =
1
1 + e−1.3182
= 0.7889
As can be seen, the network output is yˆ = 0.7889, assuming that the
target output value was t = 0.7, and the learning rate is η = 0.6, then the
error E = 0.5(0.7 − 0.7889)2 = 0.00395. Then in order to minimise this
error, the network weights must be adjusted by applying the back-propagation
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algorithm. The weights after each record are updated which is known as online
back-propagation.
Firstly, the error responsibility δx for the output node X is calculated as,
δX = ox(1− ox)(tx − ox)
= 0.7889(1− 0.7889)(0.7− .7889)
= −0.0148
Now the bias weight wX0 can be adjusted as follows,
wX0,new = wX0,current + ∆wX0
= wX0,current + ηδXu0
= 0.9 + (0.6(−0.0148)(1))
= 0.89112
Next, moving upstream to node A, it is a hidden layer node, therefore its error
responsibility is,
δA = ΦA(1− ΦA)
∑
downstream
wikδi
= ΦA(1− ΦA)(wXAδX)
= 0.7858(1− 0.7858)(0.2)(−0.0148)
= −0.000498
Now the weight wXA can be adjusted as follows,
wXA,new = wXA,current + ∆wXA
= wXA,current + ηδXΦA
= 0.2 + (0.6(−0.0148)(0.7858))
= 0.1930
Next, moving to node B, it is a hidden layer node, therefore its error respon-
sibility is,
δB = ΦB(1− ΦB)
∑
downstream
wikδi
= ΦB(1− ΦB)(wXBδX)
= 0.6525(1− 0.6525)(0.4)(−0.0148)
= −0.00134
Now the weight wXB can be adjusted as follows,
wXB,new = wXB,current + ∆wXB
= wXB,current + ηδXΦB
= 0.4 + (0.6(−0.0148)(0.6525))
= 0.3942
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Next, moving upstream to the connections being used as inputs to node A, for
weight wA0,
wA0,new = wA0,current + ∆wA0
= wA0,current + ηδAu0
= 0.8 + (0.6(−0.000498)(1))
= 0.7997
For weight wA1,
wA1,new = wA1,current + ∆wA1
= wA1,current + ηδAu1
= 0.1 + (0.6(−0.000498)(0.8))
= 0.0998
For weight wA2,
wA2,new = wA2,current + ∆wA2
= wA2,current + ηδAu2
= 0.9 + (0.6(−0.000498)(0.4))
= 0.8999
For weight wA3,
wA3,new = wA3,current + ∆wA3
= wA3,current + ηδAu3
= 0.6 + (0.6(−0.000498)(0.1))
= 0.59997
Similarly, weights between the inputs and node B are adjusted to the following
values, wB0,new = 0.09920, wB1,new = 0.2994, wB2,new = 0.4997, and wB3,new =
0.8999. The network output initially was yˆ = 0.7889, however, after training
the model, the new network output is yˆ = 0.7858, and now the error is E =
0.00368. This shows that the network output is minimising the error and
moving closer to the target output of 0.7. Table 3.2 presents a summary of
the changes in parameters after the first iteration from the ANN example.
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Table 3.2: Summary of parameter changes from ANN example
Initial Updated % Change
wA0 0.8 0.7997 −0.0375
wA1 0.1 0.0998 −0.2000
wA2 0.9 0.8999 −0.0111
wA3 0.6 0.59997 −0.0050
wB0 0.1 0.0992 −0.8000
wB1 0.3 0.2994 −0.2000
wB2 0.5 0.4997 −0.0600
wB3 0.9 0.8999 −0.0111
wX0 0.9 0.8911 −0.9867
wXA 0.2 0.1930 −3.5000
wXB 0.4 0.3942 −1.4500
wyˆ 0.7889 0.7858 −0.3930
wE 0.00395 0.00368 −6.8354
3.4 Data Analysis
This section covers the gathering of the data required, as well as the analysis
of the data with respect to various aspects. This section starts with the data
required and the data collected and is then followed by the analysis.
3.4.1 Data required and collected
As can be seen from the literature review, the following is the list of the
attribute factors that influence an accident,
G Time of Day
G Temperature
G Humidity
G Noise
G Location
G Production Rate
G Time into Shift
G Occupation
G Lighting
This required accident data was obtained from a platinum mine in South
Africa, with the data spanning from 1st January 2009 to the 31st December
2013. A detailed spread sheet of accident data was received from the mine
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for accidents over this time period, which contained the following attributes
associated to each accident,
G Date
G Time
G Injury type
G A description of the accident
G Parent Agency
G Agency
G Occupation
G Task performed during accident
G Body part injured
G Monthly production figures
Furthermore, the South AfricanWeather Service was approached for weather
data for the area of the mines location. The data received was also for the
period of 1st January 2009 to the 31st December 2013 and it contained the
following daily attributes,
G Daily maximum temperature
G Daily minimum temperature
G Daily humidity
G Daily rainfall
All of the analyses to follow distinguishes between the four injury types
of the accidents, which are Fatal Injury (FI), Serious Injury (SI), Lost Time
Injury (LTI) and Medical Treatment Case (MTC). Firstly, a FI refers to an
accident that occurs where an employee loses their life, secondly, a SI refers to
an accident that causes a person to be admitted to a hospital for treatment for
the injury, thirdly, a LTI refers to an accident that occurs where an employee
is injured and has to spend more than one complete day or shift away from
work as a result of the accident, and lastly a MTC refers to any injury that is
not a LTI, but does require treatment.
Of all the data entries in the spread sheet received, there were 161 different
occupations. With so many different occupations, it was not feasible to cre-
ate separate models for each occupation. Nonetheless, the risk output can be
scaled according to a person’s occupation on a continuous basis. Additionally,
as can be seen in the next section, the organisational units divide the mining
operations/occupations into groups that would work sufficiently well for the
model. Lastly, the task performed when the accident took place and the body
part injured will not be included in the model, as it will unnecessarily compli-
cate the model further, since there are 112 unique tasks being performed and
51 unique body parts injured in the data set received. Therefore, the rest of
the attributes received are analysed, which include organisational units, par-
ent agency, rain, humidity, time of day, temperatures, production rate and
seasonality. For all the analyses, the y-axis represents the number of accidents
and the x-axis represents the attributes possible values.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL 85
3.4.2 Organisational units
The data obtained from the mine contained 1307 accidents over the period of
1st January 2009 to the 31st December 2013 which equates to a yearly average
of 261 accidents. Table 3.3 shows a breakdown of these accidents over the five
years divided into the organisational units which are sections within the mine.
Table 3.3: Raw data split by organisational unit
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Underground Section 246 122 369 98 222 1057
Smelter Services 2 0 0 0 0 2
Smelter 3 2 2 3 3 13
Services 16 11 3 6 9 45
Engineering 39 25 28 34 19 145
Concentrators 12 4 7 5 9 37
Mining (Surface) 1 1 1 3 2 8
Total 319 165 410 149 264 1307
For the purpose of this model, the duplicate accidents were removed. For
example, if 30 people were all exposed to blast fumes at the same time and
had to get medical treatment, this corresponded to 30 accidents, however, for
the purpose of this model that will be seen as one type of accident. Table
3.4 presents the breakdown of the accidents after all the duplicates had been
removed, which resulted in reducing the accidents from 1307 to 741, which
equated to a yearly average of 148 accidents.
From this point onwards, all analyses are performed on the data set with
the duplicates removed. The number of accidents with respect to the organi-
sational units are analysed, as can be seen in Figure 3.8.
From this plot, it can be seen that the majority of accidents occurred in
the underground section, after which the engineering section has a significant
number of accidents and thereafter the rest of the organisational units appear
to have minimal accidents. Therefore, it was identified that the data-set should
be split into three subsets of data, namely, underground section, engineering
section, and the remaining units grouped together as one subset named other
section. Furthermore, three separate models were created for these three or-
ganisational unit groupings, because the risk within each grouping is notably
different.
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Table 3.4: Raw data split by organisational unit after duplicates were removed
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Underground Section 128 98 112 91 93 522
Smelter Services 1 0 0 0 0 1
Smelter 3 2 2 3 3 13
Services 16 11 2 6 9 44
Engineering 39 20 20 19 19 117
Concentrators 12 4 6 5 9 36
Mining (Surface) 1 1 1 3 2 8
Total 200 136 143 127 135 741
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Figure 3.8: Accidents by organisational unit
3.4.3 Parent agency
The agency related to each example identifies the cause of the accident, for
example, a rolling rock or blasting. The parent agency consists of ten pre-
defined groupings, of which every accident can be classified into at least one
category. These ten parent agencies can be seen in Figure 3.9. M&T Handling
is an abbreviation for ‘Materials and tools handling’. From the plot it can be
seen that material and tool handling is the primary contributor to all accidents.
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(a) Parent agency for total data set
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(b) Parent agency for underground data
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(c) Parent agency for engineering data
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(d) Parent agency for the rest of the data
Figure 3.9: Parent agency analysis
However, in the underground sections, Fall Of Ground (FOG) is the next major
contributor, yet for the engineering section, falling and moving machinery are
the next major contributors, and for the rest of the sections, other, falling
and moving machinery are the next major contributor to accidents. From this
perspective, it appears that the engineering and other sections are similar,
however, are distinguishable from the underground section.
3.4.4 Rain
Next, the rainfall was analysed, again on a total mine scale, and then in the
three smaller data sets. This was to see if rain had any influence on the
accidents occurring. Accidents were split up into if it was raining or not on
the day that the accident occurred, as it was not recorded initially with the
accident data. This was the best compromise that could be made to identify
the influence of rain. The rain analysis can be seen in Figure 3.10. From these
plots, it can be seen that the rainfall appears not to have any effect on whether
or not an accident occurred, thus there is no obvious direct correlation between
rain and an accident occurring. Intuitively, this is expected since the majority
of operations in the platinum mining industry are underground or under a roof
where rain will not influence the workers. In an open cast mine however, this
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Figure 3.10: Rainfall analysis
could be different.
3.4.5 Humidity
Humidity can range between zero and one hundred and was divided into ten
equal segments for the analysis, which can be seen in Figure 3.11. From these
plots, it can be seen that the humidity plays a similar role over all sections of
the mine, and it appears that between 50% and 90% humidity the influence is
much greater, with 60% to 70% humidity being the largest contributor to the
risk of an accident occurring.
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(a) Humidity for total data set
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(b) Humidity for underground data
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(c) Humidity for engineering data
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(d) Humidity for the rest of the data
Figure 3.11: Humidity analysis
3.4.6 Time of day
Each day was divided into 24 equal one hour groups and the accidents were
analysed hourly. Figure 3.12 displays the results of this analysis. Earlier
it was mentioned that time into shift was identified as an influential factor,
however, no data was received with respect to the time into shift when each
accident occurred. It is assumed that, since the data is separated into the three
organisational units, the time into shift is incorporated in the time of day due
to the fact that each organisational unit generally work similar shifts and as
such, the time into shift that are of high risk will show up in the time of day
plot for the individual organisational units. Nonetheless, from the plot it is
assumed that there are two twelve hour shifts which are from 06h00 to 18h00
and from 18h00 to 06h00. From this figure, it can be seen that all the plots
appear to have a very similar profile, which looks to follow a parabolic curve
for the first half and an exponential function for the second half. This shows
an overall high risk period between 24h00 and 01h00 and between 09h00 and
12h00 and low risk at the assumed shift changes.
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(a) Time of day for total data set
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(b) Time of day for underground data
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(c) Time of day for engineering data
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(d) Time of day for the rest of the data
Figure 3.12: Time of day analysis
3.4.7 Temperatures
Next, the maximum temperature, minimum temperature and temperature dif-
ference was analysed. The temperature difference is the difference between the
daily maximum and daily minimum temperatures. Unfortunately, only daily
maximum and minimum temperatures were obtained, and not the exact tem-
perature at the time of the accident. Thus instead of using an exact tempera-
ture at the time of the accident in the model, different variables will be used
in the model for the day’s maximum temperature, minimum temperature and
the difference in the maximum and minimum temperatures. Figure 3.13 show
the results from the analysis.
From all three of these plots, it appears that the individual organisational
units follow the total data set, and all of the plots appear to follow a Poisson’s
distribution.
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(a) Maximum temperature for total data set
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(b) Maximum temperature for underground
data
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(c) Maximum temperature for engineering
data
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(d) Maximum temperature for the rest of the
data
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(e) Minimum temperature for total data set
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(f) Minimum temperature for underground
data
Figure 3.13: Temperature analysis
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(g) Minimum temperature for engineering
data
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(h) Minimum temperature for the rest of the
data
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(i) Temperature difference for total data set
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(j) Temperature difference for underground
data
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(k) Temperature difference for engineering
data
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(l) Temperature difference for the rest of the
data
Temperature analysis continued
3.4.8 Production rate
The production data received contained monthly totals for the tons broken/mined
and the tons milled. For this analysis, these were added together and divided
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by the number of days in the month, after which this value was normalised
to a value of between zero and one which reflected the production percentage
relative to the maximum daily tonnage. Figure 3.14 shows the results of this
analysis.
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(a) Production rate for total data set
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(b) Production rate for underground data
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(c) Production rate for engineering data
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(d) Production rate for the rest of the data
Figure 3.14: Production rate analysis
As was assumed, this plot shows an exponential distribution, with the larger
production rate resulting in more accidents and the lower the production rate
resulting in a lower accident rate.
3.4.9 Seasonality
Lastly, the months were analysed to identify any pattern due to seasonality.
Figure 3.15 presents the results.
This plot shows that the accident data had a fairly constant spread over
each month and thus showed no significant seasonality affect, because there
was no recognisable trend or pattern throughout the year. However, there was
a strike over the period of October 2012 to December 2012 and thus that would
account for the drop in accidents over that period.
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(a) Seasonality for total data set
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(b) Seasonality for underground data
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(c) Seasonality for engineering data
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(d) Seasonality for the rest of the data
Figure 3.15: Seasonality analysis
3.5 Input Attribute Normalised Continuous
Approximations
From the section above it was identified that there was no significant differ-
ence between the total data distributions and each of the three analysed or-
ganisational units (underground, engineering and other) distributions for each
attribute analysed. As such, normalised continuous approximations were cre-
ated for the input attributes based on the total distributions. This was done in
order to normalise the input data, as well as for ease of programming. Of the
attributes analysed above, the parent agency and seasonality is omitted since
no significant trends or deductions can be made from them. Additionally, the
rain attribute is also omitted due to the fact that it would be programmed as a
one for rain, and a zero for no rain, and thus no normailisation is required for
the rain. All of the normalised continuous approximations are plotted along
with their associated distributions to see the resemblance between the two. In
Figure 3.16 to Figure 3.21 of the normalised continuous approximations, the
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left hand y-axis represents the scale for the distribution of accidents, and the
right hand y-axis represents the scale for the normalised approximation.
Firstly, a normalised continuous approximation plot was created for the
humidity distribution. By visual inspection, the best fit curve to this distribu-
tion was found to be a scaled 6th order polynomial which can be seen in Figure
3.16. Next, the best fit curve for the time of day distribution was found to be
a 10th order polynomial which can be seen in Figure 3.17. Next, the best fit
curve for the maximum temperature distribution was found to be a 5th order
polynomial which can be seen in Figure 3.18. Next, the best fit curve for the
minimum temperature distribution was found to be a 4th order polynomial
which can be seen in Figure 3.19. Next, the best fit curve for the temperature
difference distribution was found to be a 6th order polynomial which can be
seen in Figure 3.20. Lastly, the best fit curve for the production rate distribu-
tion was found to be an exponential distribution which can be seen in Figure
3.21.
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Figure 3.16: Normalised continuous approximation for humidity
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Figure 3.17: Normalised continuous approximation for time of day
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Figure 3.18: Normalised continuous approximation for maximum temperature
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Figure 3.19: Normalised continuous approximation for minimum temperature
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Figure 3.20: Normalised continuous approximation for temperature difference
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Figure 3.21: Normalised continuous approximation for production rate
3.6 Data Setup
After the data was split into three major sections, namely, underground, en-
gineering and other, it was chosen to train the model with 80% of the data
and validate it with the remaining 20%. This corresponded to training with
the first four years (2009 − 2012), and validating with the last year (2013).
However, with the improvement of safety initiatives over the years as well as
organisational restructuring, this approach to the model did not yield adequate
results, thus an alternative method was identified. This alternative method
was to create a network for each year (2009 − 2012), and then validate each
network with the subsequent year (2010 − 2013), thus creating four separate
networks for each of the three sections. The various networks discussed above
refer all to the same model discussed, however, with different network weights
associated to each model.
Next, 25 converse arguments were created to be used in the training of the
model in order to help train the model. They were necessary due to the fact
that if there are no examples in the network training that identify when there
is no accident, then the network would always generalise that for any inputs
that the output would be an accident.
The model was used to identify patterns between the influencing factors
for each accident (and converse arguments) and then generalise the pattern,
to be used to identify the continuous risk. Due to this pattern recognition
approach, the network makes use of a binary output classification system also
known as a 1-of-n output structure. The 1-of-n output structure for this model
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operates as follows, there are ten outputs which correspond to the output in
units of 10% (i.e. the first output refers to any output between 0% and 10%,
the second output refers to any output between 10% and 20%, and so on).
For example, if the first converse argument is 35% risk, then for that training
entry, all the cells are zero, except for the fourth cell which is populated with
a one. Therefore, the entire output matrix is populated with ones and zeros,
and each example can only have a single one in it. An example of this can be
seen in Table 3.5. With this system, the outputs for the converse arguments
were ranged between the first seven columns, putting more emphasis on the
lower risks because the accidents put the emphasis on the higher risks. The
accidents were defined as follows, the output for a FI and SI was assumed to
be between 90% and 100%, for a LTI was assumed to be between 80% and
90%, and for a MTC was assumed to be between 70% and 80%. This was done
so that each category from 0% to 100% had data points to train.
Next, all the data was manipulated according to the normalised continuous
approximations discussed earlier and the outputs were manipulated as men-
tioned above. Although no time into shift data was received, it was assumed
that there are two shifts, from 6h00 to 18h00 and 18h00 to 6h00. Table 3.5 is
a sample of the training inputs and outputs to the network.
Table 3.5 shows how all the accident data and converse arguments were
manipulated for training the networks. Continuous data for the five years
(2009 − 2013) was also manipulated similarly, however without any corre-
sponding output values. The continuous data was broken down into two hour
segments for the entire five years, this was so that the time of day and time
into shift have influence on the network. Then for the temperatures, humidity
and rain which was only recorded daily, the same values were used consec-
utively over the twelve 2-hour entries, thus assuming the entire day had the
same conditions, although this is not completely accurate, since the humid-
ity would change throughout the day, or the rain may only fall for an hour
or two of the entire day, this was the best generalisation that could be made
with the available data. Furthermore, the production figures received were
the monthly figures, not daily or hourly, thus every entry for the same month
was assumed to be the same production value, again this is not completely
accurate, however, it was the best assumption that could be made with the
data available.
After the data has been setup as described above, the model can be trained
and validated, which is discussed in the next chapter.
3.7 Chapter 3 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this chapter described the model created for this study as well as
the mathematics used in ANN more closely. This was followed by an example
for clarity on the mathematics. After which, the data obtained was analysed
and ultimately, normalised continuous approximations for the input attributes
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Table 3.5: Manipulated accident data
Accident Non-Accident
No. 1 2 3 1 2 3
Risks
Time of Day 0.670 0.102 0.287 0.820 0.680 0.640
Time into Shift 0.353 0.135 0.418 0.030 0.210 0.490
Temp - max 0.984 0.984 0.834 0.770 0.890 0.940
Temp - min 0.897 0.897 0.968 0.670 0.950 0.710
Temp - diff 0.536 0.432 0.199 0.730 0.600 0.900
Humidity 0.820 0.902 0.939 0.570 0.610 0.920
Rain 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Production 0.761 0.761 0.761 0.890 0.930 0.860
Output SI SI MTC 5% 24% 56%
Output1 (0% - 10%) 0 0 0 1 0 0
Output2 (10% - 20%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output3 (20% - 30%) 0 0 0 0 1 0
Output4 (30% - 40%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output5 (40% - 50%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output6 (50% - 60%) 0 0 0 0 0 1
Output7 (60% - 70%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output8 (70% - 80%) 0 0 1 0 0 0
Output9 (80% - 90%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output10 (90% - 100%) 1 1 0 0 0 0
were created from this data for all the input attributes into the model. Lastly,
the data setup for use in the model was explained.
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Chapter 4
Training And Validation Of The
Model
4.1 Introduction
Training and validation of the model designed is necessary to guarantee the
model functions as designed as well as to ensure the rigidity of the model.
The training of the model is accomplished using Matlab’s pattern recognition
neural network tool with the data as processed in the previous chapter and
the validation of the model takes the form of a case study by observing and
comparing the model risk outputs with the actual accidents. The model design
can be broken up into three parts which are repeated for each year (2009 −
2012), the three sections are underground, engineering and other. The other
section is a grouping of the following five sections, smelter services, smelter,
services, concentrators and surface mining. This chapter starts by covering the
training of the model, followed by the validation of the model, then the actual
model for the various sections and years are created, a sensitivity analysis
of the input variables is performed, the various networks are compared and
discussed and lastly, the intended use of the model is discussed.
4.2 Training of the Model
As was identified in the former chapter, the data was divided into three major
sections, namely, underground, engineering and other. Initially, it was chosen
to train the model with 80% of the data and validate it with the remaining
20% which corresponded to training with the first four years (2009 − 2012)
and validating with the last year (2013). However, with the improvement of
safety initiatives over the years as well as organisational restructuring, this
approach to the model did not yield adequate results, thus an alternative
method was identified. This alternative method was to create a network for
each year (2009 − 2012) and then validate each network with the succeeding
year (2010−2013). The various networks discussed above refer all to the same
model discussed in the preceding chapter, however, with different network
101
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weights associated to each network. Furthermore, 25 converse arguments were
created to be used in the training of the model in order to assist training the
model. Since if there were no converse arguments, the model would generalise
that for any inputs, the output would result in an accident. The converse
arguments used conditions when accidents did not occur.
A two-layer feed-forward neural network, with sigmoid hidden and output
activation functions was the network used in the model. This type of network
can classify vectors well, given sufficient nodes in its hidden layer. For each
of the three sections, for each year, a network was trained and validated. For
each network, the manipulated input values associated to the accidents and
the converse arguments as well as the target outputs are loaded into the neural
network pattern recognition tool in Matlab. Then on average, a data split of
70% data for network training, 25% data for network validation and 5% data
for network testing is selected. These values were the best values found from
trial and error. The network training data is used to train the network and
adjust the network weights according to its error. The network validation
data is used to measure the networks generalisation and to stop the training
when generalisation stops improving. Lastly, the network testing data has
no effect on the training and it provides an independent measure of network
performance during and after training. Next, the number of hidden nodes are
set, from the previous chapter it was stated that two thirds of the sum of the
number of inputs and outputs is an adequate number of hidden nodes to use,
this corresponds to twelve hidden nodes, since there are eight inputs and ten
outputs. Each network used start with twelve hidden nodes, however, after
many iterations some models ended up requiring more hidden nodes.
Next, the network was trained numerous times and the best network was
saved. Note must be taken that training multiple times would generate differ-
ent results due to different initial conditions and sampling, furthermore, note
must be taken that the lowest training error is not necessarily the best solu-
tion, as the network will not always generalise as well as a network with a
slightly higher training error. A method can be to train with half the data and
validate with the other half of the data until a suitable network approximates
the entire data set and this can be used for the model. When a suitable Mean
Square Error (MSE) is reached the retraining can stop. The MSE is the av-
erage squared difference between outputs and targets, intuitively lower values
are better and zero implies no error. The total percentage error found in the
confusion matrix indicates the fraction of samples misclassified, intuitively a
value of zero implies no misclassification.
At this point a confusion matrix can be plotted to check where the misclas-
sifications occurred in order to identify if they are of the accidents or converse
arguments as well as if the misclassification is minor (such as a Serious In-
jury (SI) being classified as a Lost Time Injury (LTI)) or major (such as a SI
being misclassified as a 10% risk). The confusion matrix has the network out-
put on the y-axis and the target output on the x-axis, thus the main diagonal
(from the top left to bottom right) indicates correct classification and the rest
of the blocks indicate misclassification, however, the blocks close to the main
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diagonal are minor misclassifications and the further away from the diagonal
the more large the misclassification is. All misclassifications below the main
diagonal are where the network predicts higher outputs than the targets and
above the main diagonal the network predicts lower output values than the
targets.
After the errors are suitable and a model is selected and the confusion
matrix is satisfactory, then the network can be validated by running continuous
data through it and comparing the output with the actual accidents which is
discussed in the next section.
4.3 Validation of the Model
As discussed in the section above, the model is validated by testing each net-
work with data from the year it was trained with and with data from the
subsequent year, which is plotted along with the actual accidents that oc-
curred in the corresponding year. Making use of the best chosen network for
each year, the network is run with continuous data from its own year and the
next year which was manipulated as presented in the former chapter. The
output of the model returns for each time step a vector of ten values which
corresponds to the ten outputs, and every value in each vector relates to the
correlation of each output, thus if there is a one in the tenth output, this im-
plies the model is certain that the output is a SI, however, if that value was
0.1 then the network is not certain that it is a SI. Thus which ever output has
the maximum correlation it is assumed to be the output value. For example in
Table 4.1, the maximum value is 0.9882 which corresponds to the output risk
being between 60%−70%. However, if the maximum value and second highest
value is close together then no clear distinction can be made between the two
categories. Thus for the purpose of this model, if the difference between the
maximum value and second highest value is more than or equal to 0.2 then
the maximum value is used, on the other hand, if the difference between the
maximum value and second highest value is less than 0.2 then the average
output between those two outputs is used.
Next, the output is averaged to a daily risk value. Then the daily risk is
plotted along with the actual accidents and this is performed for the current
year of the model as well as the subsequent year. Then these continuous risk
profiles can visually be compared with the actual accidents to validate the
model. Ideally, the risk should remain low and only peak when an accident
occurs, however, due to the random nature of accidents and so few input
influential factors and the generalisations made, the risk may peak when no
accidents occur, or the risks may be low when an accident occurs. However, it
is attempted to minimise the modelling error of high risks and no accidents and
vice versa. The plots all have colour bands in the background to differentiate
the various risk levels, these levels were set as high risk is anything above 90%
which is red, moderate risk is anything between 80% and 90% which is yellow
and acceptable risk is anything below 80% which is green.
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Table 4.1: Example network output for a single 2 hour time slot
Attribute Correlation
0% - 10% 0.0460
10% - 20% 0.0003
20% - 30% 0.0005
30% - 40% 0.0048
40% - 50% 0.0142
50% - 60% 0.0039
60% - 70% 0.9882
70% - 80% 0.0007
80% - 90% 0.0026
90% - 100% 0.0145
The next section presents the results of the training and validation for the
underground, engineering and other sections for the years 2009 to 2012, which
is followed by a sensitivity analysis and a discussion of the results.
4.4 Results and Discussion
There are three subsections which the results are broken up into. They are
the underground section, engineering section and the other sections. For each
of these subsections a network was created for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and
2012. Then each of these networks where tested with the data from the year
it was trained with, as well as the data from the following year. Next, the
underground section’s networks are trained and validated.
4.4.1 Underground
The underground section contributed 522 accidents to the total (741) of non-
duplicated accidents, this was comprised of 128 in 2009, 98 in 2010, 112 in 2011,
91 in 2012 and 93 in 2013. With such a high number of accidents occurring
in the underground section continuously, it can be seen that the underground
section is continuously at a high risk of an accident occurring. These accidents
along with the converse arguments were used in training the networks below.
The accident numbers over the five years drop from 2009 to 2010 and then
from 2010 to 2013 the accident numbers stayed fairly constant, besides for a
small increase in 2011. Next, the four underground networks are created.
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4.4.1.1 2009 underground network
In 2009 the underground section had 128 accidents which equates to roughly
2.5 accidents every week. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every
three days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will almost always
stay above 80% risk. The 2009 underground network created made use of
the training setup of 70% data for network training, 25% data for network
validation and 5% data for network testing along with twelve hidden nodes
which resulted in the following training errors,
Table 4.2: MSE for 2009 underground network
MSE
Training 0.0276
Validation 0.0416
Testing 0.0317
Total 0.0313
As can be seen from the errors, the 2009 network had an average error in
the training, validation and testing steps, which resulted in an acceptable total
for the network. Next the confusion matrix is plotted in Figure 4.1 to identify
where the misclassifications occurred. From the confusion matrix it is seen that
the majority of the data is correctly classified (along the main diagonal) and the
majority of the misclassifications are close to the main diagonal, implying that
they are close to their actual value. There are very few major misclassification
and they predominantly occurred as low target values being classified as high
output values. Since the majority of the misclassifications occur below the
main diagonal, it is assumed the network will be biased more towards higher
outputs. 14.1% of the classifications occur below the main diagonal and 8.7%
of the classifications occur above the main diagonal, thus there is a bias of
5.4% towards a higher output. This resulted in a classification accuracy of
77.8% or error of 22.2%.
Next, Figure 4.2 shows the calculated continuous risk profile along with the
actual accidents that occurred in 2009, this was used in the training described
above. From this plot it can be seen that the continuous risk varies between
65% and 100%, however, the majority of the risk lies above 80%. The actual
accidents that occurred in 2009 are plotted on the continuous risk line and this
shows a few outliers that occur at a risk below 80%. Unfortunately due to the
number of accidents occurring in the underground section which portrays the
high danger in the underground section, the risk stays above 80% for the ma-
jority of the time and thus not much use can be gained from the underground
networks.
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Figure 4.1: Confusion matrix for 2009 underground network
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Figure 4.2: Continuous risk for 2009 underground section
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Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2010)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2010 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.3. This plot shows again that the continuous risk varies between
71% and 100%, however, the majority if the risk lies above 80%. However,
this time all the accidents occur above 80% risk.
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Figure 4.3: Predicted continuous risk for 2010 underground section
4.4.1.2 2010 underground network
In 2010 the underground section had 98 accidents which equates to roughly
1.9 accidents every week. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every
four days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will almost always
stay above 80% risk. As with the majority of networks, the 2010 underground
network created made use of the training setup of 70% data for network train-
ing, 25% data for network validation and 5% data for network testing along
with twelve hidden nodes which resulted in the training errors seen in Table
4.3.
As can be seen from the errors, the network had a low training error and
the validation error was acceptable and despite the higher testing error, this
resulted in an acceptable error for the total network. Next, Figure 4.4 shows
the confusion matrix associated to this network. The confusion matrix showed
very few misclassifications and of the misclassifications, the majority were
close to the main diagonal which is better than them further away from the
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Table 4.3: MSE for 2010 underground network
MSE
Training 0.0184
Validation 0.0333
Testing 0.0746
Total 0.0249
main diagonal. In the network 12.1% of the classifications occurred below the
main diagonal and 5.6% occurred above the main diagonal, again showing a
bias towards higher outputs but only of 6.5% this time. This resulted in the
trained models accuracy being 82.1%, or having an error of 17.9%.
50.0%
50.0%
NaN%
NaN%
NaN%
NaN%
66.7%
33.3%
50.0%
50.0%
60.0%
40.0%
NaN%
NaN%
90.5%
9.5%
92.9%
7.1%
81.1%
18.9%
75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 75.0% 100% 0.0% 82.6% 90.7% 94% 82.1%
25.0% 100% 100% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 100% 17.4% 9.3% 6.3% 17.9%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
O
u
tp
u
t 
C
la
ss
1 2.4% 0.8% 1.6% 0.0%
2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0%
4 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 3.3% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
5 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0%
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
6 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
2.4% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
9 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0%
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 31.7% 0.8%
0.0% 0.8% 15.4% 0.0% 0.8%0.0%
Target Class
0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 3.3% 24.4%10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Figure 4.4: Confusion matrix for 2010 underground network
Figure 4.5 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2010. This figure shows that the continuous risk varies
between 61% and 100%, with the majority of the risk varying between 80%
and 100%. There are two outlying accidents which occur at roughly 74% and
79%, the rest of the accidents occur above 80%. Again, the risk stays above
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80% as was assumed, however, all this infers is that the underground section
is very dangerous and at constant risk of an accident.
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Figure 4.5: Continuous risk for 2010 underground section
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2011)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2011 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.6. This plot ranges between 54% and 98%, with the majority of
the risk staying between 80% and 90% and all of the accidents occurring above
80% risk.
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Figure 4.6: Predicted continuous risk for 2011 underground section
4.4.1.3 2011 underground network
In 2011 the underground section had 112 accidents which equates to roughly
2.2 accidents every week. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every
three days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will almost always
stay above 80% risk. Again, the 2011 underground network created made use
of the training setup of 70% data for training, 25% data for validation and 5%
data for testing along with twelve hidden nodes which resulted in the following
training errors,
Table 4.4: MSE for 2011 underground network
MSE
Training 0.0309
Validation 0.0438
Testing 0.0635
Total 0.0358
As can be seen, the network had an acceptable training and validation
error and despite the higher testing error, the total error was low enough, which
resulted in a suitable network. Then the confusion matrix for this network was
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plotted in Figure 4.7 and it shows that the majority of the misclassifications
occur close to the main diagonal and as such are not a problem. Furthermore,
12.3% of the classifications occurred below the main diagonal and 12.3% of the
classifications occurred above the main diagonal, thus there is no bias towards
lower or higher output values. This resulted in a training classification accuracy
of 75.2% or an error of 24.8%.
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Figure 4.7: Confusion matrix for 2011 underground network
Figure 4.8 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2011. This plot shows the continuous risk profile varying
between 75% and 100%, however, with all the accidents occurring above 80%
and again the continuous risk never spends much time below 80% risk over the
year.
Next, the 2011 underground network was used to estimate the risk in the
next year (2012) which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2012 and
this can be seen in Figure 4.9. From this plot it can be seen that the continuous
risk profile varies between 75% and 100% with the majority between 80% and
100%. There are two outlying accidents, one at 79% and the other at 75% and
the rest of the accidents all occur above 80%.
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Figure 4.8: Continuous risk for 2011 underground section
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Figure 4.9: Predicted continuous risk for 2012 underground section
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4.4.1.4 2012 underground network
In 2012 the underground section had 91 accidents which equates to roughly 1.8
accidents every week. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every four
days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will almost always stay
above 80% risk. The 2012 underground network created, similarly made use
of the training setup of 70% data for network training, 25% data for network
validation and 5% data for network testing along with twelve hidden nodes
which resulted in the following training errors,
Table 4.5: MSE for 2012 underground network
MSE
Training 0.0203
Validation 0.0461
Testing 0.0137
Total 0.0264
As can be seen, the network had a low training and testing errors and
an average validation error, which resulted in a suitable total error. Next,
the confusion matrix for the 2012 underground network is plotted in Figure
4.10, it shows that the majority of the misclassifications are close to the main
diagonal and thus is not a problem. In the 2012 underground network confusion
matrix, 8.7% of the classifications occur below the main diagonal and 10.5% of
the classification occur above the main diagonal, thus the bias is 1.8% to lower
output values, which is insignificant. This resulted in a training classification
accuracy of 81.9% or an error of 18.1%.
Figure 4.11 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2012. It shows that the continuous risk ranged between
51% and 100%, with the majority of the risk between 80% and 100%. Fur-
thermore, all the accidents occur above 80%.
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2013)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2013 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.12. This plot varies between 78% and 100%, with all the accidents
occurring above 80%.
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Figure 4.10: Confusion matrix for 2012 underground network
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Figure 4.11: Continuous risk for 2012 underground section
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Figure 4.12: Predicted continuous risk for 2013 underground section
4.4.1.5 Underground networks summary
From looking at the figures of the continuous risk profiles of the four under-
ground networks along with their predictions, they all are similar with the
risk virtually never going below 80%. Thus despite all four networks statisti-
cally being accurate at predicting the majority of the accidents, no actual use
is gained from these models, other than confirming that in the underground
section there is constantly a very high risk of an accident occurring. Tables
4.6 and 4.7 are a summary of the statistics from the underground networks.
Both tables present the year of the data used in the network on the top x-axis
and for each of these, the network used, network error, number of accidents
and percentage of outlying accidents is shown. Table 4.6 presents the values
for the risk profiles with the data used in training the networks and Table 4.7
presents the values for the predicted risk profiles.
From Tables 4.6 and 4.7 it can be seen that the 2010 network is the best
with respect to it having the lowest training error, however, the 2012 network
is the best with respect to having the least percentage of outlying accidents.
Furthermore, due to all the networks continuous risk profile staying constantly
above 80%, no one network can be identified as better than another one. Next,
networks for the four years for the engineering section of the mine are trained
and validated.
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Table 4.6: Summary of underground networks
2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Network 2009 2010 2011 2012
Network training % error 22.2% 17.9% 24.8% 18.1% 20.8%
Number of accidents 128 98 112 91 107
% outliers 6.25% 2.04% 1.79% 0.00% 2.52%
Table 4.7: Summary of underground networks predictions
2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Network 2009 2010 2011 2012
Network training % error 22.2% 17.9% 24.8% 18.1% 20.8%
Number of accidents 98 112 91 93 99
% outliers 0.00% 0.00% 1.79% 0.00% 0.45%
4.4.2 Engineering
The engineering section contributed 117 accidents to the total (741) of non-
duplicated accidents, this was made up from 39 in 2009, 20 in 2010, 20 in 2011,
19 in 2012 and 19 in 2013. These accidents along with the created converse
arguments were used in training the models below. The accident numbers
over the five years drop significantly from 2009 to 2010, however, from 2010 to
2013 the accident numbers stayed fairly constant. Next, the four engineering
networks are trained and validated.
4.4.2.1 2009 engineering network
In 2009 the engineering section had 39 accidents which equates to roughly
one accident every 1.3 weeks. Knowing that on average an accident occurred
every nine days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will often be
close to or above 80% risk. The 2009 engineering network created made use
of a training setup of 75% data for network training, 25% data for network
validation and 0% data for network testing along with thirteen hidden nodes
which resulted in the training errors seen in Table 4.8.
As can be seen from the errors, the 2009 network had a similar low error
for the training, validation and testing, which resulted in an acceptable error
for the total network. Next, the confusion matrix is plotted in Figure 4.13
to identify where the misclassifications occurred in the training. From the
confusion matrix it is seen that the majority of the data is correctly classified
(along the main diagonal) and the majority of the misclassifications are close
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Table 4.8: MSE for 2009 engineering network
MSE
Training 0.0222
Validation 0.0285
Total 0.0238
to the main diagonal, implying that they are close to their actual value. There
are very few major misclassification and they predominantly occurred as low
target values being classified as a high output value. Since the majority of the
misclassifications occur below the main diagonal, it is assumed the network
will be biased more towards higher outputs. 12.6% of the classifications occur
below the main diagonal and 8.4% of the classifications occur above the main
diagonal, thus there is a bias of 4.2% towards a higher output. This resulted
in a classification accuracy of 78.9% or a network training error of 21.1%.
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Figure 4.13: Confusion matrix for 2009 engineering network
Next, Figure 4.14 shows the calculated continuous risk profile along with
the actual accidents that occurred in 2009, this was used in the training de-
scribed previously. From this plot it can be seen that the continuous risk
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varies between 25% and 100%, however, the majority if the risk lies above
80% as expected due to the number of accidents. The actual accidents that
occurred in 2009 are plotted on the continuous risk line and this shows two
major outliers that occur 48% risk and there are five accidents which occur
just below the 80% risk, however, due to the random nature of accidents, it is
assumed that there will be some outliers that cannot be predicted. Although
there are sections where the risk is above 80% and no accidents occurred, this
does not imply an inaccurate model, the immeasurable component of human
variability is also involved in the occurrence of accidents, thus for the exact
same measured conditions an accident could happen one day and not the next.
Excluding the two major outliers and assuming the five accidents just below
the 80% are 80%, 26 of the accidents occur at a risk between 80% and 90%
and 12 accidents occur at a risk between 90% and 100%. Another interesting
observation is that of the 39 accidents, 23 of them occur when the risk has a
positive gradient or is at a peak, which effectively is the turning point from a
positive gradient.
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Figure 4.14: Continuous risk for 2009 engineering section
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2010)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2010 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.15. This plot shows again that the continuous risk varies between
25% and 100%, however, the majority if the risk lies above 80%, similar to the
trained 2009 continuous risk. However, this time there is only one outlying
accident which is a LTI which occurs at roughly 58%. This time, besides for the
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one outlier, 9 accidents occurred between 80% and 90% risk and 10 accidents
occurred between 90% and 100% risk and 15 of the 20 accidents occur while
the continuous risk has a positive gradient or is at a peak. Interestingly, from
the 1st April 2010 to the 1st July 2010 no accidents occurred in the engineering
section and this is the section were the model had the large dips, although
there were still peaks above 80% in this time period.
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Figure 4.15: Predicted continuous risk for 2010 engineering section
It can be seen from these figures that the majority of the time the risk lies
above 80% as was expected due to the network being trained with 39 accidents
in the span of one year. Furthermore, as is desired, almost all of the accidents
occur at a risk of greater than 80%.
4.4.2.2 2010 engineering network
In 2010 the engineering section had 20 accidents which equates to roughly one
accident every two and a half weeks. Knowing that on average an accident
occurred every eighteen days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk
will not stay above the 80% risk as much as it did in the 2009 network. The
2010 engineering network created made use of the training setup of 70% data
for network training, 30% data for network validation and 0% data for network
testing along with fourteen hidden nodes which resulted in the training errors
seen in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9: MSE for 2010 engineering network
MSE
Training 0.0279
Validation 0.0368
Total 0.0306
As can be seen from the errors, the network had a lower training error than
validation error, resulting in an acceptable total error despite it being larger
than the total error for the 2009 network. Next, Figure 4.16 shows the con-
fusion matrix associated to this network. The confusion matrix showed some
misclassifications and of the misclassifications, the majority were close to the
main diagonal which is better than them further away from the main diago-
nal. This time 7.2% of the classifications occurred below the main diagonal
and 21.2% occurred above the main diagonal, showing a bias towards lower
outputs of 14%. This resulted in the trained models accuracy being 71.8%, or
having an error of 28.2%.
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Figure 4.16: Confusion matrix for 2010 engineering network
Figure 4.17 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
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dents that occurred in 2010. This figure shows that the continuous risk varies
between 35% and 97%, with the majority of the risk varying between 70%
and 97%. There is one outlying accident which is a MTC that occurs at 73%
risk, furthermore, 10 accidents occurred between 80% and 90% and 9 of the
accidents occur between 90% and 100% risk. Five of the six SI’s occur above
90% risk and the rest of the accidents occur at a risk between 80% and 97%.
This time 9 of the 20 accidents occurred when the continuous risk gradient
was positive.
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Figure 4.17: Continuous risk for 2010 engineering section
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2011)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2011 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.18. This plot ranges between 40% and 97%, with the majority of
the risk staying above 80%. There are two outlying accidents which are both
LTI’s which occur at 69% and 73% risk, however, the rest of the accidents
occur within the 80% to 100% band. Besides for the two outliers, 10 accidents
occur between 90% and 100% risk and 8 accidents occur between 80% and
90% risk. Furthermore, 13 of the 20 accidents occur when the risk profile is
increasing.
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Figure 4.18: Predicted continuous risk for 2011 engineering section
4.4.2.3 2011 engineering network
In 2011 the engineering section had 20 accidents which equates to roughly one
accident every two and a half weeks. Knowing that on average an accident
occurred every eighteen days, it is assumed that the network will respond
similarly to the 2010 network. Again, the 2011 engineering network created
made use of the training setup of 70% data for training, 30% data for validation
and 0% data for testing, however, along with twelve hidden nodes this time
which resulted in the following training errors,
Table 4.10: MSE for 2011 engineering network
MSE
Training 0.0211
Validation 0.0339
Total 0.0250
As can be seen, the network had a sufficiently low training, validation, and
total error, which resulted in a suitable network. Then the confusion matrix
for this network was plotted in Figure 4.19 and it shows that the majority of
the misclassifications occur close to the main diagonal and as such are not a
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problem. Furthermore, 15.4% of the classifications occurred below the main
diagonal and 7.2% of the classifications occurred above the main diagonal, thus
the bias is shifted to 8.2% towards higher output values. This resulted in a
training classification accuracy of 77.6% or an error of 22.4%.
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Figure 4.19: Confusion matrix for 2011 engineering network
Figure 4.20 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual ac-
cidents that occurred in 2011. This plot shows the continuous risk profile
varying between 10% and 100%, however, with the majority above 80%. Only
one accident occurs below 80%, 12 accidents occur between 80% and 90%,
and 7 accidents occur between 90% and 100% risk. Furthermore, of the six
SI’s, five occur above 90% risk and now 16 of the 20 accidents occur when the
continuous risk profile gradient is positive.
Next, the 2011 engineering network was used to estimate the risk in the next
year (2012) which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2012 and this
can be seen in Figure 4.21. From this plot it can be seen that the continuous
risk profile varies between 10% and 100% with the majority between 80% and
100%. There is one outlying accident that occurs at 67% risk, then 12 of the
accidents occur at a risk between 80% and 90% and 6 accidents occur at a risk
between 90% and 100%. Furthermore, 14 of the 19 accidents occur when the
continuous risk profile is positive.
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Figure 4.20: Continuous risk for 2011 engineering section
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Figure 4.21: Predicted continuous risk for 2012 engineering section
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4.4.2.4 2012 engineering network
In 2012 the engineering section had 19 accidents which equates to roughly one
accident ever 2.7 weeks. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every
19 days, it is assumed again that the network will respond similarly to the
2010 and 2011 networks. The 2012 engineering network created made use of
the training setup of 70% data for network training, 25% data for network
validation and 5% data for network testing along with fourteen hidden nodes
which resulted in the following training errors,
Table 4.11: MSE for 2012 engineering network
MSE
Training 0.0128
Validation 0.0190
Testing 0.0675
Total 0.0170
As can be seen, the network had sufficiently low training and validation
errors and despite the testing error being rather high, this is due to the fact
that so few examples are used in the network testing, for example, if there
are four examples used in the network testing, if two are misclassified, then
the percentage error would be 50%. Next, the confusion matrix for the 2012
engineering network is plotted in Figure 4.22, it shows that the majority of the
misclassifications are close to the main diagonal and thus is not a big problem.
In the 2012 engineering network confusion matrix, 7.3% of the classifications
occur below the main diagonal and 8.4% of the classifications occur above
the main diagonal, thus the bias is 1.1% to lower output values, which is
insignificant. This resulted in a training classification accuracy of 84.1% or an
error of 15.9%.
Figure 4.23 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2012. It shows that the continuous risk ranged between
20% and 93%, with the majority of the risk between 60% and 90%. Further-
more, there are four accidents that occur below 80% risk (60%, 70%, 78% and
79%), however, only two of these are major outliers. Thus, assuming the two
non-major outliers are close enough to the 80% boundary, 14 of the accidents
occur at a risk between 80% and 90% and 3 accidents occur at a risk between
90% and 100% and of the 19 accidents present in 2012, 12 of them occur when
the continuous risk profile gradient is positive.
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2013)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2013 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.24. This plot varies between 31% and 92%, with the majority of
the continuous risk between 60% and 90%. This time there are four outlying
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Figure 4.22: Confusion matrix for 2012 engineering network
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Figure 4.23: Continuous risk for 2012 engineering section
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accidents (64%, 69%, 73% and 75%), 14 accidents that occur at a risk between
80% and 90%, one accident that occurs at a risk between 90% and 100% and
13 of the 19 accidents occur when the continuous risk profile is positive.
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Figure 4.24: Predicted continuous risk for 2013 engineering section
4.4.2.5 Engineering networks summary
From looking at the figures of the continuous risk profiles of the four engi-
neering networks along with their predictions, the 2012 network appears to be
the best network and the 2010 network appears to be the worst network. This
agrees with the network training errors, where the 2012 network had the lowest
error (15.9%) and the 2010 network had the largest error (28.2%). However,
from a statistical point of view the same conclusions cannot be drawn. Tables
4.12 and 4.13 are a summary of the statistics from the engineering networks.
Both tables present the year of the data used in the network on the top x-axis
and for each of these, the network used, network error, number of accidents,
percentage of outlying accidents, percentage of accidents occurring at a risk
between 80% and 90%, percentage of accidents occurring at a risk between
90% and 100% and the percentage of accidents that occurred when the contin-
uous risk profile is positive is shown. Table 4.12 presents the values for the risk
profiles with the data used in training the networks and Table 4.13 presents
the values for the predicted risk profiles.
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Table 4.12: Summary of engineering networks
2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Network 2009 2010 2011 2012
Network training % error 21.1% 28.2% 22.4% 15.9% 21.9%
Number of accidents 39 20 20 19 25
% outliers 5.13% 5.00% 5.00% 10.53% 6.42%
% between 80% and 90% 64.10% 50.00% 60.00% 73.68% 61.95%
% between 90% and 100% 30.77% 45.00% 35.00% 15.79% 31.64%
% with positive gradient 58.97% 45.00% 80.00% 63.16% 61.78%
Table 4.13: Summary of engineering networks predictions
2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Network 2009 2010 2011 2012
Network training % error 21.1% 28.2% 22.4% 15.9% 21.9%
Number of accidents 20 20 19 19 20
% outliers 5.00% 10.00% 5.26% 21.05% 10.33%
% between 80% and 90% 45.00% 40.00% 63.16% 73.68% 55.46%
% between 90% and 100% 50.00% 50.00% 31.58% 5.26% 34.21%
% with positive gradient 75.00% 65.00% 73.68% 68.42% 70.53%
From Tables 4.12 and 4.13 it can be seen that the 2009 and 2011 are the
better networks with respect to having the lowest percentage of outlying ac-
cidents, however, these are the networks in the middle with average network
training errors of 21.1% and 22.4% respectively. Furthermore, the 2011 net-
work has very high percentages for accidents occurring while the continuous
risk profile has a positive gradient. The average percentage of accidents oc-
curring while the continuous risk profile is positive for the trained networks is
61.78% and for the predictive networks is 70.53% and thus it appears that the
gradient of the risk profile is a warning signal in addition to the actual risk
value. From this, statistically it appears that the 2011 engineering network is
the best network. Next, networks for the four years for the other sections of
the mine are trained and validated.
4.4.3 Other
The other sections contributed 102 accidents to the total (741) of non-duplicated
accidents, this was made up from 33 in 2009, 18 in 2010, 11 in 2011, 17 in 2012
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and 23 in 2013. These accidents along with the converse arguments were used
in training the networks below. The accident numbers over the five years drop
significantly from 2009 to 2011, however, from 2011 to 2013 the accident num-
bers started to rise again. Next, the four other sections networks are trained
and validated.
4.4.3.1 2009 other network
In 2009 the other section had 33 accidents which equates to roughly one acci-
dent every one and a half weeks. Knowing that on average an accident occurred
every eleven days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will often
be close to or above 80% risk. The 2009 other network created, made use of
the training setup of 70% data for network training, 25% data for network
validation and 5% data for network testing along with twelve hidden nodes
which resulted in the following training errors,
Table 4.14: MSE for 2009 other network
MSE
Training 0.0170
Validation 0.0406
Testing 0.0206
Total 0.0231
As can be seen, the network had sufficiently low training and testing errors
and despite the validation error not being as low, this still yielded a satisfactory
total error. Next, the confusion matrix for the 2009 other network is plotted
in Figure 4.25, it shows that the majority of the misclassifications are close to
the main diagonal and thus is not a big problem. In the 2009 other network
confusion matrix, 12.8% of the classifications occur below the main diagonal
and 7.2% of the classifications occur above the main diagonal, thus the bias is
5.6% towards higher output values. This resulted in a training classification
accuracy of 79.8% or an error of 20.2%.
Figure 4.26 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2009. It shows that the continuous risk ranged between
26% and 96%, with the majority of the risk between 50% and 90%. Further-
more, there are five accidents that occur below 80% risk, however, only four
of these are major outliers (60%, 70%, 71%, and 75% ). Additionally, the
three SI’s occur at a risk of 84%, 91% and 90% and all the LTI’s occur at a
risk between 80% and 90%, besides for one outlier occurring at 75% and the
MTC’s vary between 78% and 91% besides for the three outliers mentioned
above. Lastly, of the 33 accidents present in 2009, 20 of them occur when the
continuous risk profile gradient is positive.
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Figure 4.25: Confusion matrix for 2009 other network
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Figure 4.26: Continuous risk for 2009 other section
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Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2010)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2010 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.27. This plot varies between 21% and 96%, with the majority of
the continuous risk between 70% and 90%. This time there are three outlying
accidents, two MTC’s at approximately 76% and 77% and a SI at approxi-
mately 73%. The rest of the accidents occur at a risk between 80% and 90%
and 11 of the 18 accidents occur when the continuous risk profile is positive.
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Figure 4.27: Predicted continuous risk for 2010 other section
4.4.3.2 2010 other network
In 2010 the other section had 18 accidents which equates to roughly one acci-
dent every three weeks. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every
twenty days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will occasionally
be close to or above 80% risk. However, in 2010 the accidents appeared to
occur in three clusters with gaps of no accidents in between the clusters, thus
the continuous risk may be higher than expected. Again, the 2010 other net-
work created made use of the training setup of 75% data for training, 25%
data for validation and 0% data for testing along with fourteen hidden nodes
which resulted in the training errors seen in Table 4.15.
As can be seen, the network had a moderate training, validation and total
error, however, the network was able to generalise well. Then the confusion
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Table 4.15: MSE for 2010 other network
MSE
Training 0.0455
Validation 0.0533
Total 0.0474
matrix for this network was plotted in Figure 4.28 and it shows that the ma-
jority of the misclassifications occur close to the main diagonal and as such are
not a problem, except for the network misclassifying 24% of the examples as a
10% to 20% risk. Furthermore, 15.4% of the classifications occurred below the
main diagonal and 24.8% of the classifications occurred above the main diag-
onal, thus the network is biased by 9.4% towards lower output values. This
resulted in a training classification accuracy of 59.8% or an error of 40.2%.
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Figure 4.28: Confusion matrix for 2010 other network
Figure 4.29 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual ac-
cidents that occurred in 2010. This plot shows the continuous risk profile
varying between 50% and 100%, however, with the majority between 70% and
90%. Only two accidents occur below 80% (66% and 78%), 15 accidents occur
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between 80% and 90% and one accident occurs above 90%. Furthermore, 11
of the 18 accidents occur when the continuous risk profile gradient is positive.
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Figure 4.29: Continuous risk for 2010 other section
Next, the 2010 other network was used to estimate the risk in the next year
(2011) which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2011 and this can
be seen in Figure 4.30. From this plot it can be seen that the continuous risk
profile varies between 30% and 100% with the majority of the risk between
80% and 100%. There are no outlying accidents, eight accidents occur between
80% and 90% and three accidents occur above 90%. Furthermore, 6 of the 11
accidents occur when the continuous risk profile is positive.
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Figure 4.30: Predicted continuous risk for 2011 other section
4.4.3.3 2011 other network
In 2011 the other section had 11 accidents which equates to roughly one acci-
dent every month. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every thirty
three days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will rarely be close
to or above 80% risk. The 2011 other network created made use of the training
setup of 80% data for network training, 20% data for network validation and
0% data for network testing along with fourteen hidden nodes which resulted
in the following training errors,
Table 4.16: MSE for 2011 other network
MSE
Training 0.0256
Validation 0.0271
Total 0.0259
As can be seen from the errors, the network had a sufficiently low training
and validation error, which resulted in a satisfactory total error. Next, Figure
4.31 shows the confusion matrix associated to this network. The confusion
matrix showed very few misclassifications, however, again the network had
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a few misclassifications where the network predicted the 10% to 20% risk
incorrectly. From the confusion matrix, 8.8% of the classifications occurred
below the main diagonal and 15.4% occurred above the main diagonal, thus
showing a bias towards lower outputs of 6.6%. This resulted in the trained
models accuracy being 75.8%, or having an error of 24.2%.
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Figure 4.31: Confusion matrix for 2011 other network
Figure 4.32 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2011. This figure shows that the continuous risk varies
between 20% and 100% with the majority of the risk below 80%. There is one
outlying accident occurring at 75% risk and the one SI occurs at 100% and
the other nine accidents all occur between 80% and 90% risk. This time 10 of
the 11 accidents occurred when the continuous risk gradient was positive.
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2012)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2012 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.33. This plot ranges between 20% and 100% and there are three
outlying accidents which occur at 48%, 59% and 75% risk. Then one accident
occurs above 90% risk, and 13 accidents occur between 80% and 90% risk.
Furthermore, 8 of the 17 accidents occur when the risk profile is increasing.
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Figure 4.32: Continuous risk for 2011 other section
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Figure 4.33: Predicted continuous risk for 2012 other section
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4.4.3.4 2012 other network
In 2012 the other section had 17 accidents which equates to roughly one acci-
dent every three weeks. Knowing that on average an accident occurred every
twenty one days, it is assumed that the networks calculated risk will occasion-
ally be close to or above 80% risk, however, most of the accidents occur close
together and then leave a large gap of no accidents before the next cluster of
accidents, thus the output may be higher than expected. The 2012 other net-
work created, made use of the training setup of 70% data for network training,
25% data for network validation and 5% data for network testing along with
twelve hidden nodes which resulted in the following training errors,
Table 4.17: MSE for 2012 other network
MSE
Training 0.0132
Validation 0.0353
Testing 0.0453
Total 0.0204
As can be seen, the network had sufficiently low training error, and average
validation and testing errors, which resulted in a satisfactory total error. Next,
the confusion matrix for the 2012 other network is plotted in Figure 4.34, it
shows that the majority of the misclassifications are close to the main diagonal
and thus is not a big problem. In the 2012 other network confusion matrix,
11% of the classifications occur below the main diagonal and 6.6% of the
classifications occur above the main diagonal, thus the bias is 4.4% towards
higher output values. This resulted in a training classification accuracy of
82.8% or an error of 17.2%.
Figure 4.35 presents the continuous risk profile along with the actual acci-
dents that occurred in 2012. It shows that the continuous risk ranged between
44% and 100%, with the majority of the risk between 60% and 100%. Further-
more, no accidents occurred below 80% risk, seven accidents occurred between
80% and 90% risk and ten accidents occurred above 90% risk. Lastly, of the
17 accidents present in 2012, 13 of them occur when the continuous risk profile
gradient is positive.
Next, this network was used to estimate the risk in the next year (2013)
which was plotted along with the actual accidents in 2013 and this can be seen
in Figure 4.36. This plot varies between 44% and 100%, with the majority
of the continuous risk between 60% and 100%. This time there are three
outlying accidents, two MTC’s at approximately 62% and 75% and a LTI at
approximately 74%. Of the rest of the accidents, four occur between 80%
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Figure 4.34: Confusion matrix for 2012 other network
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Figure 4.35: Continuous risk for 2012 other section
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and 90% risk and 16 accidents occur above 90%. Furthermore, 16 of the 23
accidents occur when the continuous risk profile is positive.
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Figure 4.36: Predicted continuous risk for 2013 other section
4.4.3.5 Other networks summary
From looking at the figures of the continuous risk profiles of the four other
networks along with their predictions, the 2011 network appears to be the best
network and the 2010 network appears to be the worst network. This agrees
with the network training error for the 2010 network which had the worst
network error which was 40.2%, however, the 2011 network had the third best
training error of the other networks which was 24.2%. Furthermore, from a
statistical point of view the same conclusions cannot be drawn. Tables 4.18
and 4.19 are a summary of the statistics from the other networks. Both tables
present the year of the data used in the network on the top x-axis and for each
of these, the network used, network error, number of accidents, percentage of
outlying accidents, percentage of accidents occurring at a risk between 80%
and 90%, percentage of accidents occurring at a risk between 90% and 100%
and the percentage of accidents that occurred when the continuous risk profile
is positive is shown. Table 4.18 presents the values for the risk profiles with
the data used in training the networks and Table 4.19 presents the values for
the predicted risk profiles.
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Table 4.18: Summary of other networks
2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Network 2009 2010 2011 2012
Network training % error 20.2% 40.2% 24.2% 17.2% 25.5%
Number of accidents 33 18 11 17 20
% outliers 12.12% 11.11% 9.09% 0.00% 8.08%
% between 80% and 90% 81.82% 83.33% 81.82% 41.18% 72.04%
% between 90% and 100% 6.06% 5.56% 9.09% 58.82% 19.88%
% with positive gradient 60.61% 61.11% 90.91% 76.47% 72.28%
Table 4.19: Summary of other networks predictions
2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Network 2009 2010 2011 2012
Network training % error 20.2% 40.2% 24.2% 17.2% 25.5%
Number of accidents 18 11 17 23 17
% outliers 16.67% 0.00% 17.65% 13.04% 11.84%
% between 80% and 90% 83.33% 72.73% 5.88% 17.39% 44.83%
% between 90% and 100% 0.00% 27.27% 76.47% 69.57% 43.33%
% with positive gradient 61.11% 54.55% 47.06% 69.57% 58.07%
From Tables 4.18 and 4.19 it can be seen that the 2010 and 2012 net-
works are the better networks with respect to having the lowest percentage of
outlying accidents, despite the 2010 network having the worst training error.
Furthermore, the 2012 network has very high percentages for accidents occur-
ring while the continuous risk profile has a positive gradient, thus for the other
section, statistically it appears that the 2012 network is the best. The average
percentage of accidents occurring while the continuous risk profile is positive
for the trained networks is 72.28% which is higher than that of the engineer-
ing trained networks and for the predictive networks the average percentage
of accidents occurring while the continuous risk profile is positive is 58.07%
which is lower than that of the engineering predictive networks and thus again
it appears that the gradient of the risk profile is a warning signal in addition
to the actual risk value. Next, a sensitivity analysis is performed for all the
networks and they are compared.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. TRAINING AND VALIDATION OF THE MODEL 141
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the sensitivity analysis was per-
formed in three steps, firstly the mean values of each input attribute is calcu-
lated, next the network output for these mean inputs is computed and lastly,
one input attribute at a time is varied to its maximum and minimum values
and the network output is computed for each scenario. This resulted in 17
network outputs computed for each network, Table 4.20 presents the network
output values for all the variations for the four engineering, four other and
four underground networks, along with the mean values, as well as maxima
and minima amongst the networks.
From Table 4.20, it can be seen that the average output for the networks
range between 40% and 100% and the average over all the networks created is
77.5%. Furthermore, looking at all the other scenarios, the maximum and min-
imum outputs over all the networks ranges a lot, however, all the mean values
appear to be in a similar range. Figure 4.37 presents a box and whiskers plot
of the outputs from the sensitivity analysis for each input variable. The solid
black line is the average network output line, then for each box, the whiskers
represents the maximum and minimum outputs across all the networks, the
top of the box represents the maximum average output per input attribute
and the bottom of the box represents the minimum average output per input
attribute and lastly, the mean value of each box is the mean value between the
maximum and minimum average values per attribute.
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Figure 4.37: Sensitivity analysis for all networks created
From Figure 4.37, by ignoring the whiskers and only looking at the boxes,
from the averages it appears that the production rate, humidity and time
into the shift appear to have the largest influence on the networks output.
Furthermore, it appears that the time of day and rainfall have the smallest
influence on the networks output. Due to the underground networks not being
useful because of the risk constantly staying above 80%, if the underground
networks are omitted from the box and whiskers plot, this will result in a new
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box and whiskers plot as can be seen in Figure 4.38. From Figure 4.38, again
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Figure 4.38: Sensitivity analysis for engineering and other sections
it can be seen that humidity, time into shift and production rate appear to
have the largest influence in the output and again the rain and time of day
appear to have the smallest influence over the continuous risk output.
4.6 Validation of Network Split
From the engineering networks section above it was identified that the 2011
engineering network was the best network. In order to identify why a network
was created each year, rather than one generic network, the 2011 network,
being the best engineering network, was used to predict the continuous risk
profile for every year from 2009 to 2013 along with the accidents for each year
overlaid onto the figures. As was expected, the 2011 engineering network pre-
dicted the accidents in 2011 and 2012 very well with only one outlying accident
in each year. However, going forward to 2013, the network was conservative
and the risk stayed above 80% the majority of the year and there were no
outlying accidents and going backward in time, the continuous risk profile gets
progressively worse. In 2010, the continuous risk profile varies largely and
there are eight outlying accidents, and then in 2009, it gets even worse and
there are 16 outlying accidents. Figures 4.39 to 4.43 present these outputs
from 2009 to 2013 respectively.
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Figure 4.39: Engineering 2011 network predicting 2009 risk
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Figure 4.40: Engineering 2011 network predicting 2010 risk
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Figure 4.41: Engineering 2011 network predicting 2011 risk
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Figure 4.42: Engineering 2011 network predicting 2012 risk
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. TRAINING AND VALIDATION OF THE MODEL 146
 
 
Jan 13 Apr 13 Jul 13 Oct 13
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Continuous Risk
Fatal Injury
Serious Injury
Lost Time Injury
Medical Treatment Case
Figure 4.43: Engineering 2011 network predicting 2013 risk
Similarly, for the other sections, the 2012 network which was identified
as the best network amongst the other sections networks was run with data
for every year from 2009 to 2013. Yet again, this network worked well for
2012 with no outlying accidents and it predicted 2013 fairly well with only
three outlying accidents. However, going back in time the continuous risk
profiles get progressively worse. Predicting the 2011 continuous risk profile
yields three outlying accidents, for the 2010 continuous risk profile there are
six outlying accidents and for the 2009 continuous risk profile there are 16
outlying accidents. Figures 4.44 to 4.48 presents the plots of the continuous
risk profiles along with the actual accidents from 2009 to 2013 respectively.
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Figure 4.44: Other 2012 network predicting 2009 risk
 
 
Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Continuous Risk
Serious Injury
Lost Time Injury
Medical Treatment Case
Figure 4.45: Other 2012 network predicting 2010 risk
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Figure 4.46: Other 2012 network predicting 2011 risk
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Figure 4.47: Other 2012 network predicting 2012 risk
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Figure 4.48: Other 2012 network predicting 2013 risk
From Figures 4.39 to 4.48 it can be seen that the networks are suited best
for the year they are trained and the following year, and not for any other
year. Table 4.21 and 4.22 present the statistics from these plots. Table 4.21
shows that the 2011 engineering network is best suited for 2011 and 2012, with
the lowest percentage of outliers, and highest percentage accidents occurring
while the continuous risk profile is positive while the rest had a large range.
Similarly, Table 4.22 shows that the 2012 other network is best suited for 2012
and 2013, with the lowest percentage of outlying accidents.
Table 4.21: Summary of statistics from engineering 2011 network run over all
five years
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of accidents 39 20 20 19 19
Minimum risk 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 37.00%
Maximum risk 99.00% 98.00% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% outliers 48.72% 40.00% 5.00% 5.26% 0.00%
% between 80% and 90% 41.03% 50.00% 45.00% 63.16% 57.89%
% between 90% and 100% 10.26% 10.00% 50.00% 31.58% 42.11%
% with positive gradient 51.28% 40.00% 80.00% 68.42% 52.63%
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Table 4.22: Summary of statistics from other 2012 network run over all five
years
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of accidents 33 18 11 17 23
Minimum risk 25.00% 28.00% 30.00% 44.00% 44.00%
Maximum risk 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% outliers 48.48% 33.33% 27.27% 0.00% 13.04%
% between 80% and 90% 30.30% 50.00% 54.55% 41.18% 17.39%
% between 90% and 100% 21.21% 16.67% 18.18% 58.82% 69.57%
% with positive gradient 54.55% 61.11% 63.64% 64.71% 65.22%
From the discussion so far, it can be confirmed why a network is needed
for each year that can be used to predict the following year and not just one
generic network which can be used indefinitely. Furthermore, from the results
it is identified that it is not possible to draw any significant conclusions about
the underground section of the mine due to the fact that the underground
section is constantly at a high risk of having an accident. Next, the use of the
model is discussed.
4.7 Use of the Model
Now that the model has been trained and validated, the method of how the
model is intended to be used can be discussed. Firstly, the inputs into the
future obviously will not be known, thus the entire years continuous risk pro-
file cannot be pre-determined as it was in the training and validation of the
networks above. However, educated estimates of the next weeks or months,
temperatures, humidity, rainfall and production rates can be identified and run
through the model in order to output the next weeks or months risk profile.
The further into the future the inputs are estimated, the larger the chance of
error. For example, assuming the date is the 1st March 2012, the next weeks
production is estimated to be at 75% of its maximum and the weather forecast
predicts the following weather conditions for the week as seen in Table 4.23.
These conditions are manipulated according to the normalised continuous
approximations identified in the third chapter and then run through the engi-
neering, other, and underground networks for 2011, however, the networks can
continuously be updated on a monthly basis, always using the previous twelve
months of accident data for training. For the purpose of this example, the
2011 networks will be used. After the weeks estimated data is normalised, it is
run through the three networks, the output is plotted and the actual accidents
are included for reference. Firstly Figure 4.49 presents the weeks continuous
risk profile for the engineering section, it shows the risk on the first of March is
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Table 4.23: Estimated weather conditions
Max Temp Min Temp Humidity Rain
1st March 2012 31 19 81 yes
2nd March 2012 32 19 65 no
3rd March 2012 33 16 59 no
4th March 2012 37 14 47 no
5th March 2012 37 19 48 no
6th March 2012 30 20 63 no
7th March 2012 32 19 56 no
roughly at 98% and an accident did occur on the first of March, then the risk
progressively declines until the fourth of March, then it increases again until
the sixth of March and then decreases slightly. From the plot it can be seen
that from the third to the sixth of March the risk is below 80% and thus not an
issue, furthermore, from the sixth to the seventh of March the continuous risk
gradient is negative as well as from the first of March to the fourth of march
and thus is not as much of an issue. Hence for the week predicted, the first
of March is of concern, as well as from the fifth to the sixth of March, which
is where the risk is above 80% and the continuous risk profile has a positive
gradient.
Next, the same is done with the other network. As can be seen in Figure
4.50, the risk is mainly below 80%, however, there are two peaks just above
80% that the other sections need to be cautious of. In reality, no accidents
occurred in this week for the other section.
Lastly, the same was done with the underground section. As can be seen
in Figure 4.51, the risk is constantly above 80%, which identifies that caution
needs to be taken the entire week in the underground section. In reality, one
accident occurred in this week on the second of March.
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Figure 4.49: Engineering 2011 network predicting weeks estimated risk
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Figure 4.50: Other 2011 network predicting weeks estimated risk
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Figure 4.51: Underground 2011 network predicting weeks estimated risk
4.8 Chapter 4 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion from this chapter, it has been proven that the individual net-
works per year are more applicable than one general network which can be
used indefinitely. Furthermore, from splitting the data into three sections, the
underground section is identified to be at constant risk of an accident and
thus the underground networks are not useful for identifying periods of high
risk and low risk, however, the networks for the engineering section and other
section appear to work well at highlighting periods of higher risk and lower
risk with good correlation to the accidents that actually occurred.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This chapter serves the purpose of bringing closure to the research and to
summarise the entirety of this thesis. This is achieved through an overview of
the thesis, followed by the limitations encountered during the research, then
some recommendations for future research in this field are discussed and lastly
this study is concluded. The intention of this chapter is to deliver a complete
overview of the study conducted and understand the limitations that prevented
certain results, as well as to identify the possibilities for future research by
identifying areas for improvement.
5.2 Overview
In chapter one, the research idea of estimating the continuous risk of accidents
occurring in the South African mining industry is introduced. This is then
backed up with a background of information regarding mine safety and the
risks attached to mining. Furthermore, the proposed research is defined in the
form of a problem statement to keep the focus of the research, delimitations to
give the research bounds and research objectives to follow in order to keep on
track and reach the final result of accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis.
Chapter two takes the form of a literature study, which starts by exploring
safety and risk in general, then factors that influence accidents are explored
and lastly five modelling techniques are studied and compared. Chapter three
follows with presenting the proposed model as a solution to the problem state-
ment. This is followed by an in depth look at the mathematics behind the
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), after which the data obtained to use for
this model is analysed and sorted for use in the model.
Lastly, chapter four covers the method as well as the practical aspects
of training the model and validating the model, followed by the results and
discussion of the outputs. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of the network
inputs is performed, and a section is included on how the model is intended
to be used. Next, the limitations of the research are discussed.
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5.3 Limitations
A vital portion of any research is the limitations that are identified during
the study. These limitations need to be understood in order to find a way to
perform the research around them. The development, training and validation
of the model to estimate the continuous risk of accidents occurring came across
several limitations which are listed below.
G With occupational accidents, it is statutory to record multiple factors re-
garding the accident, thus with respect to the accident data, it is abun-
dant and very detailed. This is very useful for training the model in
great detail which Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) can handle. How-
ever, a large portion of these factors are either not measured or unable
to be measured on a continuous time basis. These factors cannot be
used in the model due to the fact that the continuous risk profile predic-
tion requires them on a continuous scale. Furthermore, the more factors
that are included, the more specific the model becomes, and eventually
a model will be required per person, instead of per mining section.
G With the improvements of safety initiatives over the years as well as the
complex interactions of various factors that influence accidents changing,
a single network is not sufficient to be used to estimate the continuous
risk profile indefinitely. Thus in this research, it was chosen to create a
network for each year, which was only used to predict its own year and the
next year, however, a rolling year would be another possible option, were
the network is updated every month always using the previous twelve
months accident data and always predicting one month in advance.
G Due to the high risk nature of the work performed by the miners in the
underground section of the mine, the model output was a continuous risk
profile above 80%, indicating a permanent risk. Although this is correct,
it provides no useful information to the underground section with respect
to when they are working in a safe zone or not.
G Despite all the factors measured regarding an accident, the variability
from human behaviour is unmeasured and has an unpredictable nature.
Thus even the best generalised model has the potential to miss accidents
as well as predict high risk periods when no accidents actually occur.
G ANN make use of random starting points with the training examples
as well as for the splitting of the examples into training, validation and
testing. Thus every time the network is retrained, a network independent
of the previous network is produced. Therefore, it is possible to settle
on a sub-optimum network.
These limitations were overcome and worked around during the process of this
research and despite these limitations valid results were obtained. The next
section presents recommendations if further research were to be completed in
this field of study.
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5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
Despite the research objectives being met, there are still areas for improvement.
Ideas of improvement areas were noted during the course of this study and this
section discusses suggestions that can contribute in improving and adding to
this research by means of further research. There are three primary areas
where further research can be beneficial.
G As was noted in the limitations, very few influential factors were used
in the model due to the availability of data of many of the accidents.
A recommendation is made to research more factors that influence acci-
dents, as well as to identify and promote methods of measuring many of
these factors on a continuous time basis. This may prove tremendously
valuable in creating a more accurate model to estimate the continuous
risk of accidents occurring.
G A more detailed literature study can be performed on the probabilities
linking the influencing factors to the inputs to the networks. By mak-
ing use of global statistics and using accident information from multiple
industries could possibly prove more accurate than creating the proba-
bilities from the histograms of the actual accidents, furthermore, it could
make the model more robust and aid generalisation.
G A limitation was noted that settling on a suitable network is not always
possible, and thus a research possibility would be to determine a method
that ensures an optimal network is always selected when training the
ANN.
All of the recommendations for further research stated above are propositions
to advance and progress the research conducted.
5.5 Conclusion
Grimaldi and Simonds (1989) state that not all injuries can be prevented,
since they are unpredictable in nature and that accidents do occur at times
for reasons that are unpredictable. However, occupational injuries can be
brought down to irreducible minimums. The challenge is to identify were the
minimum is that no more can be done. This study attempted to assist in
highlighting high risk time periods, were caution can be taken in order to
reduce the accidents occurring.
As was identified in the previous chapter, the model produced worked well
at estimating the continuous risk of accidents occurring across all sections of
the mine, however, the results for the engineering section and other section
were more useful and the results from the underground section were not as
useful due to the risk constantly being above 80%. With this in mind, the null
hypothesis can be rejected and it can be said that this study was successful
at creating a model which can be used to estimate the continuous risk of
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accidents occurring in the South African mining industry. Furthermore, if the
recommendations for future research are performed and added to this research,
the potential of the model to estimate the continuous risk of accidents occurring
will increase with the models accuracy increasing as well.
It can be confirmed that at the completion of this study all the research
objectives listed in the first chapter have been achieved.
1. Relevant literature was studied and a comprehensive understanding of
occupational safety was attained.
2. Relevant literature was studied and various existing forecasting tech-
niques were explored and compared.
3. Relevant literature was studied and contributing factors that influence
accidents were identified.
4. The contributing factors that influence accidents were quantified through
a data analysis of the accident data received.
5. The sensitivity of the contributing factors that influence accidents was
achieved after the networks were trained and validated.
6. A model for estimating the continuous risk of accidents occurring was
established.
In closing, this study was successful in estimating the continuous risk of
accidents occurring based on data from the South African platinum mining
industry, however, due to the versatility of retraining the ANN, the model can
easily be adapted and tested in different heavy industrial and labour intensive
industries.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Back-Propagation
Rule
This presents the derivation of the back-propagation weight tuning rule. When
updating each weight for each training example d,
wij,new = wij,current + ∆wij
where:
∆wij = −η ∂Ed
∂wij
(A.1.1)
where:
Ed(~w) ≡ 1
2
∑
k∈Outputs
(tk − ok)2
where:
Outputs is the set of output nodes in the network.
tk is the target value of node k for training example d.
ok is the output value of node k for training example d.
The following notation is used below for the rest of the derivation,
xij Õ the jth input to node i.
wij Õ the weight associated with the jth input to node i.
neti Õ
∑
iwijxij (the weighted sum of all inputs for node i).
oi Õ the output computed by node i.
ti Õ the target output of node i.
σ Õ the sigmoid function.
Outputs Õ the set of nodes in the final layer of the network.
A-1
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Downstream(i) Õ the set of nodes whose immediate inputs include the
output of node i.
Firstly,
∂Ed
∂wij
=
∂Ed
∂neti
∂neti
∂wij
(A.1.2)
=
∂Ed
∂neti
xij (A.1.3)
because the weight wij can only influence the rest of the network through neti.
Now, a convenient expression for ∂Ed
∂neti
is required. In order to do this, two
cases need to be considered, firstly, when node i is an output node and sec-
ondly when node i is an internal node.
Case 1 – Training Rule for Output Node Weights
Similar to wij only influencing the rest of the network through neti, neti can
only influence the network through oi. Therefore,
∂Ed
∂neti
=
∂Ed
∂oi
∂oi
∂neti
(A.1.4)
Focussing just on the first term in Equation A.1.4,
∂Ed
∂oi
=
∂
∂oi
1
2
∑
k∈Outputs
(tk − ok)2
Since the derivatives of ∂
∂oi
(tk−ok)2 will be zero for all outputs nodes k except
when k = i. Thus the summation can be dropped and k = i. Therefore,
∂Ed
∂oi
=
∂
∂oi
1
2
(ti − oi)2 (A.1.5)
=
1
2
2(ti − oi)∂(ti − oi)
∂oi
(A.1.6)
= −(ti − oi) (A.1.7)
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Next, focussing on the second term in Equation A.1.4, since oi = σ(neti), the
derivative ∂oi
∂neti
is just the derivative of the sigmoid function. Therefore,
∂oi
∂neti
=
∂σ(neti)
∂neti
(A.1.8)
=
∂
∂neti
(
1
1 + e−neti
)
(A.1.9)
=
e−neti
(1 + e−neti)2
(A.1.10)
=
1 + e−neti − 1
(1 + e−neti)2
(A.1.11)
=
1
1 + e−neti
− 1
(1 + e−neti)2
(A.1.12)
= σ(neti)− σ(neti)2 (A.1.13)
= σ(neti)(1− σ(neti)) (A.1.14)
= oi(1− oi) (A.1.15)
Substituting A.1.7 and A.1.15 into A.1.4,
∂Ed
∂neti
= −(ti − oi)oi(1− oi) (A.1.16)
Combing A.1.16 with A.1.3 and A.1.1,
∆wij = −η ∂Ed
∂wij
= η(ti − oi)oi(1− oi)xij (A.1.17)
From this it can be seen that δk = − ∂Ed∂netk .
Case 2 – Training Rule for Hidden Node Weights
As stated before Downstream(i) refers to the set of all nodes immediately
downstream of node i. Noting that neti can only influence the network out-
puts through the nodes downstream of i. Therefore,
∂Ed
∂neti
=
∑
k∈Downstream(i)
∂Ed
∂netk
∂netk
∂neti
=
∑
k∈Downstream(i)
−δk ∂netk
∂neti
=
∑
k∈Downstream(i)
−δk ∂netk
∂oi
∂oi
∂neti
=
∑
k∈Downstream(i)
−δkwki ∂oi
∂neti
=
∑
k∈Downstream(i)
−δkwkioi(1− oi)
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Therefore,
δi = − ∂Ed
∂neti
= oi(1− oi)
∑
k∈Downstream(i)
δkwki
and
∆wij = ηδixij
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Appendix B
Confusion Matrix Calculations
A confusion matrix is a specific table layout that allows visualisation of per-
formance. Each column represents the instances in a true class, and each row
represents the instance in a predicted class. Figure B.1 shows the layout of the
typical confusion matrix. The two classes that can be classified are ‘X’ and
‘Y’.
X Y
PPV
1-PPV
NPV
1-NPV
TPR TNR OA
1-TPR 1-TNR 1-OA
True 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
C DY
A BX
Figure B.1: Generic confusion matrix
In the confusion matrix, the positions are labelled as follows:
A is the true positive
B is the false positive
C is the false negative
D is the true negative
B-1
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From this, it can be seen that A and D indicate correct classification and B
and C indicate misclassification. All values in the confusion matrix can be
in number format or percentage format, as long as it is consistent. Using the
definitions above, seven calculations can be performed on the confusion matrix.
Firstly, the True Positive Rate (TPR), which is also known as the ‘sensi-
tivity’, is calculated as follows,
TPR =
A
A + C
(B.1.1)
Secondly, the True Negative Rate (TNR), which is also known as the ‘speci-
ficity’, is calculated as follows,
TNR =
D
B + D
(B.1.2)
Next, the Positive Predictive Value (PPV) is calculated as follows,
PPV =
A
A + B
(B.1.3)
Next, the Negative Predictive Value (NPV) is calculated as follows,
NPV =
D
C + D
(B.1.4)
Then, the average accuracy is calculated as follows,
Avg. Accuracy =
TPR + TNR
2
(B.1.5)
Then, the average reliability is calculated as follows,
Avg. Reliability =
PPV + NPV
2
(B.1.6)
Lastly, the overall accuracy is calculated as follows,
OA =
A + D
A + B + C + D
(B.1.7)
The confusion matrix is not bound to classification of only two classes, it can
be expanded to multiple class classification.
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